CHAPTER 5.

LOGISTICS

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INTRODUCTION

In military usage, logistics includes the critical functions of procuring, storing, and distributing supplies. It also includes maintenance, medical services, and transportation. Military supplies include food, water, general supplies, fuel and oil, building materials, ammunition, major end items like weapons and vehicles, medical supplies, and repair parts. As an insurgent or revolutionary movement grows—and particularly as it develops a guerilla component—the underground must acquire the skills to manage logistical support.

Logistical operations are required to meet the materiel demands of both the underground and the guerrilla forces. Because underground workers are generally engaged in civilian occupations, they are usually able to provide their own basic supplies of food, clothing, and medicines. What they need are operational supplies—printing equipment, paper, ink, radios, and sabotage implements. Guerrilla logistical needs, including food, clothing, medicines, arms, and munitions, are both basic and operational, and these forces have usually relied in part on underground logistical operations to provide such supplies.

In practice, logistical functions are shared by both the underground and the auxiliary. Specific procedures vary according to the context of each insurgency or resistance, but in general the auxiliary handles routine logistics—especially food, water, and fuel—while the underground often takes on the more difficult task of procuring and distributing large-caliber ammunition or other special supplies. The underground personnel generally plan and supervise logistical functions, relying on the auxiliary personnel when possible.

PROCUREMENT

Purchases

Black Market

Undergrounds sometimes purchase supplies on the black market—from persons who own or have access to certain goods and who are willing to sell or trade those goods in spite of legal restrictions. For instance, some workers in an Italian anti-Fascist underground had the specific assignment of bartering with a black market sponsored by some young Fascists. This market flourished during a period when the

demand for staple goods was very high. Reportedly, 220 pounds of salt could be exchanged for an excellent machine gun.

The experiences of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) are instructive regarding how insurgencies obtain weapons, ammunition, and other supplies. The quartermaster general, a member of the PIRA leadership council, had the duty of procuring, transporting, and storing weapons. The quartermaster often had regional quartermasters. Weapons were strictly controlled. Bunkers provided storage, and weapons were supposed to be dispensed solely for operations. In some areas, small numbers of weapons were held by the local service units for guard duty or small operations, but on the whole the disciplined control of arms was maintained.

The lack of arms for defense was one of the major dissatisfactions with the original IRA leadership in 1969 that led to the breakaway Provisional movement. Therefore, arms were in short supply during the early years, and the leaders concentrated much of their initial efforts on pressuring the Republican-leaning movement for cash and arms. Firearms were restricted in Northern Ireland, so the Provisionals knew they had to establish a major flow into the country from outside sources. Early in the campaign, mines and explosives were also in short supply for the PIRA. Gelignite was stolen from local mines to make the first explosives, and then fertilizers were used until the arrival of Semtex from Libya. The success of the British army's defusing capability, however, led the group to move from simple timers to more complex detonation devices that included anti-handling features. The PIRA also introduced the car bomb, which allowed a larger explosive charge and a more discreet and safer emplacement as well as the ability to command detonations using remote-control transmitters.

The eventual flow of arms into Northern Command operational areas arrived mostly via Southern Command routes, which included safe houses, staff offices, caches, storage, and transportation. PIRA members were sent abroad to the United States to collect money and any arms they could get. By 1972, shipments of military machine guns were arriving from the United States. Soon thereafter, multiple types of arms and explosives started to flow from Libya. One network alone shipped hundreds of light, collapsible, concealable ArmaLite rifles during the 1970s. The British security forces confiscated more than 700 weapons, 2 tons of explosives, and more than 150,000 rounds of ammunition in 1971 alone, most of which came from the United States. The fortunes of the PIRA later depended on the relationship they established with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 1972. The head of Libya saw himself as a catalyst for revolutionary movements around the world and agreed to meet with an IRA representative. Although shipments began

to flow to Dublin in 1973, they were often interdicted in high-profile seizures. The *Claudia* was boarded by Irish authorities to reveal that the IRA was willing to accept large amounts of money and weapons from the state-sponsor. This was followed by the *Eksund*, which was captured by French authorities on November 1, 1987, with over 150 tons of armaments: 1,000 AK-47s, 1 million rounds of ammunition, 430 grenades, 12 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 12 machine guns, more than 50 SA-7 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), 2,000 electric detonators, 4,700 fuses, 106-mm cannons, anti-tank missiles, and 2 tons of Semtex.[1]

