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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

HANDBOOK ON AGGRESSOR INSURGENT WAR



**HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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HANDBOOK ON AGGRESSOR INSURGENT WAR

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PART ONE

STRATEGY OF AGGRESSOR INSURGENCY

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1-1. Purpose

The purpose of this manual is to provide an aid for the conduct of internal defense/internal development training for individuals and units in all components of the Army.

1-2. Scope

a. This manual is applicable to limited and cold wars. It complements FM 30-102 and FM 30-103 which are designed as training vehicles for operations during general wars.

b. Part One outlines the strategy of Aggressor insurgency and discusses its sociological, economic, political, psychological operations, and other military doctrines.

c. Part Two applies the doctrines discussed in part one to the fictitious country of New Freeland. An understanding of the application of these doctrines will assist in the training of individuals or units to participate in internal defense/internal development in any part of the world.

d. Appendix C contains geographic, transportation, communications, sociological, economic, and military data on New Freeland. These data are included to assist writers in the preparation of scenarios for conducting internal defense/internal development training exercises.

1-3. Notice to Users

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve this publication. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recom-

mended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded directly to the Commandant, United States Army Intelligence School, ATTN: Office of Doctrine and Literature, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219.

1-4. Definitions

A compilation of terms common to Aggressor insurgent war is listed below.

a. *Circle Trigon Party (CTP)*. The controlling party in the Aggressor Homeland which ruthlessly pursues its main objectives of internal consolidation and world domination.

b. *Enemy*. The forces, both political and military, viewed from Aggressor's standpoint which oppose Aggressor insurgency.

c. *Guerrilla*. An individual participating in guerrilla warfare.

d. *Guerrilla Warfare*.

(1) Military and paramilitary activities conducted during an insurgency by regular forces.

(2) Activities by irregular forces complementing campaigns waged by regular forces during time of war.

e. *Insurgency*. Military, Political, psychological, social, and economic activities conducted primarily by indigenous organizations, supported by the Circle Trigon Party, against a constituted government for the purpose of replacing it with one controlled by Aggressor.

f. *Insurgent*. An individual participating in any insurgent activity in the target country.

g. *Irregular Forces*. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular

CHAPTER 2

FUNDAMENTALS OF INSURGENCY

2-1. Historical Background of Guerrilla Warfare

Throughout history, guerrilla warfare has played an important role in the development of and the aspirations of many countries. Some examples of guerrilla warfare in modern times are—

a. In China, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, a guerrilla war was waged against the Japanese from 1927 until their defeat after World War II. The revolutionary war was continued against the Chinese Nationalists eventually driving them from the mainland in 1949.

b. The Hukbalahaps, commonly referred to as the Huks, nearly overthrew the government of the Philippines by means of a communist supported guerrilla campaign lasting from 1946 to 1954.

c. Muslim guerrillas, united under the National Liberation Front, conducted sabotage and terrorism in conjunction with guerrilla warfare and forced the French from Algeria in 1956.

2-2. Advent of Aggressor Insurgency

The examples cited in the preceding paragraph depict guerrilla warfare as a principal method to gain control of a country from within. Aggressor prophesied that guerrilla warfare could be used to gain control of a foreign country. In this instance, it would have to be complemented by economic, political, sociological, and psychological operations supported by the Aggressor Circle Trigon Party. Thus, Aggressor began capitalizing on "revolutionary warfare," known to the western world as "insurgency" as a means to attain their goal of world domination.

2-3. Prerequisites for Insurgency

Aggressor considers the primary prerequisite

for an insurgency to be a favorable attitude of the populace toward the insurgents. The local population is counted upon to render assistance to the guerrillas by providing food, manpower, shelter, helping to carry out ambushes, and most important, keeping the guerrillas informed of movements and plans of government forces. Ideal conditions in a country to satisfy the above prerequisites are political instability and disaffection, economic deficiencies and social injustice. All of these create legitimate resentment against the existing government which the insurgents can exploit. Indeed, even when conditions are such that legitimate resentment does not exist, insurgents create this resentment by exaggerating existing conditions or by promises of future improvements under an Aggressor sponsored government.

2-4. Theory of Insurgency

The basic theory of insurgency is to replace the governmental administrative system through destruction or overthrow of the existing political apparatus of the target country through the use of destructive and constructive techniques to destroy or at least to weaken government control of and contact with the population. Included in this theory are political, economic, psychological, and sociological activities as well as armed fighting. Military operations have both military and nonmilitary targets. Some examples of nonmilitary targets are raids on citizens to punish individuals loyal to the government, raids on production centers to cause chaos, ambushes of civilian vehicles burning of buildings, and the disruption of communications.

2-5. Destructive Techniques

Prior to launching military operations, Aggressor will conduct a program of sabotage and

terrorism to weaken and isolate the government. Terrorism is primarily used for its psychological effect on the community. For example, a prominent banker might be murdered, not just to eliminate him, but to frighten all bankers. In sabotage, crops are burned not only for the purpose of destroying them, but to intimidate the farmers. Raids are conducted not only to harass police and soldiers, but to create a general feeling of insecurity among the populace.

2-6. Constructive Techniques

In conjunction with destructive techniques, programs are initiated to assist the population. Insurgents look for and help families who have lost everything, those who have not received needed assistance from the government, the unemployed, and the sick. They work in the fields by assisting during the busy seasons and during floods and droughts. By these activities, insurgents win the sympathy and ultimately the support of the people, which is a prerequisite for future insurgent operations.

2-7. Agrarian Reform

After making progress in the organization of an insurgency, Aggressor establishes a program of agrarian reform. Before a program of agrarian reform can be initiated, control of certain areas is essential. In those areas controlled by Aggressor, land is divided among the peasants. In those areas still under control of the government, peasants are encouraged to occupy estates of absentee landlords and those owned by the government, and to refuse to pay land rents and taxes. Insurgents provide protection to the peasants from the tax collectors and police.

2-8. Security of the Rear

To Aggressor, security of the rear means the people of a country are sympathetic to the Aggressor cause and that wherever irregular or regular forces operate they will receive full support from the people. Guerrilla warfare depends on the population to form a secure base for its operations. Once the people have been indoctrinated, they are not expected merely to be sympathetic to the cause, but also must pro-

vide such positive contributions as food, manpower, shelter, intelligence, and transportation. In addition, the local inhabitants provide hiding places for guerrillas, often quartering them for long periods of time.

2-9. Qualities of Leaders

All insurgent operations emanating from the masses suffer from a lack of organization. This drawback must be overcome by both political and military leadership. All leaders must be unyielding in their policies, loyal to the Circle Trigon Party, and sincere in their desire to assist the Party in its domination of the world. They must be well educated in party doctrine techniques, self-confident, able to establish severe discipline, and capable of coping with counterpropaganda. Having all these qualities, the leaders will become models for the people to emulate.

2-10. Circle Trigon Party Ideology

The Circle Trigon Party strives to make people believe the world is in the last era of strife. Under the guidance of the Party, the vast majority of human beings are being prepared to wage a revolutionary war which will bring justice to the oppressed peoples of the world. Regardless of the duration of this revolutionary war, the party propagates that there is no doubt it will be followed by an unprecedented era of peace.

2-11. Relationship of Insurgency to National Policy

Aggressor maintains that an insurgency is inseparable from national policy. The basic policy is the creation of a worldwide organization controlled by the Circle Trigon Party (CTP) whose objective is to emancipate peoples of the world from colonialism and imperialism. This objective, in fact, masks the actual Aggressor plan for world domination.

2-12. Fundamentals of National Policy

Listed below are the fundamental steps in the realization of Aggressor national policy.

a. Arousing and organizing the peoples of other countries.

- b. Achieving political unification of anti-government elements within other countries.
- c. Establishing intelligence operations.
- d. Subversion (establishing population support).
- e. Organizing the masses.
- f. Establishing bases of operations in other countries.
- g. Organizing military and paramilitary forces.
- h. Establishing material strength within the country.
- i. Destroying the enemy's material strength.
- j. Overthrowing the enemy's government and substituting one controlled by Aggressor.

2-13. Political Philosophy

Everyone involved in Aggressor insurgency must understand its political goal and the political organization to be used in attaining that goal. Therefore, both the organization and discipline of insurgent forces must be highly developed so that they can carry out the political activities basic to insurgency. Both political and military leaders must be thoroughly inspired with a nationalistic attitude and the hope of liberating the oppressed people of the country. Political indoctrination of the masses supplies the ground work for guerrilla warfare and the eventual success of the insurgency.

2-14. Political Objectives

Political activities must be considered first as applied to the insurgents, second as applied to the people of the target country, and third as applied to the local government. To achieve these objectives, the following fundamentals are pursued by Aggressor:

- a. *First.* The political unification of the civil masses.
- b. *Second.* Ideological unification of the military and paramilitary forces.
- c. *Third.* The destruction of the unity of the enemy.

2-15. Control of Regular and Regional Forces

Aggressor policy dictates that objectives cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the people. Therefore, the regional and regular forces, composed of workers and peasants and led by the Circle Trigon Party, are considered belonging to the people. The Party's control of the armed forces, both regional and regular units, enables them to maintain their class solidarity.

2-16. Long-Lasting Operation

Aggressor accepts the fact that insurgent wars will be of long duration. A long period of time is necessary to obtain the maximum benefit from political indoctrination of the people, to overcome the material shortage which exists and eventually to transfer the control of a country from the enemy to the insurgents.

CHAPTER 3

PRINCIPLES OF INSURGENCY

3-1. Phases of Insurgency

Aggressor envisions insurgent war (revolutionary war) as passing through three phases. They are not separate and distinct, but merge one into another. The transition from one phase to another may be either progressive or regressive depending upon the circumstances. The intention is to achieve the overthrow of a government in the earliest phase rather than to escalate to a higher phase. If at any time it is to his advantage he will revert to an earlier phase. In any event Aggressor will never abandon his objective but will always strive for victory regardless of the adverse conditions encountered.

a. Phase 1 (Organization). During this phase, Aggressor concentrates on the organization, consolidation, and preservation of regional bases located in inaccessible areas. Volunteers are indoctrinated with the ideology of the Aggressor nation and trained to persuade and convince others that this ideology is better than the one they adhere to. These agitators and propagandists then impart their knowledge and enlist the assistance of the local inhabitants. The primary objective is to persuade as many people as possible to commit themselves to the Aggressor movement. Local militia are formed as back-up forces for the better trained and better equipped guerrilla units which will be organized later. Primarily, the local militia are a means of collecting information, forcing merchants to make "voluntary" contributions, protecting villages, and in general providing support for the Aggressor movement. By these actions, bases consisting of a protective group of sympathizers willing to supply food, information, and recruits to the guerrilla forces are established.

b. Phase 2 (Expansion). In this phase, di-

rect action assumes an ever-increasing importance. The agitators form guerrilla units which conduct sabotage and terrorism, liquidating leaders and collaborators of the local government; also, they may conduct demonstrations that expose the government's inability to preserve law and order and protect the populace. Attacks are made on vulnerable military and police outposts and columns of troops are ambushed. The primary purpose of these operations is to procure arms, ammunition and other essential material such as medical supplies and communications equipment. A key mission is to demoralize government troops and local civilians. As the growing guerrilla force becomes better equipped and its capabilities improve, political agents proceed to indoctrinate the inhabitants of districts peripheral to the base areas. Eventually, the districts are absorbed into the base areas, thus increasing their size.

c. Phase 3 (Destruction). The primary objective of the final phase is to annihilate the enemy's armed forces enabling Aggressor to obtain complete control of the country and to establish an Aggressor controlled government. All forms of insurgency (political, psychological, sociological and military) are employed during stage three, but regular warfare (war of movement) becomes more and more important with engagements increasing in number. In fact, Aggressor believes that ultimate victory will be attained with the use of regular forces. Guerrilla warfare will assume a secondary role; however, it will remain important because in the final phase the irregular forces will be a major link in the logistical system of the regular forces. Before progressing to the third phase, Aggressor will be certain of—

- (1) The absolute superiority of the insurgent forces.

- (2) An increase in the material status of Aggressor forces that will narrow the enemy's economic advantage.
- (3) An international situation favorable to the Circle Trigon Party.
- (4) A strong and forceful leadership by the Circle Trigon Party in contrast to a less sure command by the enemy.

3-2. Formula for Insurgency

The Circle Trigon Party follows the sequence below in preparing for insurgency.

- a. Trains selected personnel to lead insurgency.
- b. Develops and consolidates the organization of a front for national salvation.
- c. Expands the front organization to the cities, enterprises, and industries.
- d. Expands the front organization to the provinces.
- e. Assures that Party members have the capacity and experience to enable them to lead others.
- f. Assures the Party members' dedication to the Party's established goals.
- g. Forms guerrilla units from among the population.

3-3. Financing an Insurgency

- a. Aggressor insurgencies need money to pay the following expenses:
 - (1) The salaries of full-time workers of the insurgent organization.
 - (2) Advances to persons using an underground escape route who need money to pay contacts or buy food.
 - (3) The purchase of paper, ink, and equipment for propaganda publications.
 - (4) The purchase of explosives and other material for sabotage.
 - (5) The purchase of such equipment as typewriters and radios.
 - (6) Aid families who shelter guerrillas and escapees from the enemy.
 - (7) Assist families of insurgent workers who were captured or forced to flee.
 - (8) Payment of bribes.
 - (9) Pay guerrilla salaries and buy supplies for irregular warfare.

b. Money for an insurgency is provided by the Aggressor Homeland; by a government sympathetic to and supporting an insurgency in a specific country; by embezzlement; by gifts from wealthy individuals sympathetic to the insurgency; and by coercive means such as robberies, forced contributions, and taxes. Types of money include cash, either real or counterfeit, in the local currency and hard currency such as American dollars or British pounds.

3-4. Initial Action

a. Aggressor places great emphasis on the planning for and the organization of an insurgency. After the target country has been designated, a few select indigenous personnel are chosen for training either in the Aggressor Homeland or an Aggressor satellite country. The training is designed to enable these select individuals to lead the insurgency under the domination of the Aggressor Central Committee. Emphasis is placed on the need to liberate the oppressed people of the target country from the present leaders and the necessity for establishing a new government which will assure the freedom of the populace.

b. Upon completion of the program, the trained leaders (insurgents) return to their country to begin the insurgency. The first action is to organize a central committee. Next, additional people are recruited for leaders of the insurgent movement. Those recruited are also sent to the Aggressor Homeland or an Aggressor satellite country for training.

3-5. Establishment of Cells

a. In order to support the insurgent situation, cells are established in all geographic areas of the country and in all kinds of organizations. Each cell usually has from three to seven members, one of whom is appointed cell leader. He is responsible for making assignments and checking to see that they are carried out.

b. The cell may be composed of persons who live in a vicinity or who work in the same occupation. Often the individual members do not know the place of residence or the real

names of their fellow members and they meet only at prearranged times.

c. If a cell operates as an intelligence unit, its members may never come in contact with each other. A member usually gathers information and transmits it to the cell leader through a courier or maildrop. The cell leader may control several individuals, but the individuals never contact each other or the cell leader who is reached through intermediaries.

d. Lateral communications and coordination with other cells or with guerrilla forces are also carried out through intermediaries. In this way, if one unit is compromised, its members cannot inform on their superiors or other units.

3-6. Establishment of a Front and Government

At the beginning of an insurgency, a "front" is established by the Circle Trigon Party in the target country. A front's true identity is disguised by such titles as The League for Independence, The People's Party, or some other appropriate name. Its objective is to give the appearance of broad representation among workers, religious orders, soldiers, and farmers. Personnel who add prestige to the front are recruited to fill the most responsible positions, but in reality guidance is provided by the Aggressor Circle Trigon Party. After sufficient support of the people has been obtained, some land has been acquired, and people of stature have been recruited, the front will organize a government. The government may either be located in exile or in a guerrilla controlled area of the country. Efforts are then made at the international level to have other nations recognize it as the legitimate government of the country.

3-7. Types of Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare is conducted by Aggressor for two separate and distinct purposes.

a. *To Complement Regular Forces.* In this type of guerrilla warfare, active combat operations are waged by indigenous guerrilla forces which are usually trained, equipped, supplied, and advised by regular forces in areas occupied and controlled by the enemy. The particulars of this type of an operation are contained in

FM 30-102, Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces.

b. *To Assist Insurgency Operations.* Aggressor places great emphasis on the use of guerrilla forces in the conduct of an insurgency. This type of guerrilla warfare is waged in countries not dominated by Aggressor; therefore, employment of guerrilla forces is not controlled by Aggressor regular forces, but by the Circle Trigon Party dominated central committees of the various geographical subdivisions of the country. Because of the current world situation and the location of the Aggressor regular forces, this type guerrilla warfare is being emphasized. Details concerning this type operation are contained in this manual.

3-8. Negotiation

Aggressor, during the third phase of insurgency, may enter into negotiations with the enemy. Such negotiations are not conducted by Aggressor for the purpose of arriving at amicable agreements with the enemy but for the dual purpose of gaining time to reinforce a position (military, economic, political, or social) and of frustrating and harassing the enemy. Compromises are rarely made except to create conditions that will lead to victory for Aggressor.

3-9. Guerrilla Warfare vs. Regular Warfare

Guerrilla warfare is manifestly unlike regular warfare. Guerrilla forces will not engage in decisive battle except at a time and place of their own choosing and the advantage of surprise can be assured. Consequently, guerrilla warfare may have to gradually progress to regular warfare in order to defeat large enemy armed forces. When Aggressor believes the proper stage has been set, open war will be declared. At this time the enemy will be engaged by guerrilla units which will have assumed a military posture and have formed the people's army of the country in which the insurgency is taking place. In the event the indigenous regular forces, which are advised by Aggressor personnel, are unable to defeat the government armed forces, regular army units

of an Aggressor satellite nation may be moved to the target country to reinforce indigenous military units. However, Aggressor will com-

mit the satellite forces only if it appears ultimate victory can be achieved in a short period of time.

The type of guerrilla warfare is waged in the target country is determined by the aggressor's intent and the location of the guerrilla forces. In the case of a guerrilla force located in the target country, the type of guerrilla warfare is determined by the aggressor's intent and the location of the guerrilla forces. In the case of a guerrilla force located in the target country, the type of guerrilla warfare is determined by the aggressor's intent and the location of the guerrilla forces.

3-5. Organization

Aggressor organizes the guerrilla forces into units. The type of organization is determined by the aggressor's intent and the location of the guerrilla forces. In the case of a guerrilla force located in the target country, the type of organization is determined by the aggressor's intent and the location of the guerrilla forces.

3-6. Guerrilla Warfare vs. Regular Warfare

Guerrilla warfare is essentially a type of warfare. Guerrilla warfare will not engage in a conventional battle. Guerrilla warfare is a type of warfare that is waged in the target country. The type of guerrilla warfare is determined by the aggressor's intent and the location of the guerrilla forces.

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3-7. Establishment of a Front and Government

The establishment of a front and government is determined by the aggressor's intent and the location of the guerrilla forces. In the case of a guerrilla force located in the target country, the type of establishment is determined by the aggressor's intent and the location of the guerrilla forces.

3-8. Types of Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare is divided into three types. The type of guerrilla warfare is determined by the aggressor's intent and the location of the guerrilla forces.

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CHAPTER 4

ORGANIZATION FOR INSURGENCY

Section I. POLITICAL STRUCTURE

4-1. Worldwide Structure

In order to implement its plan for world domination, the Circle Trigon Party has established a headquarters, usually in the capital city, in every country of the world. These headquarters, known as the Central Committee for (country concerned), report directly to and are controlled by the Central Committee of the Circle Trigon Party in the Aggressor Homeland. Because of the various aspects of economy, social life, and political conditions in different countries, some central committees are more active than others.