Black market weapons have seriously impacted sub-Saharan Africa and aggravated conflicts throughout the continent. Insurgencies, along with other state and non-state actors, have multiplied armed conflicts across the African continent since the 1960s, often on the shoulders of illegal arms merchants, who in turn profit from selling small arms and other munitions to all sides in a conflict. Africa leads the world in the number of armed conflicts, and in every case these wars have been exacerbated by illegally trafficked arms—weapons that have claimed over 7 million lives on the continent. The devastation wrought by arms merchants in Africa contributes to the epidemic of displaced persons, crimes against humanity, and the perpetuation of societal violence that spawns radicalization among war-ravaged youth. Illegal arms trafficking sustains conflicts in Angola, Burundi, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC), Djibouti, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria-Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania-Zanzibar, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Insurgents operating in weak or failed states in Africa sometimes purchase arms using stolen or otherwise misappropriated noncash resources such as diamonds, gemstones, ivory, and oil. Examples include the Congolese Liberation Front (FLC), the Mai Mai militia groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. International efforts aimed at curbing the use of such resources for purchasing weapons have enjoyed only modest success, and the practice continues to flourish.

Porous borders, weak international regulation, and poorly administered trans-shipment points help the illegal arms market in Africa thrive. The failure to enforce United Nations' sanctions and embargoes leaves insurgent undergrounds relatively free to purchase arms at will. Traffickers who routinely violate such measures are rarely prosecuted, and the banks and other financial institutions that facilitate illegal arms sales generally do so with impunity. The combination of these factors tends to strengthen insurgencies, lengthen conflicts, and increase the price paid by regional noncombatants.[2]

Legal Market

Semi-finished items for manufacturing may often be purchased by undergrounds from legal firms. In most cases, this is done through a front organization that has a valid need for these items. In a similar manner, agents working in open societies in support of insurgent movements may openly purchase arms, ammunition, foodstuffs, medical supplies, and other needed items, normally through some front organization or nongovernmental group. The supplies are then surreptitiously transported to insurgent agents within the subject country through smuggling operations—by land, sea, or air.

In World War II Poland, the Home Army bought large quantities of artificial fertilizer from two German-controlled factories at Chorzow and Moscice through agricultural cooperatives and individual farmers. From this fertilizer, the underground extracted saltpeter for use in explosives. Conversely, in 2011, problems arose from a large flow of fertilizer from Pakistan into Afghanistan. This flow fed into improvised explosive device (IED) production facilities in Afghanistan, creating significant bilateral tension between the United States and Pakistan and leading to proposed measures to alter the composition of the fertilizer or to better track the sale and final disposition of the fertilizer.

BATTLEFIELD RECOVERY

Since ancient times, irregular forces have relied on battlefield recovery in order to supply their soldiers with arms and ammunition. Guerrilla warfare most often features irregular forces performing ambushes and raids against isolated conventional forces and then rapidly withdrawing. But the purpose behind such maneuvers often includes securing the battlefield long enough to confiscate whatever arms, ammunition, and other supplies the defeated forces left behind. Indeed, history provides many examples of underequipped armies sending men into battle without weapons for the purpose of arming them from the defeated opponents. Modern insurgencies likewise seek to obtain vehicles, communications equipment, food, medical supplies, and other items from their clashes with government military and police forces.

Thefts

Secret Confiscations

Supplies may be removed secretly from plants and warehouses by workers who are sympathetic to the insurgency. Italian workers during

World War II were able to supply the underground with some radios that were pilfered from stocks in their factories. The risk in this method was great, however, because inventories were taken regularly, and, perhaps more significantly, such confiscations could not be counted on to produce a steady supply of goods. The problem of inventory checks can be avoided, however, if office clerks are able to account for losses by forging orders and invoices, altering bookkeeping records, etc. This was done by Polish workers in two large pharmaceutical plants in Warsaw to cover the transfer of 5,400 kilograms of urotropine to the Home Army for use in explosives. Recent internal confiscations of authentic South African passports and their reappearance on captured or killed Islamic insurgents in East Africa have raised concerns in Europe and the United States and led to new visa requirements for visitors from South Africa.

Raid

Among the earliest activities of a growing insurgency are raids to acquire supplies and equipment. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC) in Colombia began by raiding farms to obtain foodstuffs and later began attacking small military outposts or patrols for the primary purpose of taking weapons, clothing, communications equipment, and ammunition.

Raids are often made on warehouses or other storage centers. In France during World War II, the manager of one warehouse was awakened by twelve masked resistance members who forced him to hand over his keys. There were trucks in the courtyard and 200 men ready to load them. A total of 38 tons of coats, sweaters, shoes, radios, and typewriters were taken. Many such raids were carried out in France after resistance workers established "understandings" with sympathetic warehouse employees.

After the Japanese evacuated Vietnam, the Viet Minh rapidly moved into their former occupiers' bases to seize abandoned equipment and supplies. In some cases, the insurgents had no training in how to use what they took, but they gradually trained themselves, sometimes aided by Chinese Communists.

In El Salvador, looting from the military and even simple recovery from abandoned military, police, and civil facilities were also effective means of acquiring needed supplies. By 1983, attacks on isolated army bases had increased so much that the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or FMLN) "guerillas could make credible claims that most of their

weapons, including even mortars and other artillery pieces, came from the United States by way of captured government troops."[3]

Likewise, the Maoist Shining Path insurgency in Peru and the Islamist Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria initially sustained themselves by raiding police stations and mining camps to collect weapons, explosives, and supplies.[4]

Manufacturing

Types of Manufactures

Undergrounds frequently engage in the manufacture of such items as mines, flamethrowers, hand grenades, incendiaries, explosives and detonators, boots, mosquito nets, waterproof ponchos, and hammocks. Rarely, however, are they able to turn out heavy equipment because of concealment problems. One exception occurred in France during the Nazi occupation, when workers in a steel mill of Clermont-Ferrand succeeded in constructing four crude tanks out of farm tractors and sheets of steel from the factory. The components were hidden separately inside the plant until they could be welded together and armed with 87-mm cannons and heavy machine guns.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka significantly altered the scope of their campaign against the government when they established a maritime capability that included high-speed boats manufactured for suicide operations against the Sri Lankan navy.[5]

Rural Manufacturing

The Viet Minh achieved a degree of safety in conducting their manufacturing in rural areas under nominal French control by using small, mobile workshops that could be moved from place to place to avoid French forays. The small size and simplicity of these shops aided their mobility—ten to fifteen workers generally were involved, and frequently manpower was the only source of energy. In spite of their crudeness, these shops were a major source of such items as mines and explosives.

Later, the Viet Cong employed the same procedures in their long struggle against the government of South Vietnam and their American allies. They would establish "jungle labs" in which they would convert captured military equipment and supplies into usable weapons and explosives.

Urban Manufacturing

An underground engaged in urban manufacturing has to use other means of avoiding the enemy. The Polish Army enlisted the services of

workers in legally licensed shops, especially metal shops, to manufacture small arms. Production was thus conducted more or less in the open, avoiding the difficulty of completely hiding its noise and bustle. For camouflage, arms were sometimes produced in shops that turned out similar-looking items. Hand grenades, commonly known as "*Sidelowski*" because they closely resembled the round cans of Sidel polish, were produced in the same place as the actual cans for the polish, and flamethrowers were made in a factory engaged in the manufacture of fire extinguishers.