4-2. In-Country Central Committee

The central committee in a particular country is responsible for furthering Aggressor policy in that country. The identity of the members of a central committee is usually concealed in order to prevent retaliation by the established government. Every central committee has two main sections, political and military, each having a number of subsections depending upon the extent of operations in the country concerned. The political section is normally divided into the following subsections:

a. Security. Responsible for the security of the armed forces and the central committee headquarters.

b. Liaison. Maintains contact with the front organization.

c. Propaganda. Supervises all types of propaganda campaigns, e.g., radio, leaflet, and newspaper, being conducted in the country.

4-3. Geographical Organization

For administrative purposes, a large country is divided into a number of regions, the regions into provinces, and provinces into dis-

tricts. The formation of region in small countries may not be necessary. Within each of these divisions there is a central committee which is controlled by the central committee of the next higher echelon. These committees are organized into military and political sections that are responsible for all political and military activities in their areas. The sections are as large as necessary and are organized into as many subsections as required to accomplish their mission. It is entirely possible that in a small village only one individual serves as the entire committee.


4-4. National Front Organization

Where possible, a national front is established in each country of the world to operate as a cover agency for the country's central committee. Control of the front's activities is exercised directly by the Aggressor Central Committee in the Homeland or by the in-country central committee. The organization of a national front will vary depending upon the country in which it is located, but it will usually have the following sections:

- a.* Administrative.
- b.* Religious.
- c.* Agrarian.
- d.* Military.
- e.* Professional.
- f.* Artisan.
- g.* Workers.

4-5. Mass Support

Aggressor realizes that if an insurgency is to be successful, support of the mass civil population of a country must be obtained. Therefore, after insurgent leaders have been recruited and trained and central committees



* CTP - Circle Trigon Party

Figure 4-1. Political and Military Structure.

formed, the next objective is to obtain the required mass support. To accomplish this objective, subordinate organizations of the national front are established throughout the target country to provide cover for the central committees of the geographical divisions. These organizations have humanitarian or other

legitimate goals sympathetic to the masses. Once the confidence of the people has been attained by the organizations, insurgent leaders introduce the objective of the insurgency and gradually divert the support of the masses from the established government to the insurgent movement.

Section II. MILITARY STRUCTURE

4-6. Military Section of Central Committee

The military section of the central committee is organized into four subsections.

a. Political. Responsible for the political training and indoctrination of all the armed forces in the area.

b. Staff. Plans and coordinates military operations and training.

c. Logistics. Handles all supply matters.

d. Recruiting. Responsible for obtaining personnel for military units and for collecting information on the enemy's internal defense activities.

4-7. Political and Military Relationship

The military structure is completely integrated into the political structure. Every political section contains a military component which establishes military policy and every military section has a political component which insures compliance with this policy. In theory, the two sections have an equal status; in actuality, the political section exercises control and makes the final decision because the principal mission of military action is the attainment of political goals.

4-8. Establishment of Bases

After the formation of the front organization and the establishment of the various geographical central committees in a country, Aggressor begins to organize operational bases. While a front is initially formed in a city, preferably the capital, and expanded to the villages, bases are organized in the less densely populated areas. Depending upon the situation in a given country, initially either a base is

formed in the most favorable area or bases are established simultaneously in several regions of the country.

4-9. Characteristics of a Base

A base may be clandestine or open depending upon the situation in a country. Both types have the same characteristics except for the secrecy which clothes the location of a clandestine base. These characteristics are—

a. A closely integrated complex of villages prepared for defense. The area is normally located in terrain which is fairly inaccessible to the enemy's armed forces and which provides hiding places for guerrillas.

b. An administrative machine to which any number of irregular or regular units may be added for operations in the base area.

c. A population politically indoctrinated with the Circle Trigon Party ideology. Each individual, including women and children, living in a base area has a task related to the advancement of the Party's ideas.

d. A network of food and ammunition dumps for the support of irregular and regular forces.

e. Training facilities with Aggressor advisors and instructors.

4-10. Control of Military Units

Units not located in a base area are controlled by the military section of the geographic subdivision. Those units assigned to an operational base are controlled by the military section of the base administrative headquarters, not by the geographic subdivision in which the base is located. Overall control is exercised by the military section of the in-country central committee.

Section III. MILITARY ORGANIZATION

4-11. Types of Military Organizations

a. Militia. Paramilitary units, which are a part of the mass civil organization, are organized in the villages immediately after the people agree to support an insurgency. Individuals assigned to the units are "part-time" soldiers who work at their normal vocations, e.g., farmers, workers and teachers, by day and operate as guerrillas at night. The formation and training of militia units are supervised by Aggressor trained indigenous personnel. Militia units in Aggressor-controlled areas have the mission of protecting the villages against attacks from government military forces. In enemy-controlled areas, the militia units collect intelligence, conduct terrorist campaigns, and engage in sabotage and espionage operations against the established authorities.

b. Regional units. Once local units are operational, guerrilla units, normally referred to as regional units, are organized at district and provincial levels. Individuals to form regional units are obtained from the militia in the villages. The militia must then recruit additional personnel to replace those assigned to district and provincial units. Members of the regional units are "full-time" soldiers who are not issued uniforms but wear the same type clothing as the peasants. Regional units, which are advised by regular Aggressor or Aggressor satellite personnel, conduct operations only within their districts or provinces.

c. Regular units.

(1) As the civilian population becomes more sympathetic to the insurgency and the regional forces assume a more military posture, Aggressor begins to organize regular forces. Initially, only companies and battalions are formed; then as additional personnel and equipment become available, regiments, divisions, support and service type units are organized. All regular units are subordinate to the in-country or region central committees and operate from base areas. Organizational pattern follows that of Aggressor rifle units (FM 30-102) but with

less heavy equipment and transport. Typical battalion and regimental organizations are shown in figures 4-2 through 4-5.

- (2) Personnel to form regular units are obtained from the regional forces. When the regional units are no longer capable of furnishing personnel in sufficient quantity, individuals are recruited from the population and some defectors from the enemy's armed forces are accepted. In addition, military personnel in another country having the same ethnic background as the people in the target country will be infiltrated into the country. Units are advised by Aggressor military personnel. Leaders and technical personnel are trained in the Aggressor Homeland or satellite countries. Personnel wear Aggressor uniforms and units are equipped with Aggressor manufactured items when possible.

4-12. Organization of Regional Forces

a. General. There will be innumerable differences in the organization of regional forces, according to the environment in which they operate. While they have no established organization, a certain organizational pattern does exist. Aggressor feels a guerrilla unit should not be larger than 150 men and a unit of about 125 men is ideal; therefore, company strength is usually maintained at about this level. Because of the need for rapid movement and the lack of weapons and equipment, few support type units are organized. The number of men and the quantity and quality of equipment in each unit depend often on the ability of the commander to conscript—by persuasion or force—personnel and procure weapons and equipment in his area.

b. Guerrilla Squad. The operational tendency for guerrillas to function in small groups makes the squad the ideal unit. Eight to ten men is the maximum number that can operate efficiently; therefore, the squad, which is organized in each village and town, should always




Figure 4-2. Organization — Regular Battalion.

function as a complete unit under the control of its leaders. Members of the squad are armed with rifles, shotguns, pistols or automatic weapons, homemade waterpipe rifles, and homemade bombs and mines. An attempt is made to furnish each member with an Aggressor-manufactured weapon, but this is usually not possible. In addition, each individual carries several grenades or Molotov cocktails if they are available.

c. Guerrilla Platoons. As is true of the squad, a platoon does not have a standard organization. Normally it has three squads (organized as outlined in *b* above) plus a platoon leader

and a political officer. Total strength will vary between 26 and 32 individuals, depending upon the organization of the squads. A platoon is usually organized in each district.

d. Guerrilla Company. A guerrilla company is normally organized in each province. In addition to a headquarters element, it is composed of three platoons (organized as outlined in *c* above) and a weapons support platoon. The headquarters consists of a commander, a political officer and an assistant, one or two administrative personnel, and three or four supply and mess personnel for a total of 7 to 9. The support platoon has a strength of 22 to 28

Unit	Personnel			Weapons and Equipment						
	Officers	Enlisted Men	Total	57mm AT Gun	82mm Rcl Gun	82mm Mort	14.5mm AD MG (Dual)	7.62mm Hv MG	7.62mm Lt MG	82mm AT Lchr
H & H Co	9	29	38							
Hq Sec	(7)	(9)	(16)							
Sig Plat	(1)	(9)	(10)							
Sup Plat	(1)	(11)	(12)							
Rifle Co (3)	6	105	111					6	9	9
Hq Sec	(2)	(5)	(7)							
Rifle Plat (3)	(1)	(25)	(26)						(3)	(3)
Hq Sec	[1]	[1]	[2]							
Rifle Sqd [3]		[8]	[8]						[1]	[1]
MG Plat	(1)	(25)	(26)					(6)		
Hq Sec	[1]	[1]	[2]							
Hv MG Sqd [3]		[8]	[8]					[2]		
Mort Btry	5	43	48			6				
Hq Sec	(2)	(7)	(9)							
Mort Plat (3)	(1)	(12)	(13)			(2)				
Spt Btry	5	48	53	3	3		2			
Hq Sec	(2)	(3)	(5)							
AT Gun Plat	(1)	(17)	(18)	(3)						
Rcl Gun Plat	(1)	(13)	(14)		(3)					
ADMG Plat	(1)	(15)	(16)				(2)			
Total	37	435	472	3	3	6	6	18	27	27

Figure 4-3. Personnel, Weapons and Equipment — Regular Battalion.




Figure 4-4. Organization — Regular Regiment.

personnel organized into a headquarters consisting of a platoon leader and a political officer, a light recoilless rifle squad, a light machinegun squad, and a light mortar squad. Each squad is equipped with two weapons which may have been manufactured in any country. Both the machinegun and mortar squads have a strength of six to eight men while the recoilless rifle squad has ten to twelve.

4-13. Organization of Militia

There is no established organization or even

a pattern for the organization of militia units. Under the direction of the town or village central committee but controlled by the civil authorities able-bodied individuals are formed into squad-sized groups. Each group is then assigned certain defensive, sabotage, information collection or propaganda missions depending upon whether the village is located in enemy or Aggressor controlled territory. Arms and equipment for these units are rather primitive with only equipment not needed by the regional forces and capture from the enemy being available to them.

Section IV. PERSONNEL, LOGISTICS AND TRAINING

4-14. Personnel

a. Initially, personnel are recruited by the Circle Trigon Party for positions with the front and the various central committees. Depending upon the situation within the country, either simultaneously with or immediately after the forming of these organizations, recruitment for the regional forces is begun. It

is not until the regional forces are well established and operating efficiently that personnel are assigned to regular units.

b. No attempt is made at formal conscription for any insurgent activity, for Aggressor claims that the men who serve are volunteers. In practice, however, the insurgents place great effort in sporadic recruiting campaigns. These

Unit	Personnel			Weapons and Equipment									
	Officers	Enlisted Men	Total	57mm AT Gun	82mm Rcl Gun	120mm Mort	82mm Mort	57mm AD Gun (Dual)	14.5mm AD MG (Quad)	14.5mm AD MG (Dual)	7.62mm Hv MG	7.62mm Lt MG	82mm AT Lchr
HHC	20	127	147									6	6
Hq Sec	(14)	(28)	(42)										
Engr Plat	(1)	(23)	(24)										
Sig Plat	(1)	(29)	(30)										
Scty Plat	(1)	(33)	(34)									(6)	(6)
Med Plat	(3)	(14)	(17)										
Rifle Bn (3)	37	435	472	3	3		6			6	18	27	27
Regt Arty	21	179	200			6		6	6				
H&S Btry	(8)	(40)	(48)										
Mort Btry	(5)	(55)	(60)			(6)							
AD Gun Btry	(4)	(42)	(46)					(6)					
ADMG Btry	(4)	(42)	(46)						(6)				
Sup Co	5	83	88										
Hq Sec	(2)	(5)	(7)										
Sup Plat (3)	(1)	(26)	(27)										
Total	157	1694	1851	9	9	6	18	6	6	18	54	87	87

Figure 4-5. Personnel, Weapons and Equipment—Regular Regiment.




Figure 4-6. Organization of Regional Units.

campaigns are conducted with propaganda and enticement combined with pressure. Some personnel are forcibly recruited while others join because indirect pressure is brought to bear on their families. Pressure methods and propaganda appeals to the recruits to serve the cause against the enemy for the betterment of society are often combined. Inducements include the promise of improved living conditions and educational opportunities. Deserters and prisoners of war from the enemy's armed forces are recruited after careful political indoctrination.

c. Motives of the men voluntarily joining any activity are varied. Some join purely because of patriotism for their country, while belief in Aggressor ideology influences others. In some instances, good food and clothing and possible future education provide the incentive. In others, the lure of adventure or the escape from a dreary life may be the motivating factors.

4-15. Logistics

a. In the early stages of an insurgency, logistics poses a serious problem. Arms and other

military equipment are especially difficult to procure and in many instances only enough individual weapons are available for issue to 75 percent of the personnel. Initially military equipment may be very primitive, especially that issued to the militia and regional forces, but as the insurgency progresses, more modern material is acquired. Some means of procurement are capturing enemy equipment, locating caches left by other armed forces previously operating in the area, receiving issues of Aggressor material, and manufacturing items in local factories.

b. All personnel of the armed forces are impressed with the need for picking up enemy arms and equipment from the battle area during and after any operation. In addition, raids are conducted against enemy ammunition and supply areas for the specific purpose of capturing arms and equipment.

c. In almost every country in the world some form of armed conflict has taken place. As a result of such action, arms and equipment are either inadvertently left in the area or the contesting forces have left caches of them for

future use. Insurgents take every opportunity to gather those left and establish their own caches.

d. Arms and equipment are also supplied by Aggressor. However, Aggressor regular forces have priority for Aggressor manufactured items and little is issued to guerrilla units until regular units are organized.

e. Local manufacture is a major source of arms and equipment. Small shops employing ten to fifteen workers are established. They are equipped with the crudest sort of equipment and their source of energy is usually manpower and simple machines. Consequently, manufactured weapons are of extremely poor quality. Shops are usually mobile so they can be moved from place to place. Some shops produce small arms, others ammunition and still others mines and explosives. In almost all instances, shops produce material for a local area and not for the entire country.

4-16. Training

a. The underlying principle in the training of personnel for the insurgent forces is that everyone should initially be assigned to a regional guerrilla unit. With a unit, one can gain considerable military knowledge as well as experiencing combat and learning to adapt to military life. After an individual has learned the rudiments of guerrilla warfare at the local level, he may then be assigned to units at the district and provincial levels, and subsequently to the regular forces. Regardless of the unit of assignment, the most important aspect of the soldier's training, and that which consumes the most time, is the political. The objectives of the political training are to produce soldiers in-

stilled with the insurgent cause and to provide effective propaganda agents.

b. After the leaders of the village guerrilla forces have been trained by Aggressor personnel, the regulars move to district level, and the local units conduct their own training. The local training is largely political in nature but does include—

- (1) Use of individual weapons.
- (2) Conduct of sabotage.
- (3) Some close order drill.
- (4) Familiarization with automatic weapons.

c. Once the district units are operational, they also conduct their own training with some supervision by regular personnel. Training is essentially the same as that at the local level with the exception that personnel receive more individual instruction and begin to study unit tactics. Regular personnel concentrate their efforts on training the support units which are equipped with crew served weapons. Provincial schools are established to conduct this type of training when the situation permits.

d. Training of regular forces is much more extensive and professional than training of regional forces. Aggressor regulars supervise the training which follows the same pattern as that conducted for the Aggressor armed forces. Both officer and noncommissioned officer schools are established to provide well-grounded leaders. In addition, branch schools are organized to train individuals to fill positions in the various combat units. Those individuals needing specialized training, as well as high-ranking officers and personnel extremely dedicated to Aggressor ideology, are sent to schools in the Aggressor Homeland.

CHAPTER 5

INSURGENT DOCTRINE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

5-1. Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the general sociological, economic, political, and psychological activities, and guerrilla warfare doctrine of Aggressor insurgent warfare. The tactical doctrine of irregular forces is similar to that of the Aggressor forces (see FM 30-102). These activities and doctrine are applicable to the Aggressor insurgency being conducted in New Freeland which is outlined in part II.

5-2. Doctrinal Relationship

A very strong relationship exists among the social, economic, political, psychological, and military activities of an insurgency. Each activity is an integral part of the overall insurgent effort, and each is dependent upon the other. Failure of one activity would probably

cause the insurgent effort to be unsuccessful. Because the social, economic, psychological, and political activities are especially interrelated, they are discussed together in paragraphs 5-4 through 5-21. Guerrilla warfare doctrine is discussed separately in paragraphs 5-22 through 5-40.

5-3. Phasing of Insurgent Activities

Sociological, economic, psychological, and political activities are begun early in phase 1 of an insurgency. These activities continue through phases 2 and 3 to the end of the conflict. Military activities are not begun until the beginning of phase 2. Even during phase 3 when military actions are predominant, political, psychological, sociological, and economic activities continue to be used to support the military effort.

Section II. SOCIOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINES

5-4. Infiltration

Escalation of the insurgency is dependent upon the infiltration of personnel trained in the Aggressor Homeland or an Aggressor satellite country, as well as weapons and equipment into the target country. Later in the insurgency, leaders and technical personnel will be sent to the Homeland for training and then infiltrated back into the country. In many instances, soldiers of another country having the same ethnic background as the target country will be infiltrated to join the indigenous regular forces. For these purposes, routes of infiltration and safe havens must be established if the insurgency is to succeed.

5-5. Recruitment

Techniques of recruitment vary with the phase of the insurgency. In the organizational phase, recruiting is on a highly selective basis with an emphasis on security and on ability and reliability of the recruit as these individuals will eventually be the leaders of the insurgency. Recruits for this phase of the insurgency are subjected to a thorough background investigation to insure political stability and physical endurance. The results of the investigation and tests will determine the job assignment and the long range career development of the individual within the insurgent structure. During the expansion phase, the insur-

gents enlist the support of the entire populace and mass recruiting is initiated. Mass recruiting places more emphasis on active support than on security.

5-6. Security of Activities

Concealment or disguise of insurgent activities is of the utmost importance especially during the early stages of an insurgency. Following are some of the security measures used by Aggressor insurgents:

a. Conventional Living. If an insurgent does not appear to be following a normal routine, he may attract the attention of neighbors and enemy security personnel. For this reason, insurgents are instructed to live as conventionally as possible not hiding from security personnel but misleading them. Insurgents perform their duties for the insurgency while engaging in legal occupations.

b. Documents. In many countries personal documents are essential; without them a person cannot travel, obtain a job, buy food, or rent a room. Therefore, insurgents who of necessity abandon their normal lives and assume new identities must be supplied with documents such as birth certificates, identity papers, employment permits and travel authority. One technique is to forge the documents; forms are procured, a biography is created and recorded on the documents, and falsified signatures and stamps are affixed. Another technique is to procure official documents of another person. This method eliminates the problem of authenticity of documents but the insurgent must memorize the details and if a picture is affixed to the document it must be replaced.

c. Meeting Places. The preferred meeting place is one where the arrival of a number of insurgents about the same time will not attract attention nor arouse suspicion. Such a place might be found in a secluded area such as a woods. If this is not convenient it may be necessary to assemble in an insurgent's home. In this case neighborhoods where persons are hostile to the insurgent's cause or homes of persons belonging to other cells are avoided. In any event, meeting places are changed frequently. An innocent explanation covering a

cell's activity is usually announced before a meeting or as the first item on the agenda so that a cover story will be available in case of inquiries. If possible, a meeting may be arranged to coincide with some genuine occasion for being together such as a birthday, wedding, or anniversary.

d. Use of Couriers. Due to the initial scarcity of modern electronic communications means and their susceptibility to intercept, insurgents prefer the use of couriers to transmit messages and documents. Couriers cannot conceal themselves, therefore their activities are disguised. They disguise their missions by combining them with routine trips, thereby escaping the suspicion of the enemy. This is most easily done if travel is part of a courier's daily legal life such as a mailman, taxi driver, or salesman. Aged men and women and children are also used because their movements are less likely to arouse suspicion than individuals in the active years of their life.

e. Code Words and Cover Names. In messages, including enciphered texts, insurgents make use of code words and cover names. These are simply words arbitrarily chosen to designate places, movements, operational plans and persons. Thus if a message is intercepted and deciphered, the jargon used could not easily be interpreted.

f. Regulated Liaison. Liaison between echelons is regulated so that in the event of capture, an insurgent cannot lead the enemy to his superior or subordinate. This is done by denying subordinates direct access to their superiors and by concealing from superiors the identities and addresses of subordinates except one or two with whom the superior is in direct contact.

g. Problems Relating to Capture. All insurgents are told what to expect in the event of capture so that they are better able to deal with sophisticated interrogation techniques and resist torture. Those who cannot resist torture are instructed to protect the insurgent movement by resisting long enough for their absence to be discovered. Such actions provide the insurgents time enough to implement emergency measures. Upon being released from capture, an insurgent is not permitted to re-

join his cell but is placed under surveillance until determination is made that he is not working for the enemy or being followed.