In Palestine, the Jewish paramilitary force Haganah used the same basic technique in the 1920s and 1930s, with variations. They established their own shops in industrial sections to avoid attracting attention. These places were devoted primarily to illegal production, although legitimate items were often manufactured at the same time so that production could be switched to "civilian" orders in case of inspections. Posted lookouts were used to warn of the approach of inspectors. Each shop was restricted to the manufacture of parts, which were more easily concealed than the finished products. By bringing the components together only at a well-hidden assembly plant, the underground also avoided the possibility of a raid on a shop in which all of the skilled workers and important machines might be captured. A natural look was also maintained by having open offices, reception desks, and office books, which were subject to inspection by auditors and tax assessors. To further ensure secrecy, only a few men in the underground—those coordinating production—knew the locations and operational features of the shops. Shop workers were selected only after extensive security checks on their backgrounds; they were also encouraged to form their own social milieu and to limit contacts with outsiders in order to lessen opportunities for security leaks.

Urban manufacturing is not always restricted to shops with legal covers, however.

The Polish Home Army underground had some small shops that were completely hidden: false walls partitioned rooms and cellars and concealed the quarters of the shops. To conceal machine noise, these shops had to be constructed near places where legal goods were being manufactured. Thus, one was built near a mechanical mangle and another just above a welding shop. In addition, work that involved use of chemicals often had to be done at night so that no one would notice the special colors of smoke rising from the chimneys.

Collections from the Populace

Goods may be systematically collected from the population, although this requires a high degree of underground influence and freedom of action. In rural areas, food is often collected for guerrilla troops. This was done in Greece during World War II. The Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metapo (National Liberation Front, or EAM), through its "Guerrilla Commissariat," supported guerrillas through the levy of regular tithes of foodstuffs from the peasants whom it effectively controlled. In addition to these tithes, for which no payment was made, other foodstuffs were purchased at a scale of prices set by the underground.

To avoid being considered "bandit" organizations, undergrounds often make it a practice to give at least nominal payments or IOUs for goods requisitioned from peasants or other persons of modest means. Ernesto "Che" Guevara of the Cuban *Movimiento 26 de Julio* stated that the fundamental rule is to always pay for any goods taken from a friend. He also stated that when it is impossible to pay simply because of lack of money, one should always give a requisition or an IOU—something that certifies the debt.

Such consideration is not always shown, however; in Sierra Leone, RUF rebels often killed village leaders in order to send a warning to all of the villagers and then proceeded to take whatever food and provisions they desired.

Sendero Luminoso, the Maoist insurgency in Peru, was somewhat unique in that it subsisted almost entirely on support within the native population, eschewing requests for external patronage. The bulk of financial and logistical support for the highly secretive organization thus came from sympathizers within the largely indigenous, impoverished population, which in turn was pointedly separated from the senior leadership of the movement for security reasons. Sendero's ideology of championing the rights of their Indian constituents against the white, European-descended, imperialist government ensured loyalty and continued support.[6] The movement had to develop a unique sustainment concept to overcome the fact that the movement avoided external support. Their ability to operate freely in large sections of the Huallaga Valley simplified their internal lines of communication for logistics and re-supply. Logistical support for the insurgency was administered via a regional leader (commissar) who led a five-person committee that was charged with overall operational planning and execution for each region. Logistics support was generally provided by villagers, either voluntarily or through coercion, as well as a small cadre of trained and specialized logistics personnel who provided weapons and ammunition. Local villagers would routinely be directed to hide

ammunition or other contraband items, with their compliance motivated either positively, by ideological and emotional support for the cause, or negatively, by fear of violence and even death.[7]

External Means

Support from Foreign Governments

Operational and logistical demands can sometimes overcome an insurgency's desire for self-sufficiency and independence from external influence. The New People's Army in the Philippines during the Ferdinand Marcos presidency was designed from the start to be self-sufficient. As the insurgency became more complex, however, the logistics requirements became greater. During 1971, the Communist Party of the Philippines established a permanent delegation in Beijing to coordinate support from the Chinese government.[8] The FMLN in El Salvador could not have sustained its insurgency without external support from the Soviet Union and Cuba, to include Soviet-produced man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), such as the SA-7 and SA-14, and the post-war disarmament of over 10,000 weapons, 9,000 grenades, and 4 million rounds of ammunition, in addition to the 9,500 antipersonnel land mines laid by the insurgents.[9]

Foreign governments may combine direct support of insurgencies with clandestine measures to produce and supply nonattributable goods to client movements. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operating in Iraq after the 2003 American invasion used this method to provide Shiite militias with materials to produce improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This practice gives the sponsor some degree of deniability and is of particular concern when combined with the potential for supplying weapons of mass destruction.

Import Firms

An underground may use businesses engaged in foreign trade to import equipment under noncontraband labels, as occurred during Haganah activities. A textile firm, for example, might order textile machinery, and delivery would be in arms-producing machinery or arms parts. Payment to the firm would be made for goods or services supposedly received, thus keeping all financial records in good order. In 2010, a similar scenario emerged when thirteen shipping containers labeled "building supplies" were seized in the Nigerian port of Lagos and found to be packed with rocket launchers, mortars, explosives, and ammunition. Authorities remained unsure of whether the weapons—originally shipped from Iran—were destined for internal insurgent groups, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

(MEND) or Boko Haram, or whether the weapons were en route to Gaza via West Africa.

Parachute Drops

Supplies may also be obtained from a sponsoring government through parachute drops. Probably the most familiar instance of this type of operation is the drops that the French resistance received from Great Britain's Royal Air Force. Sophisticated radio liaison was necessary in order to work out the details of the drops. Such matters as agreement on drop-zone locations, the exact times of the drops, and ground-to-air recognition signals had to be coordinated in advance. After the drops, which usually took place at night, resistance personnel stored the goods in caches near the drop zone so they could leave the scene immediately and without incriminating evidence. Special liaison agents from abroad were often used to help execute these complex arrangements.

Wartime Equipment

Wartime stores of equipment sometimes provide a postwar source of supplies. For example, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was able to provide guerrillas after World War II with many arms cached during the war. These were arms originally received in air drops from the British for use against the Japanese. By claiming that many drops were lost, the Communists received extra drops, and only these extra arms were returned to the British authorities after the war. The rest remained in caches and were finally used during the "Emergency."

The beginning of the Kosovar uprising in 1997 was greatly facilitated by the collapse of the government in neighboring Albania that same year and the immediate, open access that the Kosovars, who were ethnic Albanians, gained to the ammunition and weapons depots in Albania.[10] In 2011, the revolution in Libya and the eventual demise of the Gaddafi regime resulted in the proliferation of advanced weaponry into the Sahel and Maghreb regions of Africa and the reported acquisition of Libyan weapons stores by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) insurgents.[11] Perhaps most concerning was the experience in Sierra Leone and the Niger Delta, where RUF and MEND insurgents, respectively, were found to have acquired weapons that were sold by Nigerian soldiers, to include African Union (AU) peacekeeping soldiers who were actively engaged in operations against the RUF and six members of the Nigerian security forces who sold 7,000 military assault rifles, sub-machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades worth $1 million to Niger Delta militants.[12]

Transportation by Vehicles

It is often necessary to ship contraband by trucks, in which case a number of devices may be used to hide the cargoes and avoid arousing suspicion. Arms destined by the Haganah for caches in agricultural regions were often hidden in farming implements that were being taken to these places, while consignments to urban areas were frequently put in compressors, gas cylinders, asphalt sprayers, and other industrial pieces. During the orange season, truck cargoes were sometimes covered with layers of oranges, which would roll into any hole made while the cargo was being inspected. Illegal cargoes were also concealed by tarpaulins covered with fertilizer, preferably with a disagreeable odor. The chances were that policemen, well-dressed and polished, would not insist on a full inspection of such cargo. Another device was the use of trucks of well-known firms such as breweries, whose products were shipped everywhere and in great quantity. These usually escaped suspicion. Underground members dressed as policemen and driving motorcycles sometimes escorted heavy truckloads under the very "auspices of the law." Trucks even succeeded in joining British military convoys, often traveling hundreds of miles and passing many roadblocks with no check at all. It was necessary, of course, to make telephone calls and inform commanders of roadblocks that two or three lorries from another unit had been added.