5-7. Activities of the Cells

Activities of cells are many and varied. Some of them are—

- a. Agitation.
- b. Psychological operations.
- c. Mob violence.
- d. Passive resistance.
- e. Coercion.
- f. Threats.
- g. Terrorism.
- h. Bribes.
- i. Subversive political action.
- j. Sabotage.
- k. Espionage.
- l. Agrarian reform.

5-8. Agitation

a. Agitators have the primary function of speaking at public gatherings. These gatherings may vary in size from a few people to several thousand. Agitators do not invent issues nor do they base their speeches on abstract intellectual theories. They exploit basic emotions of fear and insecurity. Agitators are not hindered by facts, and they need none, since the themes used are emotional and common to all men.

b. Themes of speeches are—

- (1) *Distrust*. The agitator plays on his audiences suspicion of things they do not understand. He points out that the individual is being manipulated and duped by the government.
- (2) *Dependence*. The agitator talks to the crowds as if they suffered from a sense of helplessness and offers them protection through membership in a strong organization led by a strong leader.
- (3) *Exclusion*. The agitator suggests that there is an abundance of material goods for everyone, but that the crowd does not get the share to which it is entitled.
- (4) *Anxiety*. The agitator points to a general premonition of disasters to

come, and plays upon the fears of the individual and the general uncertainty of life in the community.

- (5) *Disillusionment*. The agitator points to politics and alleges that the government and its leaders are guilty of fraud, deception, falsehoods, and hypocrisy.

5-9. Psychological Operations

a. The broad objectives of psychological operations are to affect by various means the attitudes, emotions, and actions of given groups within a society for specific political, military, economic or ideological reasons. Considered as psychological operations are communicative acts such as propaganda as well as physical acts of murder, assassination, or a simple show of forces which are intended to influence the minds and behavior of people.

b. Psychological operations are directed toward six broad audiences, each of which requires specific appeals and may require the use of different communicative media. These audiences are—

- (1) *The enemy*. This may be a native ruling group, a colonial government, or a foreign occupier of a country. Aggressor's psychological operations objectives are to harass and confuse the enemy, and to reduce his morale and efficiency.
- (2) *Persons sympathetic to the enemy*. The objective is to persuade the group to withhold assistance from the enemy and perhaps to win some persons over to the support of the Aggressor cause.
- (3) *The uncommitted*. Aggressor seeks to persuade this group to resist authority and support Aggressor, or at least not to cooperate actively with the government.
- (4) *Persons sympathetic to Aggressor*. The objective is to provide moral support and tactical instruction on what is to be done and how to do it.
- (5) *CTP members*. Psychological operations directed at members of the CTP

are designed to maintain morale and unity.

- (6) *Foreign supporters.* The objective is to win financial aid, material assistance, and diplomatic recognition from foreign governments.

5-10. Propaganda Messages

a. The theme of the message as well as the objectives of the propaganda campaign must be carefully considered when writing a propaganda message.

b. Four types of messages are used in conducting propaganda campaigns. They are—

- (1) *Conversionary.* Conversionary messages attempt to transfer the allegiance of persons from one group to another.
- (2) *Divisive.* Divisive appeals are designed to divide various groups under enemy domination and control.
- (3) *Consolidation.* Consolidation propaganda attempts to bring about unified compliance by the populace to Aggressor directives.
- (4) *Counterpropaganda.* Counterpropaganda messages are aimed at disrupting the images portrayed by enemy propagandists.

c. In order to increase the probability of successful propaganda operations certain guidelines are followed for composing messages. First, messages are directed to specific audiences within the target country rather than the public at large. Second, messages exploit existing attitudes of the audience rather than attempt to effect a complete change in attitudes. Third, claims made in messages do not exceed the limits of belief of the audiences. Fourth, messages ask for responses which will promote not only an ideal but also the individual's own well-being measured in terms of job opportunities and survival.

5-11. Communication Media

In directing a message at a target audience, the insurgent must determine the communication media available to that audience. Some of the media include radio, newspapers, and leaflets, word of mouth, slogans written on

walls, entertainment teams and chants at mass demonstrations.

a. Radio.

(1) Most radio broadcasts originate outside the borders of an enemy-controlled country because within the country broadcasting may be possible only for short periods of time. An advantage of radio broadcasts is that individuals do not have to be literate in order to hear and understand them. Disadvantages are:

- (a) Means must be found to inform the target group in advance of the time and channel of the broadcast.
- (b) Broadcasts by low power portable transmitters have limited range.
- (c) Enemy radio-locating equipment can pinpoint the position of a transmitter, forcing frequent changes of channels and of transmitter sites.
- (d) Only a few receivers may be available to the People.

(2) A successful technique used by Aggressor insurgents to counteract enemy radio-location equipment is to set up a transmitter close to a government transmitter. Then broadcasts are made on frequencies proximate to those used by the government. This makes it difficult to locate the insurgent transmitter and attracts the audience listening to the government broadcasts since they are able to hear the clandestine broadcast in the background.

b. Newspapers and Leaflets.

(1) Newspapers and leaflets are used extensively by Aggressor insurgents. This is an excellent means of conducting propaganda as printed material can be reused by passing it from person to person. Newspapers are used to keep the people informed and to rally them against the enemy. Newspapers are also used to describe how to conduct sabotage.

(2) In order to print newspapers and leaflets, quantities of paper, ink and

other supplies are needed. These are procured from outside the target country or are confiscated from the enemy. Elaborate systems of distribution are established to assure the printed material is delivered to those for whom intended and is less likely to fall into enemy hands.

c. Slogans Written on Walls. Another way of transmitting information and harassing the enemy is by writing slogans or symbols on walls in public places that are convenient to the target group. These slogans are displayed on walls in such a way that they cannot be easily erased. Much use is made of jokes and cartoons conveying disrespect and resistance in a socially acceptable manner.

d. Word of Mouth. In countries where a large portion of the population is illiterate and few radio receivers are available, word of mouth messages are the principal means of communication. Agitators who spread rumors seek locations such as market places. They circulate through the crowd spreading rumors and appealing for aid to the insurgent movement. In some instances, propaganda messengers go from village to village singing revolutionary songs.

5-12. Mob Violence

a. Mobs and demonstrations are used very effectively by Aggressor insurgents. Insurgents work on the assumption that bloodshed can be very effective in giving the proper impetus to the cause they are promoting. They use women and children for acts of violence to inhibit the police in their use of countermeasures or at least to embarrass them. Women and children are also used to mock enemy troops. The hope is that an enemy soldier will be so infuriated as to attack one of these people and hence arouse the wrath of the populace.

b. Insurgents go to great lengths to organize a demonstration. Often large numbers of people are hired to put on a demonstration. Included in the mob are many hoodlums armed with long wooden clubs and placards. Once the mob is gathered, it is organized as follows:

(1) *External command.* Insurgent lead-

ers who comprise the external command remain some distance from the scene of the immediate action observing and issuing orders from a place of relative safety.

(2) *Internal command.* The insurgent cadre which implements the orders from the external command is located within the mob. Because this cadre is in the midst of the action, great care is taken to protect its leaders.

(3) *Bodyguards.* Bodyguards surround the internal command shielding it from the police and assisting in its escape if necessary. They also flank the mob and guard the banner carriers.

(4) *Banner carriers.* These men carry banners which are switched upon instructions. At first, signs with slogans expressing popular grievances are used. Then as the mob becomes frenzied, the signs are switched for others bearing Aggressor propaganda. Key insurgents are stationed near conspicuous banners so that they can be easily found by messengers bearing instructions from the leaders.

(5) *Cheering sections.* Demonstrators carefully rehearse slogans to be shouted and the sequence in which they are to be used.

(6) *Messengers.* These people deliver messages between the external and internal commands.

(7) *Shock guards.* These men carrying clubs march along the side of the mob. If the insurgents are engaged by police, they rush into the center of the mob. This sudden and violent action provides enough diversion to enable the internal cadre to escape. The police are left with only bystanders, unknowing excitement seekers, and sympathizers.

5-13. Passive Resistance

a. Passive resistance is an important supplement to major underground activities, particularly since it allows sympathizers to aid the

movement with relatively little risk. One advantage of passive resistance is that the offenses committed are so trivial that the governing authority will not take extreme countermeasures. Particularly if many engage in such activity, the government is unlikely to undertake any severe punitive action. A second advantage is that this type of activity camouflages an organized underground; hence enhancing its effectiveness.

b. Some passive resistance activities are—

- (1) *Boycotts.* By boycotting certain products, markets or activities, the resisters show contempt for governing authority; thereby affecting the morale of enemy forces or supporters.
- (2) *Social ostracism.* Collaborators or people sympathetic to the enemy authority are frequently targets of ostracism. To maximize its effect, ostracism is best employed against a particular group of people who are easily identifiable and small in number. Exploitation of existing prejudices to minorities or special interest groups (such as a religious sect) assist in magnifying the effect of ostracism.
- (3) *Fear and suggestion.* Telephoned threats, bomb scares, and threats to contaminate drinking water are matters which the police must investigate and against which they must take precautionary action. Such activities divert the attention of the police and reduce their effectiveness against more important activities.
- (4) *Overloading the system.* By following enemy governmental instructions to report suspicious incidents and persons, large numbers of people can turn in false alarms or make unfounded denunciations of people suspected of aiding the insurgents. In this way the enemy governmental authority is so overloaded that valid reports cannot be handled.
- (5) *Absenteeism and slowdowns.* Production is hampered when workers fail

to report for reasons of illness or when they go to work but create deliberate errors or work slowly.

5-14. Coercion

a. Aggressor policy is to win support wherever possible through persuasion alone. When this is not possible, coercion or intimidation will often be used to obtain the support of undecided or uncommitted people.

b. Insurgents, for instance, will ask fellow members of a union to pay a small amount of monthly dues to the CTP. Rather than risk trouble over such a small amount, workers usually contribute. Then the insurgents will ask for a larger amount threatening to expose the workers to the enemy government as members of the CTP if they do not further cooperate.

5-15. Threats

a. Threats consist of two parts: The demand and the punishment. Both, in order for the threat to be effective, are so stated that they cannot be misunderstood by the individual or group to which the threat is directed.

b. Demands are always made upon tangible actions. Some examples are: paying money to the insurgent organization, not giving aid or money to the enemy, and providing information on the enemy's activities.

c. Punishment is also always accomplished when the demand is not met. Some examples of punishment are: confiscating an individual's valuable possessions, bombing a home, causing bodily harm to members of the individual's family, and assassinations.

5-16. Terrorism

a. Because terror is a state of mind, Aggressor carefully assesses the probable reactions that may follow it. Such acts as mass murders, assassinations, and bombings will usually produce fear, but this fear does not necessarily lead people into the insurgent ranks. It may lead them to indignation and cause them to sympathize with the enemy. For this reason, Aggressor restricts its use of mass terror.

b. Aggressor advocates the selective use of terror as opposed to mass terror. The assassination of a government official will lead some

people to refrain from seeking public office and this will weaken the enemy government. Likewise, the assassination of a village leader will make it difficult to obtain another leader enabling the insurgent movement to have more freedom of action. Such actions display the government's inability to protect its officials, causing the populace to lose respect for the government.

5-17. Bribes

While Aggressor does not advocate the extensive use of bribes, insurgents do use them successfully. Money, food which may be rationed or other hard to obtain necessities may be given to an individual in return for a service. Such an individual may be an enemy government official who is required to disrupt the workings of a particular department in some manner. Or it may be a private citizen who will be required to obtain information pertaining to the enemy or perform a small act of sabotage.

5-18. Subversive Political Action

a. The General Plan. Insurgents infiltrate communications and transportation industries, labor unions and student organizations. The purpose of this infiltration is to cause members, especially leaders, of these organizations to become sympathetic to the insurgency. Subversion of communications and transportation industries disrupts enemy activities. Control of unions enables union funds to be diverted to insurgent activities but more important to call strikes and riots. Infiltration of the leadership of student groups permits the organization of demonstrations against actions of the enemy government.

b. Leadership Tactics. Insurgents influence the actions of industries, labor unions and student organizations by obtaining leadership positions. An insurgent seeking leadership in an organization, takes the initiative in planning activities, and volunteers for any job no matter how unpleasant. He avoids any appearance of subversive activity. His candidacy is supported by cell members in the rank and file, but close ties between the candidate and his cell collaborators are hidden from the general member-

ship. Thus, having demonstrated that he is active, eager and capable, and having the apparent unsolicited support of a number of members, the insurgent rises to a position of leadership.

c. Membership Tactics. Insurgents take active part in meetings of organizations they have infiltrated. By having the most vocal group insurgents can pass resolutions which the apathetic or outmaneuvered majority may not favor. Thus this small group is easily able to influence the direction of an organization and eventually gain control.

d. Letter-Writing Campaigns.

- (1) Aggressor uses letters as a device to tie up the police and channel the police into work not dangerous to insurgency. One means of accomplishing this is by sending anonymous letters to the police headquarters denouncing enemy governmental officials for acts of disloyalty. These accusations charge that officials accepted money in return for favors, or that they associated with the insurgents. Police investigators disprove these charges but much time is wasted in surveillance and cross-examinations.
- (2) Insurgents also use letters to disrupt production. This may be carried out by sending forged enemy government instructions to factory and workshop managers proclaiming a certain day as a holiday. These instructions are sent just before the appointed holiday leaving little time to discover the forgery. If not discovered production loss will be considerable. If discovered the resultant investigations will consume valuable time and effort.

5-19. Sabotage

Aggressor doctrine states that sabotage is to be used to destroy a target not easily reached by irregular or regular forces. Sabotage is divided into two categories: selective and general. Selective sabotage is carried out by cells trained for this purpose, while general sabotage is conducted by the populace at large.

a. Selective Sabotage. The aim of selective sabotage is to incapacitate that which cannot easily be replaced or repaired in time to meet the enemy's crucial need. The length of delay required varies with the target. A tactical target such as a bridge, which might be crucial in the transport of troops and supplies to an area of operation, need be removed from use for only a few hours or a day. A strategic target such as a factory, however, must be incapacitated for a much longer period, perhaps months, if the action is to be effective. Because sabotage of strategic targets normally requires a larger number of people to be successful, insurgents place primary emphasis on tactical targets. Careful planning precedes all selective sabotage operations.

b. General Sabotage. General sabotage operations are conducted not only to hamper the enemy's military effort but also to encourage the populace to engage in general acts of destruction. Although destruction acts do not have much material effect, they do provide a stimulant for the population to fight the enemy. To foster general sabotage, insurgents instruct the population in certain techniques. These techniques are limited to making simple devices, e.g., homemade incendiary grenades (Molotov cocktails) and fragmentary hand grenades which do not require technical skills or elaborate equipment.

5-20. Espionage

Espionage is another activity conducted by insurgents. Enemy personnel are recruited as sources of information in governmental agencies, military organizations, and industry. These sources are primarily collectors of intelligence information which is needed by the insurgents for the planning of political and

military operations. Secondly, the sources permit insurgents to determine those individuals who violently oppose the insurgency. These latter are closely watched and if their actions seriously threaten the insurgency, they are assassinated.

5-21. Agrarian Reform

a. Primarily during the early stages of an insurgency, Aggressor conducts a campaign for agrarian reform. Insurgents convince the peasants that they should own the land they work on, not the government or rich landowners.

b. If the land occupied by the peasants is owned by landowners, agitators going from village to village propagandize against the paying of rent. If enough of the peasants subscribe to this action, landowners vacate the land either because of a lack of capital or because of threats made against them and their families. After departure of the landowners, the land is divided among the peasants. The insurgents then require the peasants to pay a nominal amount to them for furthering the Aggressor cause. The peasants do not object because they feel the land was obtained through the efforts of the insurgents and that additional benefits might be gained by cooperating with them.

c. If the land occupied by the peasants is government-controlled, a similar procedure is followed by the insurgents. In this instance the peasants are persuaded not to pay the taxes imposed by the government. Tax collectors and police sent by the government to collect the taxes are assassinated and soon it is possible for the peasants to control the land. Then a tax is levied on the peasants by the insurgents.

Section III. GUERRILLA WARFARE DOCTRINE

5-22. Fundamental Axiom

Aggressor guerrilla warfare actions are based on the axiom "Conserve our strength and destroy the strength of the enemy." It is applicable from the simple case of the soldier who shoots at an enemy from a covered posi-

tion to the more complicated example of a battalion ambushing an enemy unit.

5-23. Basic Doctrine

Guerrilla warfare doctrine is based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It is adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the

existing lines of communication, the weather, and the support which can be expected from the populace in the area of operation. Basically, the doctrine is: when the enemy advances, withdraw; when he defends, harass; when he is tired, attack; and when he withdraws, pursue. The objective of this doctrine is to tire the enemy in preparation for eventual defeat by regular forces.

5-24. Essential Guerrilla Task

At the beginning of guerrilla warfare, an essential task of guerrillas is to keep from being destroyed. Survival can best be assured by taking positions that are relatively impossible to approach or reach enabling guerrillas to evade the enemy. As individuals and units become accustomed to operating from relatively inaccessible positions, an advantage is gained over the enemy. He can then be attacked at his nearest point to guerrilla positions and later operations can be launched deeper into enemy territory against communications and bases of operations.

5-25. Operational Techniques

A basic Aggressor guerrilla technique is to keep the enemy constantly off balance through an initial seizure and subsequent maintaining of the initiative. Taking maximum advantage of their mobility and ability to remain undetected until the last moment, Aggressor guerrillas give the enemy the impression that he is surrounded and fully at their mercy. Outposts are attacked and liquidated where possible, and an attempt is made to keep the enemy from obtaining rest and sleep. Enemy positions in heavily wooded areas are harassed day and night; those in open areas by night patrols. In order to accomplish this, cooperation of the populace and a perfect knowledge of the terrain are necessary.

5-26. Political Objective

The political objective of military operations overshadows all other aspects. The mission of the military is not merely to eliminate enemy positions but to win the support of the people. Tactical instruction continually emphasizes that the principal goal is to liberate the inhabitants within the area of an operation.

5-27. Factors of Guerrilla Warfare

The three interrelated factors of Aggressor guerrilla warfare are—

- a. A set of six tactical principles.
- b. Completely accurate and current intelligence.
- c. Detailed planning, training, and rehearsal for every operation.

5-28. Six Tactical Principles

a. *Mobility.* Mobility permits guerrilla units to concentrate quickly in a given area, assume positions almost immediately and depart an area on a moment's notice. Units are capable of moving considerable distances in short periods of time, often marching several nights to the area of operations. After an attack is launched and is successful, the units depart the area, usually in another direction from which they arrived. Mobility also permits guerrilla units to escape from the threat of encirclement.

b. *Surprise.* The tactical principle of surprise combines the elements of speed, secrecy and the capability of choosing the objective as well as the time and place to attack. Speedy movements are possible because guerrillas are not encumbered with an excessive amount of equipment. Few support-type units are needed, and there is no heavy equipment to be moved. Secrecy is achieved by marching at night avoiding villages and inhabited areas. Many ruses are used to disguise the place and time of an attack. One is to mislead the enemy into believing an attack would take place at a time and place other than that actually scheduled. This is achieved by providing double agents with false documents and by giving the incorrect information to local inhabitants collaborating with the enemy. Another ruse is to overtly move units away from the direction of the attack only to have them return by a covert route.

c. *Undermine Enemy Morale.* Aggressor believes the undermining of enemy morale is an absolute necessity; consequently, every available means is used to accomplish this important tactical principle. Agents are infiltrated into enemy camps to encourage treason and

spread propaganda. Threats are made against pro-enemy families. Bribes are paid to persons usually in positions of authority in order to induce them to perform illegal functions beneficial to the insurgents. Women are used for blackmail and bribery purposes.

d. Security. Much emphasis is placed on the security of insurgent forces. Special intelligence units are organized to screen and cover movements of irregular as well as regular units. These intelligence units also infiltrate enemy positions to obtain information on the preparedness and morale of the enemy. Local units cover the movement of district and provincial units which in turn cover the movement of regular units. Local inhabitants also cooperate by not disclosing any information or by giving the enemy false information as to the whereabouts or movements of insurgent forces.

e. Collaboration of Population. In all military actions, collaboration of the population is considered essential as insurgent forces operate from bases which exist because of the attitude of local population. This means that collaboration is an integral part of insurgent operations as acquiring additional area is one of the chief aims of insurgent forces. Attacks, for example, are launched not only to liquidate enemy military units, but to gain control of the population, for without control of the population the ground gained cannot be an asset to the insurgent cause.

f. Flexibility. Flexibility permits the guerrilla to adapt himself to all circumstances. While regular warfare follows a firm set of tactical principles, guerrilla units change their tactics frequently during the fight in an attempt to surprise the enemy. This is necessary in order to overcome the numerical superiority which enemy units invariably have over the friendly.

5-29. Intelligence

a. Aggressor intelligence policy is based on the Chinese adage, "Know yourself and your adversary and you will be able to fight a hundred battles without a single disaster." Nothing provides more assistance to insurgent

forces than correct and current information regarding the enemy.

b. In each country an elite intelligence corps is formed within the military. The corps is composed of Circle Trigon Party members chosen because of their special physical, mental, and moral qualifications. After members are assigned to the corps they undergo intensive training prior to being assigned to guerrilla units. Because the intelligence corps is the reconnaissance element of the military, training stresses the improvement of hearing, observation and the preparation of reports

c. While the intelligence corps employs such comparatively modern methods as telephone and radio intercept, it depends heavily on interrogations of local civilians. They are probably the most valuable means of obtaining information pertaining to enemy activities. Every man, woman and child is considered a potential agent by the intelligence corps. As many as possible are recruited to provide information concerning the enemy. An espionage net is established in every village. Thus, a single careless spoken word or the movement of enemy vehicles or personnel is reported almost immediately to the espionage system. The intelligence corps evaluates the information and relays it to the military, enabling countermeasures to be taken in time to prevent the enemy from successfully accomplishing his mission.

5-30. Detailed Planning

Insurgent forces place considerable emphasis on planning for any type of operation. A plan is considered necessary regardless of the size of a unit whether it be a squad or a regiment. Plans include military as well as political instructions, the matter of supply and equipment, and the proper means of cooperating with local civilians. After a plan is formulated it is discussed with all participants and assignments of duties are made. Improvised sand tables, such as diagramming the operation in the dirt with a stick, are used as training aids. Then the plan is rehearsed as many times as deemed necessary over the exact terrain, if possible; or a terrain similar to that where the operation will take place.

5-31. Offensive Categories

Aggressor guerrilla warfare doctrine emphasizes offensive action as the primary means of successful operations. The three broad categories of offensive action are attacks, meeting engagements, and ambushes.

5-32. Attacks

a. Attacks are operations against outposts, training centers, villages and sometimes capitals of districts and provinces. Great effort is expended to make sure no pattern is established as where and when they will be launched.

b. In addition to the factors of guerrilla warfare (para 5-25), certain other tactical principles are applicable to attack tactics. They are—

- (1) Planning routes of escape.
- (2) Considering the possibility of being reinforced by reserves.
- (3) Protecting the roads and areas which support and reserves must use to move to the point of attack.
- (4) Numerical superiority at the point of action.

5-33. Meeting Engagements

a. Aggressor defines a meeting engagement as an unexpected and sudden meeting of two opposing forces neither of which knows the other's strength, weapons, composition or mission. In such a situation neither force has an operation plan. Aggressor realizes they will usually be at a disadvantage in such a situation; therefore, meeting engagements are avoided if possible.

b. Realizing meeting engagements cannot be avoided in all instances, Aggressor trained guerrillas, if possible, will immediately break contact unless they have the advantage. In the event that they cannot break contact or immediately see that they have the advantage, the basic tenets are—

- (1) Deploy troops to critical terrain before the enemy does.
- (2) Open fire before the enemy does.
- (3) Assault before the enemy does.

c. In order to preclude the possibility of meeting engagements, Aggressor doctrine stresses the need for security and silent com-

munications. Scouts precede the main body and both flank and rear security are established. When any of these security elements detect the enemy, word is passed quickly and silently to the commander. While this is being done the remainder of the security element takes positions which permit observation of the enemy unit.

5-34. Ambushes

a. Aggressor divides ambushes into two main categories—

- (1) The "hit and run" which is designed to delay the enemy unit, to inflict casualties, to cause the enemy unit to deploy a portion of its force for route protection, or to disrupt their communications.
- (2) The "annihilation," which has the purpose of intercepting, encircling by surprise, and destroying an enemy unit.

b. The hit-and-run ambush is used primarily during Phase 2 of an insurgency. It is used to restrict the action of the ambushed force, and also to assist other types of guerrilla operations. In the latter instance, its purposes are to cover the withdrawal of a guerrilla force and to prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching an area of operation. The principal difference between the hit-and-run and the annihilation ambush is that in the former guerrillas do not normally deploy force to the rear of the ambushed enemy unit. Strength of a hit-and-run ambush force may vary from half a squad to a company.

c. The annihilation ambush is used only during Phases 2 and 3 of an insurgency. There are two types—

- (1) *Ambush of a small force.* The main objective of the ambush of a small force is the center of the column where the headquarters of the ambushed unit is likely to be located. Secondary objectives are the blocking of the enemy's retreat and the interception of reinforcements. About half of the ambush force is committed to the main objective. The remainder of the force is split with the majority

being employed to the rear and the others to the front of the ambushed unit. Initially small groups occupy prepared ambush positions. After the enemy force has reached the ambush site and is fired upon, the main body move to its position.

- (2) *Ambush of a large force.* At times, the enemy unit is so large that one unit does not have sufficient strength to ambush the enemy force. When this occurs, three units rather than one are employed. One element occupies prepared positions blocking the advance of the enemy unit. When the lead element of the enemy unit reaches the blocking position it is fired upon by the blocking force. At this time the main assault force attacks both flanks of the enemy column while the third element moves into positions to the rear of the column. These tactics enable the guerrilla units to completely surround the enemy force preventing the withdrawal of the ambushed unit. Also, reinforcements are prevented from reaching the position. The blocking force may be as large as a company, the main assault force possibly five companies and the rear blocking force three companies.

5-35. Defense

In view of the fact that aggressor guerrilla warfare doctrine emphasizes offensive action little emphasis is placed on defensive tactics. In order to preclude the need for defensive operations, elaborate precautions are taken to prevent the discovery of guerrilla positions. Positions are located in relatively inaccessible terrain; only the most trusted civilians know of their locations; outposts are established which can notify the position well in advance of the enemy's presence; and positions are well camouflaged.

5-36. Defensive Tactics

Disappearing is the principal defensive tactic. All villages and positions are organized in such a manner that even if the enemy launches

a surprise attack, everyone is able to disappear on a given signal. When a surprise attack is launched, militia units establish a perimeter defense around the position permitting regional and regular forces time to escape. The two methods of disappearing are:

- a. To retreat into previously prepared hiding places in the area. These hiding places can be subterranean caves, specially constructed tunnels, and positions prepared in the banks of rivers. The latter usually originate below the water level. All of these are well camouflaged and usually stocked with food and water in the event concealment is necessary for several days. Tunnels are constructed in several levels with secret doors leading from one level to another. They are also equipped so the defender can fire from one place to cover his movement to another. In addition, concealed pits are constructed to trap and injure the attacker.
- b. To retreat individually or in small groups either into the woods or neighboring villages where the guerrillas simply melt into the population.

5-37. Communications

While telephones are sometimes used and in rare instances carrier pigeons are pressed into service, guerrilla forces rely primarily upon radios and messengers as means of communication. The insurgent communications system serves not only the military units but is also used for political, propaganda and intelligence activities. Communications personnel are carefully selected for their assignments and receive extensive training. As with other types of equipment, the quantity and quality of communications material increase as the insurgency progresses. However, even at the onset of guerrilla operations, the communications system operates most efficiently.

5-38. Handling of Prisoners of War

a. Neither the regional nor the regular forces take large numbers of prisoners because prisoners slow down operations and cause special security problems. In addition, prisoners require a certain amount of food which is often a scarce commodity.

b. Immediately upon capture, prisoners are guarded and bound usually by tying their

elbows behind their backs. After collecting captured arms and equipment in the area of operation, prisoners are marched, under guard, to a base area whose location is concealed by taking devious routes, marching at night or even blindfolding the prisoners.

5-39. Treatment of Prisoners

a. Prisoners are afforded identical medical treatment and receive the same food as the insurgents. They are, however, confined to buildings or other restricted areas and are subjected to political indoctrination.

b. Interrogations of prisoners are conducted by trained individuals. Information obtained supplements tactical information which is

usually procured by the insurgent intelligence organization. Prisoners are sometimes threatened with bodily harm or withholding of certain privileges but the threats are seldom carried out.

5-40. Indoctrination of Prisoners

Aggressor insurgent doctrine stresses that the most important reason for taking prisoners is for propaganda exploitation. Almost all of prisoner's time is devoted to political education. The purpose of this policy is to convince him that the insurgent's policy is better than the enemy's. Once a prisoner accepts this idea he is released with instructions to convert as many of the enemy as possible to the Aggressor's ideology.

PART TWO

AGGRESSOR INSURGENT WARFARE IN NEW FREELAND

CHAPTER 6

BACKGROUND OF AGGRESSOR INSURGENT ACTIVITIES

6-1. Purpose

The purpose of part two is to present a practical application of the doctrine outlined in part one. As a means of application, an Aggressor war is conducted in the fictitious nation of New Freeland, which is a country of geographic, climatic, economic, sociological, and political conditions representing a composite of various countries. An understanding of the insurgent activities presented will enable individuals or units to apply the doctrine, with modifications, to internal defense/internal development in any part of the world.

6-2. Program for World Domination

At the close of World War II, Europe was in great turmoil, the United States was occupied with the problems of demobilization, attempts to re-establish colonialism in Asia caused instability in many countries, and revolutions were taking place in Africa, Latin America, and South America. Based on these chaotic conditions, Aggressor drew up a program for world domination. Basically, this program consisted of acquiring satellite nations, establishing a Circle Trigon Party central committee in every country of the world and acquiring additional territory by conducting insurgent wars in underdeveloped countries.

6-3. Aggressor Satellite Nations

Because of the chaotic conditions which existed after World War II, Aggressor was able to gain almost complete control of several former national powers and to relegate them to the role of satellites. The Circle Trigon

Party has insured the obedience of these countries by installing high ranking members of the Party at their executive levels and by stationing elite Aggressor army units throughout their areas. The armed forces of these satellites have received equipment, only a small portion of which is of the latest design, and technical assistance from Aggressor. Consequently the organizational structure and tactical doctrines of the armed forces of the satellite countries are very similar to Aggressor's.

6-4. World Circle Trigon Party Organization

The Circle Trigon Party is the only, and consequently the ruling, political party in the Aggressor Homeland. It has complete control of the Aggressor government and is pursuing its objective of world domination. In order to accomplish this objective several directorates, corresponding to the large land masses of the world, were formed at the headquarters of the Circle Trigon Party in the Aggressor Homeland. These directorates are: Aggressor Homeland, North America, South America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, Middle East, and Asia. The directorates established Circle Trigon Party headquarters (known as the in-country central committee) in each of the countries located within their respective area of responsibility. These in-country central committees become nucleus of the Aggressor intelligence collection organization.

6-5. Conduct of Insurgent Warfare

Based on the intelligence obtained by an in-country central committee, the decision is made by leaders of the Circle Trigon Party when to

begin active insurgent operations. To date, insurgent warfare has been waged only in underdeveloped countries, but Aggressor believes that in time, and no time limit has been set, insurgencies will take place in highly developed countries. Once the decision is made to begin an insurgency, the primary mission of the in-country central committee is to control the operation. Direction of the insurgency may be controlled directly from the Homeland or from an Aggressor satellite located adjacent to the target country.

6-6. Postwar Hostilonia

a. Prior to World War II, Hostilonia, a country bordering New Freeland on the north (fig C-1), was a colony of Atlantia. During World War II, the country was occupied by the Axis powers. Immediately after the withdrawal of the Axis forces, Atlantia again assumed control. However the Hostilonians had become very nationalistic and desired to become an independent country. Atlantia, because of Hostilonia's rich natural resources, did not desire to grant it independence.

b. Soon a nationalist revolution took place and, in 1947, Atlantia gave control of the Hostilonian government to a group dominated by pro-Atlantian elements. However, the Atlantian decree which granted Hostilonia its semi-independence retained many trade and resource exploitation privileges which caused widespread and intense dissatisfaction with the Atlantian controlled government.

c. A second revolution under the leadership of Fasili Makeban, a militant Circle Trigon Party leader sent to Hostilonia by Aggressor, took place in 1950. As a result of this revolution, the government was replaced by one headed by Makeban and assisted by individuals sympathetic to the Aggressor cause. Thus, another satellite was added to the group already within Aggressor's control.

6-7. Aggressor-Hostilonia Mutual Defense Pact

a. In 1951, Makeban, leader of Hostilonia, and Grandofrato, then dictator of the Aggressor Homeland, signed a Mutual Defense Pact. The pact assured Hostilonia of economic as-

sistance to bolster its economy and promised Hostilonia military support in the event of invasion. In return, Hostilonia permitted the building of military highways from the Hostilonian capital south to points near the New Freeland border, the stockpiling of large quantities of war materiel in Hostilonia and the training of the Hostilonian Army to be supervised by Aggressor military personnel.

b. In 1955, the Aggressor sponsored military activities were nearing completion and Hostilonia agreed to assist Aggressor in conducting an insurgency in New Freeland. Thousands of Hostilonian agents were infiltrated into New Freeland with the mission of conducting an extensive study of the country. The purpose of the study was to—

- (1) Obtain details of road and rail networks and port facilities.
- (2) Survey mountain and marsh regions to determine those areas which could be used for bases of operations.
- (3) Analyze topographical and climatic conditions.
- (4) Catalogue all industries as to their production capacity and vulnerability of their managerial staff to subversion.
- (5) Provide information concerning New Freeland's internal defense capabilities.
- (6) Determine the political and social problems of New Freeland.
- (7) Evaluate leading personalities in the country as to their probable support or resistance to the planned insurgency.
- (8) Provide information on the vulnerability of student and religious groups to control by Aggressor.
- (9) Survey villages and districts to determine those which are antagonistic toward the government of New Freeland.

6-8. Results of the Study

The study, completed early in 1956, revealed—

a. Trails in the Morane Mountains located in southern Hostilonia and northern New Free-

land could be used as routes of infiltration into New Freeland.

b. Bases of operations could be established in the mountains and swamps.

c. The people of New Freeland were generally dissatisfied with the slowness of progress toward modernization and the assumption of quasi-dictatorial powers by Yumjab, the president of New Freeland.

d. Executives of important industries could probably be subverted.

e. Vital information of New Freeland's National Police and Armed Forces to include their organization, equipment, and strength.

f. The political ignorance of the Primipeople living in the Morane Mountains.

g. Eastland farmers were experiencing hardships and were dissatisfied with the national government.

h. The Chinese, Indians, and Occidentals had little representation in the National Assembly.

i. Dissatisfaction with the government by

the Patharis, a large religious group in New Freeland.

j. Influential individuals in government and professions who would probably assist the Aggressor insurgency.

k. Student groups had become disenchanted with New Freeland's ruling political party—the New Freeland Independence Rally (NFIR)—and would support the insurgency.

l. The leaders of the People's Liberation Alliance (PLA), which was outlawed by President Yumjab in 1955, had fled to Hostilonia. Headed by Rab Isa and his young protege Roda Khan these people could be used as a link between the Circle Trigon Party and the insurgent effort in New Freeland.

m. Leaders of the People's Liberation Alliance who rather than leave New Freeland had gone underground could provide the nucleus for an in-country central committee.

n. Members of the People's Liberation Alliance would willingly go to Hostilonia for training in the conduct of insurgency and subsequently return to New Freeland to become leaders of the insurgency.

CHAPTER 7

ORGANIZATION OF THE INSURGENCY IN NEW FREELAND (1955-1961)

7-1. Insurgent Leaders

Based on the study conducted of New Freeland by Hostilonia, members of the Aggressor Circle Trigon Party contacted Rab Isa and Roda Khan (leaders of the People's Liberation Alliance) who had fled to Hostilonia, and asked them to join the party. Without hesitation, both agreed. In the spring of 1956, Isa and Khan, along with several of their fervent followers, were sent to the Aggressor Homeland for consultation with high ranking members of the Circle Trigon Party. The latter were impressed with the New Freelanders and outlined a program of training to prepare them to become the leaders of the insurgency. Upon completion of the training, Isa and Khan returned to Hostilonia and New Freeland respectively to begin operations. Isa's initial mission was to prepare facilities for the training of New Freelanders while Khan was to establish a central committee and recruit individuals for insurgent training.

7-2. Establishment of a Central Committee

Upon returning to New Freeland in the summer of 1956 Roda Khan established the headquarters of the Central Committee in the Morane Mountains near the Hostilonian border. He then divided the country geographically into six regions, 42 provinces and 260 districts. The regions corresponded to the provinces of New Freeland. Provincial and district boundaries were arbitrarily established within regions and districts respectively. Six of Khan's most trusted followers were dispatched to establish central committees in each of the regions. The immediate mission of the committees was to recruit individuals to become leaders of the insurgency.

7-3. Training of New Freelanders in Hostilonia

Recruiting personnel proved to be an easy task as former members of the People's Liberation Alliance were eager to join the insurgent movement. During the fall of 1956, several thousand individuals were sent to Hostilonia where Rab Isa had completed preparations for their training. Initially they were given a short period of intensive political indoctrination followed by three months of basic military training. Those successfully completing this phase were sent to specialty schools operated by Aggressor personnel. Some attended leadership schools where squad, platoon, and company operations were taught. Others went to special operations schools where they learned methods of attracting student groups, labor unions, the Primipeople in the Morane Mountains, members of the Pathari religion, and the peasants to the insurgent cause. Still others were taught how to conduct espionage and sabotage. Those personnel showing the best progress and absolute dedication to the establishment of a new government in New Freeland were trained for leadership positions at the province, district, and village levels. During all types of training, adherence to the policies of the Circle Trigon Party was stressed.