The New People's Army in the Philippines established a complex intra-island and inter-island network tied to small boats called bancas. Bancas were extensively used for fishing and legitimate island trade, and it was almost impossible to distinguish an NPA banca from another banca. Moreover, the Philippine security forces lacked the brown water navy and patrol boat structure to effectively secure the thousands of miles of navigable waterways. During the three decades of active insurgent operations by the NPA, only limited logistics shipments were ever interdicted by Philippine security forces. Waterways were effectively conceded to the NPA.[13]

By Foot and on Animals

Because guerrilla bases are usually in remote areas that are difficult to access, the transport of supplies to guerrillas has usually not been mechanized. In German-occupied Greece, for instance, the rural "Guerrilla Commissariat" used pack animals as far as they could negotiate the mountain trails, and mountain dwellers carried the supplies the rest of the way. In Vietnam in the early 1950s, coolies were used extensively. One Viet Minh division required about 40,000 porters to

supply its minimum needs. These coolies were local inhabitants organized into what was called the "auxiliary service." On level terrain, the coolies were expected to cover 15.3 miles per day (12.4 at night) carrying 55 pounds of rice or 33–44 pounds of arms. In mountainous areas, the day's march was shortened to about 9 miles (7.5 miles at night), and the load was reduced to 28.6 pounds of rice and 22–33 pounds of arms. In Sierra Leone, the RUF forced villagers to serve as "human caravans" and carry the food and possessions that the RUF stole from their village.

If several days or nights of travel are required, stopover facilities will be needed. Che Guevara recommends that "way stations" be established for this purpose in the houses of persons affiliated with the movement. According to Guevara, these houses should be known only to those directly in charge of supplies, and the inhabitants should be told as little as possible about the organization, even though they are trusted people.

STORAGE

Supplies are sometimes stored in individuals' houses. More often they are stored in centralized locations so that fewer persons are subject to capture in the event of searches. Caches are frequently located in remote areas. Members of the French resistance, for example, dug and camouflaged pits near parachute drops to store equipment until it could be moved to more convenient hiding places. The FMLN in El Salvador adopted the policy of burying weapons caches throughout the countryside, avoiding the establishment of large supply depots. In that regard, any capture or find by the El Salvadoran armed forces was not enough to significantly cripple military operations.[14] In Burma, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) insurgents were found to be storing large caches of explosives in Karen refugee camps along the Thai border.[15] Remote areas are also used as hiding places for the benefit of guerrillas. The Malayan Min Yuen collected food in rural areas and delivered it to caches hidden in the jungle, where it was picked up by the guerrillas. In Vietnam, local inhabitants helped "prepare the battlefield" for the guerrillas by storing food near the scene of an impending Viet Minh attack. These stores enabled the guerrillas to travel lightly and quickly. Where supplies must be stored for longer than a couple of days, the caches have to be ventilated and insulated against dampness. Of course, the ventilators must be camouflaged. Pipes from underground Viet Minh caches were sometimes covered at the surface by bushes.

MAINTENANCE

Weapon and equipment maintenance is a crucial logistic function for conventional armies; it is even more so for insurgents. Because logistics are often desultory, interdicted, or otherwise unreliable, undergrounds must provide for effective maintenance of equipment that is on hand. The underground shares maintenance duties with the auxiliary and the armed component. Guerrillas perform routine unit-level maintenance on their equipment, and the auxiliary typically handles higher levels of maintenance (e.g., engine replacement, weapons repair). Insurgencies that enjoy control over relatively secure areas often build dedicated maintenance areas within their secure compounds and training camps.

MEDICAL

Undergrounds typically seek to establish effective medical services, both to sustain the end strength of the armed component and to extend such services to the population they are attempting to win over or govern. In impoverished areas or among populations that are alienated from effective government control, insurgents can secure local loyalties through the provision of vaccinations and other simple health care. As with the maintenance function, undergrounds will often establish hospitals and clinics within relatively secure areas, such as training camps. To obtain the requisite medical expertise, underground leaders will seek to recruit doctors, nurses, and medical technicians into the auxiliary.

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