7-4. Organization of the Central Committee

While the insurgents were being trained in Hostilonia, Roda Khan was completing the organization of his Central Committee. Upon direction from the Aggressor Circle Trigon Party, the Central Committee was organized into two sections, the political and the military. The political section, Political Cadre (PC), headed by Adler Condoro, was charged with the political training of the military, the political indoctrination of the populace, subversion, sabotage, espionage, and terrorism. The

military section, People's Liberation Army of New Freeland (PLANF) headed by General Hare Ajoy, was given the mission of organizing guerrilla units and of conducting the military campaign. Plans were made to organize central committees in the provinces and districts in a similar manner to that of the New Freeland Central Committee. At all echelons, the political and military sections would be completely integrated. Committees would become operational as trained personnel became available.

7-5. Preparation for the Insurgents

Upon completion of the plans for organizing the Central Committee, Roda Khan concentrated on preparation for receiving the insurgents being trained in Hostilonia. Lists of the most promising trainees were provided by Rab Isa and they were given tentative assignments in order that training could be concentrated in their particular area of responsibility. Meanwhile, areas for operational bases were selected. A few of the bases were made operational in order to provide areas for processing the insurgents. These were stocked with clothing, documents, money, weapons, and other material needed by the trained insurgents to accomplish their missions.

7-6. Establishment of a Front

In order to obtain the support of the masses, the outlawed People's Liberation Alliance was established as the front organization to provide cover for the Central Committee. This move assured the insurgents of the support of a large number of people who had no Circle Trigon Party leanings but looked to the People's Liberation Alliance as the focus of opposition to Yumjab and his policies. As central committees were organized in the provinces and districts, branches of the People's Liberation Alliance and humanitarian organizations directed by the Alliance were established in the same area.

7-7. Trained Insurgents Return to New Freeland

By the summer of 1957, New Freelanders trained in Hostilonia (now full-fledged insur-

gents), Aggressor technicians, and advisors began infiltrating back into New Freeland. They traveled in groups of five to twenty following trails through the Moranes used only by smugglers and Primipeople. The infiltrators, observing strict security measures, marched at night sleeping during daylight hours at rest stations established along the routes. Upon arrival at one of the operational base areas, they were issued clothing, proper credentials (identification card, ration card, employment permit) to establish a cover story, money, and other items required to accomplish their mission. After spending a few days at a base camp, they departed individually for their place of assignment.

7-8. Initial Activities of the Insurgents

The number of trained insurgents was small in comparison to the population of New Freeland; consequently, they were not capable of launching the insurgency themselves. They concentrated on recruiting additional personnel for the insurgent movement and organizing them into cells. Cells were formed to conduct agitation, psychological operations, mob violence, passive resistance, coercion, threats, terrorism, bribery, sabotage espionage and agrarian reform. Early in 1958 many of the cells were organized and by the summer of that year some were operational.

7-9. Early Objectives of the Insurgency

Realizing active military operations could not begin for some time, the Central Committee devoted almost all of its energy toward political, economic, psychological operations and social objectives. These included—

- a. Establishing additional base areas.
- b. Converting the Primipeople.
- c. Converting the villages.
- d. Agrarian reform.
- e. Infiltrating student groups.
- f. Infiltrating unions.
- g. Subverting individuals in government and industry.
- h. Infiltrating the Pathari religion.
- i. Organizing militia and guerrilla forces.
- j. Conducting propaganda campaign.
- k. Sabotaging communications.

7-10. Converting the Primipeople

a. Agitation cells began operating in the villages of the Primipeople in the fall of 1958. At first the chiefs of the villages were apprehensive toward the insurgents, but as it became evident they were sincerely interested in the welfare of the Primipeople, village meetings were arranged at which the agitators were permitted to speak. These representatives of the political cadre spoke eloquently, playing upon the Primipeople's antipathy toward the Synthese, the despised "flatlanders" who governed New Freeland, and encouraging them to form a Primipeople Confederation.

b. In addition to the agitation cells, psychological operations and passive resistance cells also were operating. Their theme was the same as the agitation cells. Individuals assigned to these cells had to be especially careful not to arouse the suspicion of the Primipeople.

c. Response to the activities of the political cadre-controlled cells was most gratifying. By early 1959 most of the villages had agreed to becoming a part of the Primipeople Confederation which in actuality is a front organization for the insurgents in the Morane Mountains.

7-11. Conversion of the Villages

a. At the same time the Primipeople were being converted, political cadre cells were also active in the other villages throughout the country. The approach to the peasants was much the same as that used on the Primipeople. Agitation cells would convince the Chief to arrange meetings of the villagers. During the meetings, members of the cells would accuse the New Freeland government of not being concerned with the peasant's problems and of being controlled by the Atlantian monopolists. The agitation cells promised the people ownership of land, a voice in the government, and better living conditions if they would provide assistance to the agitator's cause. All promises were made in the name of the People's Liberation Alliance, with no mention ever being made of the central committee or its affiliation with the Circle Trigon Party.

b. Psychological operations and passive resistance cells operated in conjunction with the

agitators. Leaflets were distributed to the villagers, slogans were written on walls, and messages were passed by word of mouth. These media contained the same ideas as did the speeches of the agitators.

c. As a result of these activities, many villages decided to assist the insurgents. In those villages which did not desire to assist, threat, terror, and coercion cells were then employed. One of the most used procedures was terrorism. A special terrorist cell would enter a village, kill the Chief, and hang his body in the village square for everyone to see. This tactic had three major accomplishments. First, the villagers were apt to change their minds. Second, news of the disaster had considerable effect on the attitude of neighboring villages. Third, it made the villagers feel totally at the insurgent's mercy and underlined the inability of the government authorities to protect them. Another procedure was to threaten the lives of families of leading citizens of the villages if they didn't cooperate. Still another procedure was to threaten exposure of an individual to the government for an illicit act he may or may not have committed. A promise was made that the individual would not be exposed if he cooperated.

7-12. Activation of Base Areas

a. During the winter of 1957 and 1958, a few of the previously selected base areas were activated for the purpose of processing the insurgents arriving in New Freeland. These bases, located in the Morane Mountains, would continue to be used for this purpose and as bases of supply for the insurgency.

b. By late 1959, the Primipeople and many villages were converted to the insurgent cause. Khan decided the proper time had arrived for the activation of additional bases as they were necessary to provide areas from which guerrilla operations could be launched. Not all of the previously selected base areas were located in areas where the people were sympathetic to the Aggressor cause. Those located in favorable areas were activated and personnel assigned to administer them. As the bases became operational, activities continued in an attempt to expand the base areas.

7-13. Agrarian Reform

An attempt was always made by the insurgents to carry out any promise made to the people. One of the promises which was relatively easy to fulfill by the insurgents was agrarian reform. By late 1958 and early 1959 the National Appraisal Act, previously passed by the government of New Freeland, had proved to be a failure. Therefore it was only necessary to encourage the peasants to occupy the land acquired by the government from the plantation owners and the Christian Church. The insurgents covertly assisted in dividing the lands among the peasants. The government reaction was either to ignore the peasant's actions or to move in with heavy-handed repressive measures. The insurgents profited in both instances, in the first they emphasized to the peasants the impotence of governmental authority, in the second they emphasized governmental brutal oppression. Later, when they were able to exercise control over a given area, the insurgents continued the land distribution program but they in turn became the recipients of the peasant's taxes.

7-14. Urban Insurgent Organization

Simultaneous with organizational activities in the rural area, cells were also active in the urban centers. Individuals were infiltrating student groups and unions, subverting employees in governmental agencies and industry, and infiltrating the Pathari religion.

7-15. Infiltrating Student Groups

Realizing the inherent capability possessed by the Tamaburen (organization of high school students) and the Saridaburen (organization of college students) in furthering the insurgent effort, the insurgents trained for this purpose began infiltrating those organizations in late 1958. By 1960 both groups were under control of the insurgents and they began quiet demonstrations and peaceful picketing against the policies of Uttar Yumjab, president of New Freeland. By 1962, the groups became more active and outspoken toward the government. Ironically one of the groups' salient issues was the government's failure to curb guerrilla activities in the rural areas.

7-16. Infiltrating Unions

Unobtrusively, insurgents gained important positions in several of the more important labor unions in New Freeland. By 1962 three of the largest unions, the Coast City Dock Workers, the United Mine Workers Union in Mining City (see fig. C-1 for locations), and the Rail Transportation Union were completely infiltrated. In the spring of 1962, factional disputes in the United Mine Workers Union erupted weakening its support Yumjab's government. At about the same time, the Coast City Dock Workers Union and the Rail Transport Union went on strike. These strikes disrupted communications and transportation facilities halting the export of pineapples, sugar, bananas, and tea which had an adverse effect on the already poor economic conditions in New Freeland.

7-17. Subverting Individuals in Government and Industry

a. Simultaneous with other operations, political cadre personnel began subverting individuals in government and industry. Members of subversion cells had obtained employment with the government and began approaching middle-rank civil servants. Later, individuals in the National Assembly as well as a few cabinet members were contacted. The mission of the subvertists was to persuade the civil servants to become members of the People's Liberation Alliance; thereby, assuring that some individuals familiar with governmental operations would be available after overthrow of the government by the insurgents.

b. A similar campaign to subvert individuals in industry was also initiated. But rather than concentrate on the subversion of New Freelanders a concerted effort was launched to cause the Atlantians to leave the country. The Atlantians were subjected to assassination, intimidation, and kidnapping. Signs were posted in conspicuous places demanding they go home. Despite government promises of greater salaries, additional police protection, and other benefits, nearly all were coerced into fleeing the country by 1962. Their loss was keenly felt by the government for they had comprised nearly 60 percent of the country's industrial

technical staff. After they departed, many of their positions were filled by political cadre personnel trained in the Aggressor Homeland and other countries of the world.

7-18. Infiltrating the Pathari Religion

a. The group of Synthese (the largest ethnic fashion faction in New Freeland) who belonged to the Pathari sect has long resented religious discrimination by the Christian Synthese, who looked upon the former as "barbarious" and an "outmoded and primitive sect." Although the Pathari sect first gained followers among natives inhabiting the western part of the Central Plateau and peasant farmers of the savanna region, several moved to major cities and were employed as laborers in factories and mills. They became quite influential in the unskilled laborer class. Some of the grievances that stemmed from this traditional hatred of the Christian Synthese were that in spite of being the majority group, the Pathari were underpaid, decent job opportunities were denied them, and they were forced to live in the poorer sections of the cities.

b. The political cadre (PC) capitalized on such conditions and formed an organization called the "Pathari Believers Movement" which advocated relief from the religious discrimination and oppression of the New Freeland government. Many followers from the unskilled laborers in urban areas were recruited and the movement expanded to Pathari living in rural areas, the majority of whom also responded favorably. It was soon to become one of the most aggressive insurgent organizations.

7-19. Formation of Militia

As soon as a village became converted to the insurgent cause, militia units were formed. They were formed by organizing squads of physically able young men. In larger villages several squads would be formed and the most capable leader chosen to organize a platoon. In no instance was a unit larger than a platoon formed. The militia units were equipped with any type of weapons available. These were often obsolete or homemade models. Personnel were not full time soldiers but performed their usual avocations (farmer, laborer, artisan)

during the day and trained in the evening. Training, which consisted primarily of political indoctrination and some basic military subjects, was supervised by political cadre personnel who had been trained in Hostilonia. Ostensibly the mission of the militia units was to provide protection for the villages, but in reality they were to provide personnel for the guerrilla units to be formed at a later time.

7-20. Formation of Regional Forces

By 1961, militia units had been organized in hundreds of villages and the decision was made to organize regional forces. To supervise the formation of guerrilla units and their initial training, Hostilonia-trained advisory personnel were infiltrated into New Freeland. Additional personnel had to be recruited by the local militia to replace those used to form the regional units. By the fall of 1961 platoons had been organized in almost all the districts and formation of companies at the provincial level had begun. (For organization of guerrilla units see para 4-10 and fig 4-6.) Total strength of the regional units by mid-1962 was about 10,000 personnel in addition to 20,000 militia.

7-21. Propaganda Operations

a. From the beginning of the insurgency propaganda cells supported all other activities. A radio station had been established in Hostilonia near the border of New Freeland in 1956. This station was powerful enough to reach all the Primipeople in the Morane Mountains and the peasants in Eastland and Westland provinces. Another station, a mobile unit, began operating in the southern Alto Mountain area in 1960. Thus after radio receivers were distributed to the villages and workers in the city, propaganda broadcasts could be heard by almost everyone on a scheduled basis.

b. In Capital City, the Central Committee began printing a newspaper, "The Spark," in 1960. At first "The Spark" was published only weekly but by 1961 daily editions were printed. Copies were distributed throughout Capital City and sent to the other cities by covert means. Eventually copies were even passed to some of the villages where literate individuals read them aloud at public gatherings.

c. The political Section of the Central Committee through the People's Liberation Alliance supervised the operations of the radio stations and the printing of "The Spark." All programs and all articles had to be approved by the Political Section before broadcasting or printing. The aim of the propaganda was to assist the other activities in converting the people to the insurgent cause. Some broadcasts and articles attacked Yumjab's regime by exaggerating its weaknesses. Others emphasized the prejudices of minority groups toward the government.

7-22. Sabotaging Communication Facilities

Those insurgents trained in the conduct of sabotage began operating shortly after entering New Freeland. Cells were formed for the destruction of rail lines, roads, docks, and oil pipelines. Operations were restricted to blowing portions of the short spur railroads, knocking out small sections of the highways and trails, damaging unloading facilities at the docks, and causing failures at some of the pumping stations on the pipelines. Plans were made for the destruction of larger targets, such as rail and road bridges, at a later date.

7-23. Guerrilla Operations (1961)

a. As early as 1961 squad size regional units began active operations. The first objectives were the assassination of government tax collectors sent to the villages to collect land rent from the peasants. By means of an excellent intelligence system guerrillas knew the exact schedule and composition of the tax collector teams. Teams were composed of one or two tax collectors and two to four na-

tional policemen. By means of prior planning, guerrilla squads had little difficulty ambushing many of the teams and killing the personnel.

b. In some instances the plantation owners had not vacated the land as required by the National Appraisal Act. Obviously the government was not going to enforce the law so the guerrillas decided to terrorize the owners. Squad size units attacked and killed plantation owners as well as members of their families. News of these operations spread causing plantation owners not killed to vacate the land permitting the plantations to be divided among the peasants.

c. Other operations were launched against the National Police outposts located along the Hostilonian border. Squads attacked outposts consisting of six or less men, annihilated them and captured their equipment. By late 1961 and early 1962, a few of the larger outposts were attacked by regional platoons. The primary purpose of these attacks was to obtain arms and equipment for the regional units.

d. As a result of the guerrilla attacks, government military forces began operations against suspected guerrilla locations. The government operations were always unsuccessful as the guerrilla intelligence system knew the details of every attack. This information permitted the guerrillas to vanish but more important to ambush the advance guard of the government forces. In isolated instances, district guerrilla companies were employed to ambush the governmental units but in no instance did the guerrilla companies actually attack outposts.

CHAPTER 8

EXPANSION OF THE INSURGENCY IN NEW FREELAND (1962-1965)

8-1. Escalation of Military Activities by PLANF (1962-1963)

a. Prior to 1962 regional guerrilla operations were minor in nature. The first full-fledged operations began in early 1962 with well organized and highly successful ambushes of government military reconnaissance patrols and raids against military outposts, armories, and small town garrisons. In the beginning, these operations were limited to a relatively small scale due to lack of sufficient weapons and equipment. As the quantity of arms and ammunition captured from government forces increased so did the number of raids and the size of forces employed. By midsummer of 1962 company size operations were quite common.

b. The savanna region in Eastland province, being the backbone of the country's agriculture, was the first territorial target area of the expanded operations. Through successful military operations against the government forces, the guerrillas extended their control in the area. By January 1963, in spite of repeated attempts by government forces to regain the initiative, the People's Liberation Army of New Freeland (PLANF) was in full control of an area extending from a point just south of East City along the coastline to the border between Eastland and Coastland provinces and extending inland an average of 50 miles.

c. Elsewhere in the country the expansion of military operations followed the same timetable adhering to a similar pattern varying only in so far as geographic factors dictated different detailed application. The fundamental common factors throughout the country was that the PLANF seized and maintained the initiative. Thus, by early 1963 the PLANF had succeeded in excluding government forces from the following areas: the southern foothills of the Alto Mountains north of South City and the

entire mountain areas of Westland and Northland provinces excluding the towns of Border Town and Mining City. In these areas they set up their major in-country bases. Government lines of communication between these areas and the rest of the country were successfully blocked.

8-2. Actions by Yumjab's Government (1963)

a. Alarmed by the rapid expansion of guerrilla operations and by the inability of its forces to effectively counteract them, the New Freeland government in May 1963, at the insistence of its military leaders and with very reluctant consent by President Yumjab, appealed to the United States for an increase in economic and military aid. The United States responded promptly by doubling the strength of its advisory element, substantially increasing the flow of military equipment to the country, and granting additional financial aid. The aim of this American response was to enable the New Freeland government to rapidly expand the size of its own military establishment. The guiding principle remained that U.S. military personnel, with the exception of Special Forces teams, were to refrain from active participation in combat operations.

b. Also in 1963, at the insistence of his political advisors, President Yumjab began an agricultural population relocation program and instituted a policy of food storage and rationing. In essence, this program resembled the "fortified hamlet" program tried in other countries. Peasants were forced to move into fortified villages with the idea of affording them better protection while preventing them from giving support to guerrilla elements. All food stores in a given area were moved into the village and strict accountability was demanded in order to prevent the people from slipping food

out of the villages to be given to the guerrillas. Apart from a few showpiece sites near Capital City the program never really got off the ground. The people resisted the idea of being forced to abandon their traditional homesites and the government did not have sufficient manpower to enforce its decrees.

c. By the end of 1963, the situation in New Freeland had not been much improved by the Yumjab government's actions. Having failed to give sufficient priority to a rapid expansion of its military establishment and wasting much of the American financial aid in poorly organized and mostly unsuccessful attempts at extending its political influence in the countryside, the civilian government became the object of resentment and distrust in the eyes of the country's military leaders. Much of the newly arrived military equipment and many of the American military advisors remained idle because there were no troops to equip and train. The new Freeland military leaders began to express the opinion that Yumjab and his cohorts did not seem very eager to adopt an actively militant attitude against the People's Liberation Army of New Freeland (PLANF). Some charged Yumjab with "neutralistic" aspirations implying that he was simply waiting for the opportune moment to make a deal with the rebels. In the meantime the PLANF was extending its control over more and more territory.

8-3. Military Coup d'Etat

a. In January 1964, the military, lead by General Bardo, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, overthrew the Yumjab government and formed a military directorate to govern New Freeland. The coup was bloodless and the members of Yumjab's government were allowed to choose between leaving the country or returning to the anonymity of civilian life. Yumjab himself chose exile.

b. One of the first measures of the military government was to declare a state of emergency and decree total mobilization. The New Freeland Armed Forces were expanding rapidly and by mid-1964 reached a total of 180,000

men. Most of these, as late as April 1964, were still training and not fully equipped. American delivery of equipment was increased to the limit imposed by existing poor port facilities. Most of the new units were concentrated in training areas around the major cities so that there was not telling effect upon the war effort. Operations against the guerrillas remained essentially defensive in nature.

8-4. Government Activities and Operations (June 1964)

a. By June 1964 the newly expanded government forces were ready to take to the field. American advisors were to be found at all levels down to battalion. Several American Special Forces camps had been set up in the Middleland province plateau where the population around Lake Major and Lake Minor showed a high degree of receptivity to anti-Aggressor propaganda when coupled with positive civic action to improve their standard of living.

b. In June 1964, favored by an unusual delay in the coming of the heavy rains, government Army columns fanned out of the major cities in Coastland and Middleland provinces in search of the insurgents who suddenly had become very elusive. Only sporadic contacts with indecisive results were reported. With the troops went joint U.S.-New Freeland civic action teams, the latter being dropped off in villages along the way. Small government outposts were established in the larger villages. A similar pattern was followed at the same time in central Eastland and in Southland with the government reasserting its control over much of Southland between Route 2 and the Neutralistan border. Thus the end of June saw what appeared to be firm government control established not only in the cities but in the countryside of the central plateau, half of Southland province, two thirds of Coastland province, and one third of Eastland province. All of Westland and Northland provinces, one third of Eastland and one third of Southland provinces were still under insurgent control. Control of the remainder of the country was disputed with both sides claiming full authority.

8-5. Forming Insurgent Regular Units

a. In the summer of 1963 the People's Liberation Army of New Freeland (PLANF) began to form regular units. At this time the estimated PLANF total strength was 37,000 personnel: 12,000 full time guerrillas in the regional units and 25,000 part time militia. The regional units, organized at the district and province level and subordinate to the local central committees, had been operating within their own geographical areas of responsibility. The militia was being used primarily as a village defense force and a major source of local intelligence as well as a manpower pool for the regional units.

b. Manpower for the regular units was drawn from two primary sources. The leaders, technical specialists and some of the rank and file were obtained through infiltration of personnel from Hostilonia. These infiltrators were New Freelanders who had been sent to Hostilonia for special training and Hostilonian Synthese personnel. A second source of manpower for the regular units was the existing regional forces. In guerrilla circles it was considered an honor to be selected for assignment to regular units; therefore, local recruiting presented no problem except that in order not to deplete the regional units PLANF leaders were forced to set up a rigid timetable and manpower management plan governing the formation of regular units. In general they attempted to keep the strength of regional units constant by replacing personnel shifted to regular units with personnel drawn from the militia. The militia in turn stepped up its local recruiting program.

c. Initially the PLANF formed platoon and company-sized regular units and only toward the end of 1963 did it begin forming regular battalions. Organization and training of the regular forces generally followed standard Aggressor doctrine for rifle units (figs 4-2-4-5). In order to cope with the consequent increase in demand for experienced advisors and more sophisticated military equipment, infiltration of men and materiel from Hostilonia was increased.

d. Infiltration from the north had been a

continuous process since the mid-1950's. At first it had consisted of only a trickle of experts, both military and political. In the summer of 1963 infiltration rates began to climb. By August of 1963 the estimated infiltration rate was 150-200 personnel a month. By the end of 1963 this had been increased to an estimated 7250 a month.

e. By the end of 1963, PLANF had approximately 12,500 men in its regular forces. Most of these regulars were at this time organized into 19 battalions. There were six battalions in each of the two major base areas in the Moranes and seven battalions at the base area in the Alto Mountains north of South City. In addition there were some independent companies in Eastland province.

f. During the last few months of 1963 the PLANF, in preparation for operations which would require shifting its best striking forces from area to area, began to establish a series of "safe areas" throughout New Freeland. These consisted of small mobile bases located in areas nominally under government control where equipment and supplies were stored. Usually located in heavily wooded areas, although at times located in villages friendly to the Aggressor cause, they served as temporary bases for guerrilla operations in the vicinity and as way stations for units moving from one major base to the other. Mobile field medical facilities were also located in the safe areas. The main characteristic of these safe areas was that they could be shifted from one location to the other rapidly and with a minimum of advance notice. The PLANF regular forces now possessed an enhanced capability to operate away from their main base areas.

g. During the first half of 1964, the PLANF employed its regular units sparingly. Government activity did not become aggressive until the June-July period at which time the PLANF ordered its forces to go into hiding and to avoid major engagements whenever possible. Thus the first six months of 1964 were spent in further organizing and training a rapidly expanding insurgent force. Ammunition factories and armament repair shops were located in each of the three large base areas. An officer school

was established in the Northland province base area and a noncommissioned officer school was established in each of the other large bases. Through increased infiltration, the rate had increased to an estimated 2,000-2,500 a month in June 1964, and local recruiting, the strength of the regular force by mid-1964 had reached an estimated 22,500. The regular forces were now organized into battalions and independent companies, and for the first time the regulars began to organize regiments. The independent battalion remained the basic maneuver unit but three regiments, one in each of the major base areas, were also organized.

8-6. Insurgent Operations August 1964-July 1965

a. The PLANF offensive launched in August 1964 consisted of two simultaneous campaigns. One campaign consisted of a series of operations conducted in the countryside to inflict heavy casualties on government forces and drive them back into the cities. The other consisted of extensive sabotage operations geared to disrupt government communications in the countryside and create chaos and confusion in the major cities. The PLANF had charge of sabotage in rural areas. The Political Cadre (PC) was responsible for the conduct of sabotage in the cities. Both organizations were selective in their use of sabotage as the insurgent leaders were looking to a time when they could gain control of the country and would need transportation and communication facilities for their own use. Damage of targets was rarely so severe that it could not be restored in two or three days, but the insurgents still hampered government operations by either interdicting repair crews or repeating the damage elsewhere.

b. The insurgent offensive was initiated in August 1964 with attacks on villages in government controlled areas. The insurgents struck suddenly and effectively overrunning government garrisons and ambushing reinforcements. In those villages with small or no government garrisons, the PLANF employed its regional units and assassination teams to murder or chase away members of the government civic

action teams and terrorize the villagers into submission. Whenever the government mounted large scale search and destroy operations PLANF threw its regular forces into action. Aided by superior intelligence and mobility the regular forces were generally able to concentrate their units in large enough numbers as to outnumber government forces in a given place at a specific time. Heavy casualties were inflicted on government forces making it unprofitable for them to move into the countryside. By choosing the beginning of their offensive to coincide with a prevalence of adverse weather conditions they neutralized the threat of the New Freeland airforce. In addition to inflicting heavy casualties on government forces, the insurgents captured large amounts of American war materiel and were progressively able to equip more and more people with modern equipment.

c. As the government forces in August-September 1964 lacked tactical air transport units, due to a combination of bad roads and inclement weather, they depended almost entirely on the rail system to shift troops and supplies. The insurgents, reluctant to inflict permanent damage on a rail system which they felt they would soon be needing themselves, devised a practical solution to disrupt rail transportation. PLANF sabotage teams removed sections of rail from many places on the country's railroads hiding the rails for future use. These locations were always at a considerable distance from the cities, so that government repair crews could be ambushed. In the few instances where government escort forces were too strong, the insurgents simply moved a certain distance down the line and while repairs were being effected in one place the insurgents sabotaged the rails in another. By November 1964, government forces had lost the use of the country's rail system as a means of transporting troops and supplies from one city to another.

d. In December 1964, the insurgents for the first time made a direct attack upon U.S. personnel. A political cadre sabotage team bombed a U.S. advisory billet in Capital City inflicting moderate casualties. This was followed by simi-

lar incidents—not all as successful—in other cities. In January 1965, the insurgents attacked two U.S. Special Forces Camps in the central plateau. They overran one 35 miles north of Central City but were repulsed with heavy losses by the defenders of the second camp near Lake Major. From February through June 1965, the insurgents limited their operations to reacting against government attempts to move back into the countryside. At the same time they consolidated their hold over occupied areas, trained replacements for the casualties sustained during the 1964 offensive, and organized new units.

8-7. Government Activities and Operations—1965

The Aggressor offensive which began in August 1964, changed what had appeared to be a hopeful situation for the New Freeland government into a situation which was more precarious than the one faced by General Bardo when he overthrew Yumjab. By early 1965, Government forces were again relegated to the cities as the insurgents controlled the countryside and communication between the cities was possible by air only. The remaining American Special Forces camps in the central plateau held on with the help of the lake area people but insurgent pressure was becoming unbearable. In June 1965, General Bardo was forced to appeal once again to the United States for an increase in aid both in quantity, and more significantly in quality. For the first time New Freeland requested the intervention of American ground and air combat units to assist in offsetting the advantages gained by the insurgents through an increased rate of infiltration of personnel and equipment from the north.

8-8. Arrival of U. S. Combat Forces

The United States, after careful deliberation, decided to assent to New Freeland's request for assistance. In August 1965, carrier based aircraft were ordered to provide tactical air support to New Freeland units. American helicopter transport units arrived in New Freeland in October 1965 and several ground combat and support units were alerted for deployment to New Freeland by December 1965.

8-9. Insurgent Operations July-December 1965

a. In July 1965, the PLANF resumed the offensive by attacking and successfully overrunning South City, a provincial capital. After looting the local bank, cleaning out the government army depot, and murdering several high government officials—including the province commissioner—they withdrew.

b. In August 1965, they ambushed a government battalion a few miles north of Middle City. In September 1965, two PLANF regular regiments attacked River City. For the first time the weather allowed U.S. and New Freeland tactical air to play a significant part in the operations and the PLANF regulars were forced to withdraw with heavy losses. During October-November 1965, there was a lull in large scale operations while small local attacks, ambushes and terrorism continued. In December 1965, the PLANF resumed the offensive but with mixed results. For the most part insurgent operations were of the type where a government force would be enticed to move out of a city and be ambushed. In a few instances helicopter-borne government reaction forces surprised the insurgents and inflicted moderate to heavy casualties on the ambushers.

8-10. Situation by December 1965

a. The end of 1965 saw the government forces in firm control of the cities and the insurgents claiming control of the entire countryside. This claim was a considerably exaggerated one in that the insurgents did not have the manpower to occupy the entire countryside nor had they succeeded in turning all of the rural population into pro-Aggressor supporters. Undeniably the insurgents controlled ground movement in most of the countryside and many villages had turned into insurgent strongholds. However, a considerable number of villages remained very reluctant supporters of the insurgents and only when forced at gun point. Insurgent strength in December 1965 was estimated to be: regular units, 50,000 men organized into 15 regiments, 25 independent battalions, 10 independent companies and various support type units; regional units, 12,000

men in 95 companies; militia, 40,000.

b. Government strength, by the end of 1965, in spite of high casualty and desertion rates, had reached a total of approximately 259,000 men under arms. In addition to an increase in personnel and general quality and quantity of

equipment, government forces now enjoyed for the first time other major advantages. These advantages were a tremendous increase in fire-power deriving from American tactical air support and a degree of mobility derived from the availability of American helicopter units.

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... the insurgents limited their operations to terrorism and guerrilla warfare. At the same time they established their hold over the area and trained operations for the coming campaign during the 1966 offensive and prepared new units.

8-7. Government Activities and Operations—1965

The Agreement of October which began in Au- gust 1961 changed what had appeared to be a hopeful situation for the New Yearland gov- ernment into a situation which was more pre- carious than the one faced by General Burtis when he overthrew Fongak. By early 1965, the government forces were again reduced to the extent that the insurgents controlled the country- side and communication between the cities was possible for all only. The remaining American Special Forces camps in the central plateau held on with the help of the late year govern- ment but the situation was becoming untenable. In June 1965 General Burtis was forced to spend some time in the United States for an increase in aid both in quantity and more particularly in quality. For the first time New Yearland requested the intervention of Ameri- can forces and air combat units to assist in restoring the advantages gained by the insur- gents through an increased rate of infiltration of personnel and equipment from the north.

8-8. Arrival of U. S. Combat Forces

The United States first sent a helicopter- borne command to New Yearland's request for assistance. In August 1965 combat units were ordered to provide tactical air sup- port to New Yearland units. American heli- copter transport units arrived in New Yearland in October 1965 and several ground combat and support units were added for deployment to New Yearland in December 1965.

CHAPTER 9

UNIFORMS, INSIGNIA, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

9-1. Uniforms and Insignia

a. Regional Forces and Militia. Members of the regional forces and militia usually wear the traditional garb of the New Freeland peasant which consists of a broadrimmed handwoven hat, loosefitting linen trousers and a cotton shirt worn outside the trousers. Inasmuch as the regional forces and militia do not have a rank structure, no insignia of rank is worn by personnel. Occasionally, an individual may wear a part of a uniform discarded by a regular, however, this practice is generally avoided because the uniform is immediately identifiable, thus hampering the blending into the local population by guerrillas being pursued.

b. Regular Forces. Uniforms, insignia, and rank structure of the regular forces are identical to those of the Aggressor armed forces (FM 30-102); however, branch and rank insignia are seldom worn in combat. As soon as the People's Liberation Army of New Freeland (PLANF) began to organize regular forces, uniforms were provided by Hostilonia. By late 1964, some uniforms and insignia were being manufactured by local factories in areas controlled by the insurgents.

9-2. Procurement of Materiel

a. Weapons and equipment for PLANF forces are acquired from many sources. Initially they were obtained from the caches left during World War II and from local artisans who fabricated some crude weapons. As additional guerrilla units were organized and operations increased, United States weapons and

equipment were obtained by recovery from the battlefield after engagements with New Freeland forces. The main source of supply however is Hostilonia, which early in 1963 began shipping materiel to base areas in the Morane Mountains.

b. In order to provide sufficient ammunition, PLANF established ammunition factories in each of the three large base areas. Also located in these base areas are weapons and equipment repair shops.

9-3. Equipment of Militia and Regional Forces

a. Militia units are issued materiel available to PLANF such as old model weapons and the crude weapons manufactured locally. Regional forces receive captured U.S. equipment and some outdated models of Aggressor equipment.

b. PLANF policy dictates that all members of the militia and regional units will not be armed. In most instances only 60 percent of the squad personnel are issued individual weapons but all carry hand grenades or Molotov cocktails. PLANF rationalizes that in any type operation some casualties will be sustained. The weapons of the casualties are then distributed to those without weapons.

9-4. Equipment of Regular Forces

Regular forces are the best equipped of all the military units. They are issued Aggressor materiel provided by Hostilonia and shipped to supply dumps located in the base areas in the Morane Mountains. See FM 30-102 for the type of equipment.

CHAPTER 10

INSURGENT ORDER OF BATTLE

10-1. General

a. The People's Liberation Army of New Freeland (PLANF), in accordance with Aggressor doctrine, has successfully enforced strict security measures to prevent its units from being identified and located. While regular regiments are subordinate to a region, their subordinate units, as well as their headquarters, move frequently, rarely operating in one location for an extended period of time.

b. Regular regiments are designated by arabic numerals, and have code names and code numbers, much like the regular Aggressor army. Often these units are identified in insurgent documents and verbal orders solely by code numbers. While the unit designation does not seem to change, the code numbers are changed very frequently, at times even daily. Battalions subordinate to a regular regiment are designated 1st, 2d, 3d battalion of parent

regiment. All other units subordinate to a regiment retain the regimental designation, i.e., medical platoon of parent regiment, supply company of parent regiment. All regimental units use the parent unit's code name and code number.

c. Independent regular units, those not subordinate to a regiment, have a combination numeral-letter or solely numerical designation. In addition they have code names and code numbers. Unit designations as well as code names and numbers are changed frequently.

d. Regional units, for the most part, are usually designated by words. These words may correspond to the name of the commander, the geographical command to which subordinated, or be simply a code name. The same unit may be known by more than one name at the same time and the identification undergoes frequent changes.

10-2. Identified Regular Regiments

Unit	Commander	Code Name	Code No.	Subordination	Last known location
1	Comdt De Unamuno	Montoro	22000	Westland Region	10 km north of Mountain City.
7	COL Thijm, J. R.	Monteta	Unknown	Westland Region	Lake Major Area.
10	COL De Villou	Foraju	Unknown	Southland Region	Foothills of Alto Mountains.
23	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Northland Region	10 km south of North City.
27	COL Mohr, F. R.	Unknown	Unknown	Eastland Region	Marshland southeast of East City.
*Unknown	Unknown	Danji	Unknown	Unknown	Eastland Province.
75	Unknown	Unknown	49001	Northland Region	30 km southeast of Border Town.
180	Unknown	Orato	94020	Westland Region	Unlocated.
Unknown	Blasti	Unknown	Unknown	Northland Region	Unlocated.
**Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	93600	Northland Region	Vicinity of junction of route 40 and route 60.

*Possibly a duplicate identification of the 27th identified above.

**Possibly a duplicate identification of unit commanded by Blasti.

10-3. Identified Regular Independent Battalions

Unit	Commander	Code Name	Code No.	Last known location
<i>a. Infantry</i>				
2	Von Krusenstern	Unknown	Unknown	Southland.
4	Unknown	Mezo	29104	Southland.
34	Unknown	Pardo	Unknown	Middleland.
93	MAJ North, A. V.	Unknown	Unknown	Westland.
175	Comdt Holland, O. M.	Treni	31918	Coastland.
524	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Eastland.
Monto	MAJ Monto	Unknown	29134	Eastland.
Popolo	MAJ Meitner, E. A.	Unknown	Unknown	Northland.
Revolucia	Guidi, Mario D.	Unknown	Unknown	Northland.
<i>b. Miscellaneous</i>				
1B Sig	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Northland.
14A?	Unknown	Unknown	10048	Northland.
*540?	Yen	Unknown	34063	Unlocated.
840Z Engr	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Eastland.
170B Arty	Crump, J.	Foco	Unknown	Eastland.
724Z Arty	Pascal	Unknown	Unknown	Southland.
863D Arty	Unknown	Unknown	47320	Westland.
Vinculo	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Westland.

* Possibly an Engineer type unit.

10-4. Identified Regional Units

Unit	Commander	Code Name	Code No.	Last known location
Kuglo Company	Hooch, W.K.	Unknown	Unknown	Westland.
Bando Company	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Westland.
Mordu Company	CPT Mordu	Unknown	Unknown	Westland.
Bastiono Company	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Southland.
Alas Company	Melas	Unknown	Unknown	Southland.
Kesto Company	Lt Kesto	Unknown	Unknown	Middleland.
Polvo Company	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Middleland.
842nd Company	Unknown	Bonamgio	Unknown	Middleland.
741st Company	Broussonet	Unknown	Unknown	Middleland.
Bonega Company	Lt Bonega	Unknown	Unknown	Eastland.
Tuta Company	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Eastland.
Deka Company	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Northland.
Le Play	Lt Le Play	Unknown	Unknown	Coastland.

CHAPTER 11

INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS OF INSURGENT MILITARY ACTIVITIES

11-1. General

a. In spite of all precautions taken to deceive the enemy about their probable courses of action, the People's Liberation Army of New Freeland (PLANF), like any other armed force, must inevitably carry out specific activities in preparation for or in conjunction with specific actions. Some of these activities may be essential to the intended mission, others may be dictated by the concept of tactics peculiar to the PLANF's irregular warfare doctrine. In many cases, these activities can be detected and when properly analyzed will allow the development of a reasonable estimate of the PLANF's probable courses of action. In order to do so a thorough knowledge of Aggressor—since the PLANF is Aggressor trained—and PLANF tactical doctrine is essential. FM 30-102 and this manual contain all that is known about Aggressor and PLANF tactical doctrine. In addition, some of the indicators of Aggressor activities contained in chapter 24, FM 30-102, when used in conjunction with the indicators listed below may prove valuable.

b. Since the type of operation emphasized by PLANF, and most often used in New Freeland, is the attack against fixed and mobile objectives, the indicators contained in the following paragraphs have been developed to aid in determining that a given objective has been targeted by PLANF for an attack.

c. Experience in New Freeland has shown that not all indicators for a given action will be seen in one place at any one time. Investigation of many instances of PLANF attacks against government objectives in New Freeland has revealed that in each instance a varying number of the primary and secondary indicators were available. The accurate and timely evaluation of existing indicators has served to

thwart several of the PLANF's carefully planned operations.

11-2. Indicators of Insurgent Attack

a. *Activities within the Area of the Objective.*

- (1) *Unusual behavior of civilian and New Freeland military personnel within the objective area.* This group of indicators includes all those acts and attitudes through which civilians and New Freeland military personnel show fear of remaining within the objective area. Among these acts are sudden increases in the desertion of New Freeland military personnel and insistent requests by civilians that they be allowed to leave the area. Since insurgents always attempt to recruit personnel within the objective to aid the attacking force, a discovery of such recruiting attempts may indicate that the area has been targeted for attack.
- (2) *Arrival of insurgent defectors, informers with information and documents.* This indicator is difficult to evaluate since in some instances bona-fide defectors bringing genuine documents and information have gone over to the government forces. It is a known standard PLANF procedure, however, to send in bogus defectors with fake documents tending to draw the attention of government forces away from the PLANF's intended objective. A sudden increase in such "defections," especially of personnel seeming to be highly knowledgeable of the insurgent's immediate plans, must be viewed as a possible indicator.

b. Activities in the Immediate Area (one kilometer radius) of the Objective.

- (1) *Unusual behavior by civilians living around the objective.* Insurgents may find it impossible to withhold knowledge of an impending attack from the local population. If the objective is within a normally inhabited area, such as a town, or a road marked for ambush where it goes through a hamlet, the local population may suddenly disappear. The sudden disappearance of the local inhabitants may indicate an attempt on their part to remove themselves from what they know is about to become a battlefield.
- (2) *Appearance of insurgent regular forces reconnaissance patrols.* Since close reconnaissance of the objective is an essential element of Aggressor insurgent doctrine, the detection of such activity in the immediate vicinity of a possible target for insurgent attack should serve as a definite warning. While insurgents in New Freeland have utilized covert intelligence collection means to obtain information about government installations and positions on a continuous basis, they almost invariably have dispatched reconnaissance patrols from the force earmarked for an attack during the last phases of the unit's preparation. Insurgent regular forces normally are kept in well protected base areas unless they have been designated to carry out an attack. Detection of the presence of regular forces in the vicinity of a likely objective, especially if engaged in specific reconnaissance activities, is a primary indicator of attack.
- (3) *Preparation of attack positions.* Aggressor insurgent doctrine emphasizes the importance of thorough preparation to insure the success of an attack. In New Freeland it has been found that the insurgents whenever possible launch their attacks from prepared

positions. Attacks, therefore, are often preceded by intense digging of trenches, foxholes and mortar positions. Some of these positions have been found as close as 200 meters from their objective.

- (4) *Planting of false information.* This is part of the overall deception plan. In addition to sending bogus informers and deserters with false documents into the objective, insurgents have at times planted false documents in the area around the objective with the hope that government patrols will find them.

c. Activities in the Vicinity (one to ten kilometers radius) of the Objective.

- (1) *Appearance of insurgent regular forces patrols.* Reconnaissance patrols may be detected prior to their reaching the immediate area of the objective b(2) above. PLANF reconnaissance personnel may often approach the objective wearing uniforms of the New Freeland forces. The observation and/or capture, in the vicinity of an objective, of PLANF personnel wearing uniforms and unit designations of the new Freeland forces manning the objective has often preceded an insurgent attack.
- (2) *Establishment of close in facilities.* Preparation of the battlefield is an important part of PLANF operational planning and involves both tactical and logistical considerations. This preparation includes the establishment of such facilities as ammunition and food dumps, medical facilities, and the preparation of mass graves in which to quickly bury their dead so as to prevent the enemy from accurately assessing insurgent casualties. All these facilities are established as close to the objective as possible. Some forward dumping areas have been discovered at 1000 meters from the objective.

(3) *Unusual activity of local populace.*

While the population in the area which is about to become a battlefield may tend to disappear prior to an attack, the people living in what might be considered the immediate rear of the insurgent's planned operation will also become involved. Standard PLANF procedure requires the gathering of information on the attitudes and reliability of the civilian population in the area of planned operations. Based upon this, the local population may be assigned a passive or active role within the scope of the operation. Thus the insurgents will engage in such activities as agitation to win local active support. Support of the local populace is necessary so that personnel can be recruited for such tasks as transporting supplies, digging mass graves, preparing supply dumps, evacuating the wounded, billeting the insurgents, and obtaining additional detailed current intelligence about the intended objective.

(4) *Unusual movement of insurgent regular or regional forces and heavy weapons.* All movement of insurgent forces should be observed with care and evaluated on a continuing basis. PLANF forces may not move directly toward their objective. In fact they often have been observed moving away from the objective during daylight hours only to double back under cover of darkness. In any case, PLANF units must move to the vicinity of the objective, bringing forward all available heavy weapons before attacking, and, according to their tactical doctrine, they must mass near the objective at the last possible moment. Such movement and massing, if detected in time, could provide valuable indicators of the PLANF's probable courses of action. Indicators in this category also include the sudden appearance of new PLANF units in the vicinity of the

objective, preventing the local populace from going into a given area formerly open to them, and the setting up of new road blocks. At times PLANF trained medical personnel will arrive in the villages around the objective with the overt purpose of providing medical care for the local populace but the type of medical supplies they bring will show their true purpose is to set up medical facilities in which to treat their own wounded.

(5) *Use of preparatory fires.* PLANF tactical doctrine, like Aggressor's, underlines the need for an attack to be preceded by artillery preparatory fires. In New Freeland the insurgents have followed this procedure using mortars, bazookas, and recoilless rifles to fire their preparation.
d. Activity Between 10 and 80 Kilometers from the Objective.

- (1) *PLANF operational planning and training for the attack.* PLANF unit commanders and their subordinate officers are always thoroughly briefed and in most cases study a planned operation through the use of terrain models, sketches, and maps. The operation is then fully explained to the troops who subsequently undergo a period of rehearsal and training keyed to the future operation. The capture of personnel who have trained and rehearsed for a specific operation, even when it occurs at a considerable distance from the objective, could prove to be a valuable indicator.
- (2) *Unusual movement of PLANF regular and/or regional force elements and heavy weapons within an 80 kilometer radius of the objective.* Troops designated to carry out an attack usually have been kept in areas well concealed and protected from the objective during the planning and training phase. A march of several days may be required to bring the attack forces into the immediate area of the objective.

Detection of the attack force during the movement phase, or of the arrival of the attack force's elements within an 80 km radius of an objective should be considered as an indicator of probable attack.

11-3. Examples of Indicators Available to Government Forces Prior to Specific Attack in New Freeland

a. Indications for a Reinforced Battalion Attack Against Government Stronghold B-58 in Middleland.

- (1) The government force desertion rate doubled.
- (2) Attack positions and foxholes within 600 meters from the government perimeter.
- (3) Several PLANF regular force reconnaissance personnel were captured.
- (4) Civilians were recruited in the nearby villages to aid in the evacuation of PLANF wounded; to dig a large grave; to supply unusual amounts of food.

b. Indications for a Two-Battalion Planned Attack Against A Government Depot and Division Headquarters Complex at Rezaville, Eastland.

- (1) Local civilian personnel were recruited to carry PLANF supplies.
- (2) Previously unreported PLANF regular forces were detected in the area moving toward Rezaville.

(3) Two insurgents were captured wearing the government army uniform and insignia of the unit assigned to guard the depot.

(4) Several PLANF regulars were captured 35 km north of Rezaville. During their interrogation it was revealed that they had been training for an attack against Rezaville.

c. Indications for an Attack Against U.S. Special Forces Camp Bravo in Middleland.

- (1) Civilians within the camp asked to leave the camp.
- (2) Civilian personnel in nearby villages reported the arrival of PLANF medical teams. Their descriptions of the medical supplies brought into the villages indicated they were intended for the treatment of a large number of casualties.
- (3) One PLANF deserter purporting to be a regular force company commander arrived at the camp. He revealed to the interrogators that his PLANF regiment had been alerted to move against a government district capital 40 km to the east thus having the area near the camp practically free of insurgent regular forces.
- (4) A U.S. patrol discovered, 48 hours prior to the attack, two lines of assault trenches linked with communication trenches 500 meters from the camp's outer perimeter.

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

DA PAM 310-series	Military Publications: Indexes (as applicable).
AR 220-55	Field and Command Post Exercises.
AR 320-5	Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
AR 320-50	Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.
ATP 20-5	Army Training Program for Field Training and Maneuvers.
FM 21-5	Military Training Management.
FM 21-6	Techniques of Military Instruction.
FM 21-30	Military Symbols.
FM 30-5	Combat Intelligence.
FM 30-31	Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations, Counterinsurgency.
FM 30-101-1	Esperanto, The Aggressor Language.
FM 30-102	Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces.
FM 30-103	Aggressor Order of Battle Book.
(S) FM 31-21A	Special Forces Operations (U).
FM 31-22	Internal Defense Development Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine.
FM 31-73	Advisor Handbook for Internal Defense and Development Operations.
FM 105-5	Maneuver Control.

APPENDIX B

INDICATORS OF AGGRESSOR INSURGENCY

As is true of Aggressor conventional warfare, certain indicators of insurgent war also exist. Those indicators applicable to the early stages of an insurgency are listed below. The list is neither all inclusive nor does every indicator apply to each country where Aggressor is conducting an insurgency. Those indicators pertaining to active guerrilla operations are outlined in chapter 11 where they are related to the conduct of guerrilla warfare in New Freeland. Both groups of indicators may be applied, with modifications, to any country in the world.

INDICATORS

1. Request for legal immigration of known or suspected revolutionists.
2. Identification of known or suspected revolutionists.
3. Detection of the smuggling of critical material (non-medicinal narcotics and other high value, quick cash, goods; medicine; hard currency; automatic weapons; propaganda and/or material necessary to produce propaganda).
4. Establishment of groups of questionable origin devoted to a cause.
5. Increased critical comment of unknown or questionable origin in national or local news media concerning in-country government or conditions.
6. Increased support of questionable elements in-country by Aggressor satellite countries through their propaganda media.
7. Strange women, men, boys, and girls visiting towns and villages.
8. Assassination or support of forced removal of strong anti-Aggressor personnel in the national or local governments.
9. Appearance of questionable doctrine in the educational system at the local level coincidental to key personnel changes.
10. Increased flow of political and other refugees between 20 and 35 years of age from Aggressor satellite countries.
11. Increase in the number of migrants in an area not known to need or use migratory labor.
12. Presence of unexplained trails and cold campsite areas in remote areas.
13. Reports, by inhabitants of remote areas, of groups of men moving through or remaining in a remote area.
14. Increased travel into isolated or remote areas from surrounding areas.
15. Refusals of peasants to pay land rent.
16. Organized agitation and unrest among various segments of the population as a result of causes for which there is no known reform movement or organization.
17. Appearance of literature among the populace alluding to the existence of a political group or party purporting to represent the "true" will of the people.
18. Announcement by an Aggressor satellite country of recognition of a government in exile purporting to represent the "true" will of the people of the target country.
19. Increased theft of explosives and chemicals which can be readily combined to manufacture explosives.
20. Increased pilferage from military installations or theft of obsolete and/or non-serviceable material slated for destruction.
21. Increased theft from salvage yards of metals, e.g., pipe, casings, wire, spikes, nails.
22. Discovery of various types of caches in an area e.g., weapons, explosives, medicine, propaganda, money (to include counterfeit).

23. A change in attitude toward the government, its agencies or laws, by a segment of the population in an area traditionally government supporting.

24. Drop in the voluntary enlistment rate or increase in AWOL and/or desertion rate in the Armed Forces.

25. Inability of local police and other security agencies to recruit and/or keep sources of information in an area.

26. Assassination and support of forced removal of government officials, including health, agricultural, educational and military officers.

27. Reports of abduction of young men.

28. Inability of the constituted government to collect taxes in an area.

29. Vigorous activity on part of agitation teams in villages.

30. Mass demonstrations by student, relig-

ious, minority and ethnic groups, advocating and presenting petitions containing demands and slogans.

31. Conduct of provocative acts (sabotage—terrorism—propaganda).

32. Forced destruction of government issued identification cards.

33. Kidnapping local planters for ransom.

34. Imposition of taxes on plantation operators.

35. Falsifying military identity papers and/or official documents used to gain entry into areas not normally open to the general public which are related to national or local defense, communications and transportation systems, and the production of electrical power.

36. Appearance of pro-Aggressor writings and/or slogans on buildings.

APPENDIX C

NEW FREELAND

Section I. GEOGRAPHICAL DATA

C-1. Purpose

The purpose of this appendix is to provide aid to writers in preparing scenarios for internal defense/internal development training exercises. Use of this appendix in conjunction with part II, especially in chapters 9 and 10, will enable writers to devote time necessary for the conduct of research to the preparations of scenarios. However, if preferred, scenarios may be prepared based on the situation in an existing country.

C-2. Location and Size

New Freeland, located between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn, measures 700 miles in width and 500 miles in depth at its extreme dimension. It covers an area of 367,500 square miles, making it approximately the size of Venezuela.

C-3. Boundaries

The portion of the boundary of New Freeland, which is formed by the northern half of the province of Westland and the province of Northland, coincides with the periphery of the Morane Mountains which rise in northern Westland and diminish eastward terminating in the foothills of western Eastland. The eastern half of this range is paralleled on the north by the Green River which continues east beyond the termination of the Moranes for some miles before turning south to empty into the Blue Sea. This river marks the northern and eastern borders of the province of Eastland in the northeast corner of New Freeland. Southeast New Freeland is bounded by the Blue Sea. The northern portion of the western border is coincident with the western periphery of the Morane Mountains, but, for the greater portion

of the west and south, the surveyed border does not coincide with any natural frontiers. To the north of New Freeland, separated from it by the Moranes, lies Hostilonia. To the northeast across the Green River lies Pacifica, and to the west and south, across a surveyed border, lies Neutralistan.

C-4. Topography

a. General. The salient feature of New Freeland's topography is the curious formation of the Alto Mountains which form a high narrow semicircle isolating a central plateau from a greater, nearly semicircular region of tropical savanna. The Morane Mountains, a lower broader range, lie along the northern border. On the slopes of the Morane Mountains tropical rain forest merges into the jungle vegetation of the valley lowlands. To the west and east the foothills of the Morane and Alto Mountains provide a sizeable upland region while to the west lies the Keinlager desert, New Freeland's only wasteland. A large fertile delta region lies along the southeast coast from the mouth of the Green River midway down the upper third of the coast of Coastline Province.

b. Mountains.

- (1) The Alto Mountain range constitutes not only a geological oddity but a prominent geographical feature that exerts a considerable influence on all phases of New Freeland life. Especially striking are the effects on the economy, communications, and climate. The Altos form a semicircle joined to the Morane Mountains in the east and west and enclosing a plateau in the center. Viewed from a northern perspective the configuration




Figure C-1. Map of New Freeland.

of these two mountain ranges resembles a cup inverted on a saucer. Although physically joined at two locations, the Morane and Alto Mountains are geologically separated ranges whose only relationship is proximity. The Altos are a moderately high volcanic range. They were probably formed somewhat earlier than the Moranes. Several peaks along the Altos reach elevations of 11,000 feet, but in general the elevation varies from 9,000 to 10,000 feet.

- (2) The Moranes have considerably less elevation and a greater width than the Altos. Of later origin, they are not a volcanic formation but, rather, they constitute a range of faulted mountains whose formation can probably be attributed in no little degree to the influence of the Altos. The Moranes rise in the extreme northwest corner of New Freeland where several peaks attain a height of 5,000 feet. From here the Moranes gradually diminish eastward with elevations ranging from 3,500 to 4,000 feet along most of their length. The broad slopes of the Moranes support huge rain forests that blend into the jungles in the Valley lowlands. It is the jungles and the forests, rather than the mountains, that so severely impede communications and make these mountains virtually impassable to modern means of land transportation.

c. The plateau. The main mass of the plateau is formed by lava flow and erosion, the latter originating mainly from the Altos with minor contributions from the Moranes. The mean elevation of the plateau is 2,000 feet rising slightly in the north under the effects of erosion from the Moranes. Although there are some shallow valleys in the tableland they are not significant, being generally unsuitable for either navigation or irrigation.

d. The uplands. Between the mountains and the savanna of the east and south and the wasteland in the west lie the upland regions.

The uplands are comprised of the foothills of the mountains and the sloping plateau that eventually merges with the savanna. In Eastland, Middleland, and on the western slopes of the Altos, rainfall and irrigation provide conditions for a flourishing agriculture.

e. The desert. Western Southland contains the bulk of New Freeland's only wasteland, the Keinlager Desert. The desert is an arid, stony, sandy plain interspersed with outcropping of rocky hills, some rising to an elevation of 700 feet. The mean elevation of the desert is 200 feet.

f. The savanna. Approximately half of New Freeland is tropical savanna. The savanna lies mostly in the east and south with a narrow projection into Westland. It is often difficult, because of the gradual incline of the plain, to determine just where the savanna ends and the uplands begin, particularly since the vigorous agriculture has obscured the differences in natural vegetation that once existed. Included in the term savanna is that rather sizeable area that is more properly defined as delta whenever it is convenient to do so.

g. Soils. In general the soils of the savanna are the lateritic soils (a clay which hardens on exposure to air) of wet-dry tropics interrupted with alluvial deposits. Alluvial deposits are especially prevalent along the major river beds, among the network of irrigation canals in Eastland, and in the vast delta regions. The soils of the central plateau is lateritic with a few alluvial deposits along the northern regions. Quite naturally the soil of the plateau closely resembles that of the Alto mountains. The Altos have chiefly lateritic soil zones with lithosols (imperfectly weathered rock fragments), including islands of podzolized (soils that develop in a temperate to a cold moist climate under a forest or heath vegetation) and alpine meadow soils at higher elevations. The rain forests have the lateritic soils of continuously humid tropics.

C-5. Climate and Weather

a. General. New Freeland has a climate which is essentially dominated by the monsoon seasons although the typical pattern and char-

acteristics of monsoons are considerably modified by the rather unusual geography of northern New Freeland. While there are four major identifiable climate zones in New Freeland nearly three-fourths of the country has a tropical rainy climate. This tropical rainy climate has produced the rain forests of the Morane mountains in the north and the tropical savanna of the broad sweeping plains of southern and eastern New Freeland. The curious formation of the Alto mountains has climatically, as well as geographically, isolated the central plateau which has a humid subtropical climate. A number of factors, not the least of which are these same mountains, have resulted in a tropical arid wasteland in the west. The Alto mountains themselves contain the fourth zone in the higher temperature regions.

b. Seasons; the monsoons.

- (1) In general the two monsoon systems prevalent in New Freeland cause the pattern of a rainy summer monsoon separated from a cool, dry winter monsoon by the hot spring intermonsoonal and the fall intermonsoonal seasons. During the six-month period from May to October the weather is dominated by the influence of the seasonal winds of the southwest monsoon. The summer southwest monsoon and the winter (Nov—Apr) northeast monsoon are wind systems caused primarily by differences in temperature between the land and the adjacent body of water. In the summer the high temperature over the land gives rise to a low barometric pressure. Since the adjacent body of water does not absorb and retain as much heat as the land a cooler air mass builds up above it. This is the condition that exists in the intermonsoonal period of April and May when New Freeland experiences its highest temperatures.
- (2) Sometime early in June this increasing condition of low inland barometric pressure and cooler sea air reaches its logical culmination as great indrafts of moisture-laden sea air rush towards

the interior where they form great ascending air currents. This "break" of the monsoon is characterized by violent, lashing rains as the winds, forced upward by the unstable currents and the general configuration of the land, unleash torrential downpours.

- (3) This rainy summer season which is inaugurated by the "break" of the monsoon in June lasts until October when the low-pressure system begins to break up. During the rainy season the inward-moving southwest winds are gradually forced upward by the increasing land elevation, releasing a fairly evenly distributed amount of precipitation until they reach the foothills of the Alto mountains. Although the winds have been dried out to no little degree in their passage across the land, the abrupt rise of the barrier presented by the Altos causes the heaviest concentration of rainfall to descend on the southern and western slopes. The peculiar configuration of the mountain ranges in the north gives rise to the conditions that sustain a rain forest in the Moranes, on the leeward side of the Altos.
- (4) Despite the rising summer temperatures a rather complicated set of circumstances involving the Alto mountains on one hand, and the effects of the continental climate of Neutralistan on the other, combine to create a high pressure system over the barren Keinlager Desert. The high-pressure anti-cyclone not only precludes the likelihood of rainfall over the desert but it diverts the southwest wind around the eastern periphery of the Keinlager Desert. Consequently when these winds pass the Keinlager and again swing into a southwest orientation they are north of the Altos and are free to run through the slopes and valleys of the lower Moranes often leaving a precipitation in excess of 100 inches.

(5) As the southernmost of the winds traversing the Moranes approach the eastern end of the range they are confronted with the interior wall of the eastern arc of the Alto semicircle. This formidable obstruction and the existence of a low barometric pressure over the plateau combine to draw the winds inward across the plateau. This situation is tantamount to the creation of an independent monsoon system although a rather dry monsoon, for it deposits only between 30-50 inches of rainfall. More often the amount is nearer the lesser figure but in spite of this, broadleaf semideciduous and broadleaf deciduous forest flourish amid surroundings of tropical savanna because of the ability of the soil to retain the water. This capacity of the soil for the retention of water is also very instrumental in sustaining the tropical rain forest through a dry season that is only occasionally relieved by rain.

(6) By October the general breakup of the low-pressure system causes the monsoon to dissipate into the second intermonsoonal season, the autumn season of October and November. The temperatures which were depressed during the summer rainy season by the cloudiness and precipitation now begin to rise again except that the relative conditions are now reversed. The sea absorbs and retains more heat than does the land, and a high-pressure system builds up inland. (The low-pressure system of the summer monsoon varies between 1002 and 1008 millibars, while the high-pressure system generally varies between 1014 and 1017 millibars.)

(7) The temperature does not reach the heights that it achieves during the spring intermonsoonal period and gradually begins to fall again as the cool, dry season extending from later November into March sets in. The air begins to move out approaching a peak

of high pressure in December. This season is frequently described as the retreating monsoon. It is characterized by northeast winds of lower velocity, clear skies, and cooler temperatures. The northeast winds vary from 0 to 10 miles per hour as opposed to the winds bearing the southwest monsoon which regularly achieve velocities greater than 25 miles per hour.

(8) The exceptions to the generally dry conditions that prevail over New Freeland during the winter northeast monsoon are, not surprisingly, found in the central plateau and northern rain forest. These two geographical and meteorological orphans are apparently involved in a conspiracy to establish an independent climate. Humid moisture-laden air rising from the rain forest is occasionally caught up and carried over the plateau by the local winds that circulate within the embrace of the Altos. The precipitation that is produced as a result of this phenomenon is instrumental in preserving the plateau from its logical fate as a desert wasteland. The plateau in reciprocation manages to produce locally varying conditions of high and low pressure which, when migrating across the Moranes, clash with the continental climate producing the rainfall that occasionally relieves the dry season in the rain forest.

c. *Rainfall.*

(1) Virtually all the rainfall throughout New Freeland occurs during the months of the summer monsoon with the highest concentration arriving in July and August. During this season the great savanna that extends throughout southern and eastern New Freeland often receives as much as 100 inches of precipitation in the wetter regions, although the average usually varies from 80 inches on the coastal plains to 60 inches in the drier inland regions. The wettest region,

the western and southern slopes of the Alto mountains, regularly experiences precipitation in excess of 100 inches.

- (2) The central plateau, which is cut off by the Altos and must rely on the diverted winds from the Moranes, receives anywhere from 30 to 50 inches of rain during this season, while the rain forests of the Moranes receive an inundation exceeding 100 inches.
- (3) After October the rainfall declines rapidly until November by which time it is negligible or nonexistent. The dry months of November through March are relieved by sporadic showers in the north caused by the eccentric behavior of the plateau rain forest climate, and occasionally in the East by the effects of the continental climate.

d. Temperature.

- (1) The temperature of New Freeland reaches its peak during the intermonsoonal periods with the hot season occurring during the March-May period. During this season Capital City, Middle City, South City, and the surrounding vicinities frequently record temperatures of 100 degrees F. Normally however the coast has temperatures in the lower 80's, relief coming from the sea breezes, while inland the temperatures mount to the middle 90's. On the plateau the temperature rarely exceeds the 80's. The rain forest of the Morane mountains maintains a fairly constant level in the 80's.
- (2) The break of the monsoon in June brings cloudiness and precipitation that depress the temperatures to the low or middle 70's. This relief from heat, however, is offset by the increase in humidity.
- (3) The autumn intermonsoonal season brings clear weather and slightly higher temperatures—nowhere reaching the peaks of April and May—which gradually fall off as the cool

weather sets in. Temperatures on the savanna hover about the comfortably dry 70's while the upland regions experience slightly cooler weather. Elevation seems to be the criterion for temperature during this season.

- (4) On the central plateau ground fogs are common during the cool season and temperatures often fall to the low 50's. In the rain forests the humidity keeps the temperature up to its normal level.

C-6. Strategic Areas

a. The most important strategic area of New Freeland is Capital City, not only because it is the nation's capital, but because it is also the only seaport of consequence, a national rail center, and the focal point of the road network. The city's harbor, located on the upper end of a long, narrow bay, is an all-weather port capable of accommodating ships of unlimited size.

b. The second most strategic area is Middle City which, like Capital City, is a rail center. Middle City is located in the center of the vast savanna and functions as a depot and distribution point for goods transported to and from the eastern half of the country.

C-7. Approaches and Internal Routes

a. There is no readily traversable route through the northern frontier of New Freeland because of the formidable barrier presented by the Morane Mountains and its labyrinth of tropical rain forest and jungle. The only plausible route is through the valley of the Red River, and this is by no means an easy access. Navigation of the river is difficult because of its swift current and many rapids which necessitate frequent portages. Travel by land through the valley is equally as difficult because of the terrain. Jungle extends to the river edge in many places, and there are steep cuts through the mountains on either side. The border between New Freeland and Neutralistan offers no substantial natural obstacle.

b. The only hazard to air navigation is the Alto mountain group of central New Freeland. Since the highest peaks reach an altitude of only 11,000 feet, the Altos do not constitute a

serious obstacle to modern air travel. Therefore all practical purposes, New Freeland may be regarded as readily accessible by air from all directions.

C-8. Coast and Landing Beaches

In addition to an excellent harbor at Capital City, and two lesser ports in Pearl City and Coast City, the coast of New Freeland is accessible to small craft along its entire length. This accessibility is the result of a relatively steep and short continental shelf and a beach that provides firm footing. In general, however, the northern half of the coast would be unsatisfactory for landing operations despite its accessibility. At the extreme northern end

there is the vast delta region and, although the mouth of the Green River provides an additional entry, the surrounding bogs and marshes would severely inhibit inland penetration. Below the delta region a long reef parallels the shore. This reef presents a serious obstacle to a landing on the mainland. South of the reef no such obstacle exists either off-shore or inland. Although existing charts of the coastal waters are incomplete and outdated, the channel into the Capital City harbor is clearly marked. This channel accommodates ships of unlimited size, and because of the steepness of the channel, medium-size vessels can approach rather near to shore.

Section II. TRANSPORTATION DATA

C-9. General

The following compilation of data on New Freeland transportation systems describes conditions as they existed *prior to the onset of the insurgency*. As of the end of 1965 the country's land transportation system has been effectively disrupted by the insurgents and communication is possible only by radio. The physical facilities described are still in existence, however badly in need of maintenance and repair, and if military control can be re-established over a given area, they may be put to good use.

C-10. Railroads

a. The inadequacy of a road network, which was incapable of supporting a sustained flow of heavy traffic, had made the railroads the life-line of commerce and transportation. Yet, the government controlled rail network at best barely fulfilled the minimum requirements for internal transportation. At that, several large cities including two provincial capitals, South City and East City, are without railroad accommodations.

b. The rail system is better described as a chain rather than a network because, except for a line running between Middle City and Coast City, it is simply one rambling extension running from West City south to Capital City,

and from there northeast to North City. Thus, a break anywhere along this chain of about 767 miles of broad gauge (5½ feet) line severs rail connection between eastern and western New Freeland.

c. Although Capital City handled the greater volume of freight, Middle City is the rail center of New Freeland. From Middle City, double track lines extend in three directions; north 185 miles to River City, south 115 miles to Coast City, and southwest 150 miles to Capital City. From Capital City another double track line extends northeast 173 miles to Emerald City. A single track extension from Emerald City 145 miles to West City and from River City 114 miles to North City completes the rail system.

d. In addition to the broad gauge lines, several narrow gauge trunklines branch off to connect various processing mills to the main line. These are relatively short spurs built by the former colonial tenants to bring machinery to the mill site, take the finished product out, and serve as a means of hauling agricultural raw material within the plantation to the mill.

e. Roadbeds on the spur lines are constantly eroded during the rainy season. The main lines are built along higher ground on avenues relatively unaffected by the erosion that often fol-

lows the torrential downpours. The roadbeds are built on high fills where natural high terrain does not exist. The beds consist of gravel in the subballast and crushed rock in the top ballast. The ties have not been chemically treated to prevent rot and therefore require constant maintenance. The average life of a tie is about ten years; less where wet conditions prevail. A relatively light (65 pounds per yard) rail is used.

f. The main yards, maintenance facilities, and the control and administrative center are located in Middle City. Extensive storage and cargo transfer facilities are found in all major cities. In addition, several rather sizeable cargo transfer areas are to be found at the junctions of the various spurlines. These also serve as collection and dispersal depots. Because of the "chain" arrangement of the rail lines, there are no alternate routes between any given points. Therefore, a break anywhere along the line halts traffic across that point. There are no elaborate bridges or tunnels, except for a bridge across the Red River near Junction City. Destruction of this bridge would create a lengthy repair problem. Destruction of the Middle City yards and control center would severely impede operations. The storage and freight transfer facilities are comprised mainly of impermanent easily replaced, one story, light wooden sheds. Therefore, in themselves, they do not constitute strategic targets.

C-11. Roads

a. There is only one sizeable all-weather road in all of New Freeland and it will not support a sustained flow of heavy traffic. This one "highway," Route 1, extends from a point 50 miles southwest of Capital City, through Capital City and Middle City to East City. The road is 15 feet wide with a crushed stone surface laid over a sand and gravel base the depth of which is generally determined by the rate of erosion at any given point. Through most of the lowlands it is built on a "dike" through which is laid culverts and drainage facilities to inhibit erosion.

b. The pre-insurgency traffic on Route 1 consisted mainly of animal-drawn carts, light ve-

hicles (trucks and cars under 1/2 ton), and new heavy vehicles. After being subjected to the heavy traffic of military convoys it began to deteriorate rapidly so that if control of it is regained by government forces extensive repairs will be necessary to make it passable to heavy vehicles. There are two major bridges on this road, one across the Red River, the other across the Blue River. These bridges, as all bridges in New Freeland, are sturdier than the roads they service. Constructed on wooden pilings with steel mesh road surfaces, they will support vehicles the size of heavy tanks.

c. The remaining roads are usually about eight feet wide which means that when vehicles meet one must pull over so that the other may pass. In the foothill and upland regions, these roads have gravel surfaces laid on sandy clay beds. In the southern savanna regions, the gravel surfaces are seldom over an inch thick, often becoming indistinguishable from the clay-like base. The road from Pearl City to Capital City is an exception because of the resources of crushed stone along the coast. This road, though narrow, is an all-weather road. On the other hand, the road from Coast City to Capital City is generally unreliable.

d. Military Road 11 leading northwest from North City through Mining City to Border Town, is little more than a trail in spite of the efforts by the New Freeland Army Engineers to improve it while they had control of the area. The difficulty involved in maintaining this route is rather obvious. The torrential downpours wash out all semblance of a roadbed. Generally for only three months of the year, December through February, was the road between North City and Mining City open to light vehicles. Occasionally during this time, a vehicle could continue the trip to Border Town, but it was seldom attempted. This road was primarily used by merchants taking out the hemp and rattan harvested by the Primi-people. Pack animals were used for this purpose, although at the height of the summer monsoon in June and July, it was often impossible for these pack animals to negotiate the trail.

C-12. Inland Waterways

The inland waterways of New Freeland are generally unsuitable for navigation, except perhaps to accommodate local traffic for short distances. The swift, fast falling streams so adaptable to hydroelectric projects are unnavigable. They empty into either the Blue River complex in the east or the West-Red River system in the west. Formerly, the Blue, Red, and Green Rivers were navigable during the rainy season when water was high, but during the dry season, these broad rivers, while still navigable, would accommodate only very shallow draft boats. However, over the years the growing irrigation system that depends on these rivers has diverted more and more of the water. Consequently, during the dry season, the frequent broad, shallow portions of the river interrupt navigation. As a result, the river traffic has been reduced to a very small volume carried on seasonally when the rivers are at their high water levels.

C-13. Maritime Transportation Facilities

a. New Freeland has only one port of commercial significance, Capital City. Capital City has an excellent, well-protected, natural harbor capable of accommodating ships of unlimited size. Ships with over a 28-foot draft, however, have to anchor alongside one of the several long wharves jutting out into the bay. These wharves, which are protected well enough to provide all-weather anchorage, are serviced by steam-operated traveling cranes and narrow gauge rail facilities. These same rail facilities serve the rest of the port area. Along this line small, antiquated steam engines shuttle cargo from traveling cranes on ancient vintage gondolas and flatcars. Only recently have a few wharves acquired modern cargo handling equipment in the form of foreign aid for New Freeland—mainly electric lift trucks and diesel tractors to replace the small steam engines.

b. There are also harbor facilities at Coast City and Pearl City, but these handle only the

local fishing fleet and a few coastal tramps that do a local trade. Coast City does have a natural harbor but it has not been exploited. Current facilities consist of two wharves capable of providing anchorage for ships with drafts up to 22 feet, but these are not protected all-weather anchorages. Moreover, unloading and storage facilities are outmoded and inadequate.

c. Capital City has no shipbuilding installations. It does have a few small, floating dry docks, but these are adequate only for the maintenance of the larger fishing vessels and the smaller coastal tramps—ships not exceeding 400 tons. The port and dock facilities include spacious warehouses and transshipment sheds, with considerable room for expansion. These facilities, however, are generally rather rickety, light-framed, one-story, wooden structures. There are a few concrete block and sheet metal buildings, but these are mostly still owned and maintained by foreign business interests.

C-14. Aviation

a. Capital City has the only airfield in New Freeland capable of accommodating large jet aircraft. Built primarily as an air force base by Atlantia during World War II, the runways and facilities have since been enlarged to conform to modern standards. Other airfields at Junction City and North City can handle all types of large conventional propeller driven aircraft, but at present the runways are too short for large jet aircraft. Commercial traffic in and out of these fields is light but there is a brisk military traffic.

b. New Freeland has no aircraft industry. The Government and Air Force have acquired their craft either through surplus or foreign aid programs. In addition to the commercial fields, there is a military airfield outside Central City which is used in conjunction with an Air Force training school. At present it can handle small jet aircraft on a 700 foot runway, but is to be expanded to accommodate larger aircraft.

Section III. COMMUNICATIONS DATA

C-15. Telephone Communications

Capital City, Middle City, Junction City, and Emerald City have separate telephone systems which were interconnected until the insurgents cut the cables. As of the end of 1965, the cables had not been repaired and intercity telephone communication was not possible. Capital City has the most modern exchange but by Western standards it is rather primitive. Intracity telephone communications are poor because of frequent interruptions and breakdowns due to inadequate cable capacity.

C-16. Telegraph Communications

The telegraph system, which was quite good but had a limited capacity, was the primary means of communications throughout New Freeland until the insurgents caused it to be inoperative. Initially paralleling the railroad

routes, thus connecting only those cities located on the routes, it had been expanded to all major cities except Border Town. The system is also not usable as of the latter part of 1965.

C-17. Radio Communications

The government radio station (the only one in New Freeland) transmits from Capital City through relay stations in Junction City, Middle City, and River City. Although the station in Capital City has a 500 watt transmitter, the relay stations are necessary because of the frequent violent weather disturbances that interfere with transmission. In addition, the government information bureau has a high frequency radio network connecting all major cities and strategic areas. Its main function is to maintain communications with all other areas of the country under government control.

Section IV. SOCIOLOGICAL DATA

C-18. Population and Ethnic Derivation

a. *General.* The population of New Freeland is about 21,300,000 according to the 1957 census. It is comprised of the following ethnic groups:

	Approximate Percent	Approximate No.
a. Synthese	70	14,910,000
b. Chinese	16	3,408,000
c. Indians	10	2,130,000
d. Primipeople	3	639,000
e. Occidentals	1	213,000

b. *Synthese.* The Synthese, the majority of the population of New Freeland as well as Hostilonia, came into the area they now occupy from the north during the first century AD. They speak Synthese, an Asiatic tongue. The Synthese represent a distinct ethnic group and do not regard themselves as having anything in common with the Chinese or the Indians. The cultural differences between the Synthese on the one hand and the Chinese or the Indians on the other are accentuated by the fact that the majority of the Synthese are of the Pathari religion, while a strong minority are Christians. The Chinese are Buddhist, and the In-

dians are largely Hindus. A growing Synthese middle class is coming into direct competition with Chinese retailers. This Synthese economic growth, along with the religious differences, provides another area of friction between the Synthese and the Chinese.

c. *The Chinese.* The Chinese constitute the largest foreign group in New Freeland. They began immigrating to the area that is now New Freeland in about the 16th Century. Through the years they have developed a highly influential role in retail trade throughout the country. Estimates of their participation in retail trade vary from 50 to 80 percent.

d. *The Indians.* The Indians, the most important non-Synthese resident minority after the Chinese, live in the larger towns and cities. An outstanding group is made up of merchants specializing in textiles, jewelry, precious metalwork, and of owners of better class retail stores. Another group is made up of moneylenders and moneychangers. Such middle-class groups compete with the Chinese more than with the Synthese. Other Indians work as la-

borers in and around the cities. Caste and geographical origins, together with concomitant kinship ties, are major determinants in the individual Indian's occupational status.

e. The Primipeople. Tribal groups inhabiting the mountain country constitute another element of the society of New Freeland. The tribesmen, known as Primipeople, lead a very primitive existence in isolation from the rest of the country. They are animists. The Primipeople, nomadic by nature, have a simple class structure. Certain individuals are known as chiefs, but there is little variation either in social standing or in wealth. They exist by gathering food in the forest, engaging in simple agriculture, hunting, occasionally working as harvesters and growing hemp and rattan.

f. Occidentals. The Occidental population of New Freeland stems mainly from the descendants of the old ruling colonial powers. The balance is made up of technicians and businessmen from Europe and the United States. Also a small number of Occidentals has been engaged in missionary work with New Freeland's large lower class.

C-19. Social Class Structure

a. The upper class, constituting about one percent of the population, consists of large landowners, highly successful professional people, business leaders, high government officials and military officers.

b. About nine percent of the population is considered to be in the middle class. Included in this group are subordinate government officials, members of the clergy, teachers, most business men, and owners of medium sized farms. This group is the spokesman for the masses.

c. The upper-lower class, about 20 percent of the population, is comprised of skilled laborers, government clerks, soldiers, store clerks, and most office workers.

d. The largest group, about 70 percent, in the class structure is the lower class. Included in this group are unskilled laborers, small farm owners, tenant farmers and landless farm laborers.

C-20. The New Freelanders

The average New Freelanders belongs to the lower class. He earns a living by either tilling the soil or working as an unskilled laborer in the shops and factories. Of short stature with a brown complexion, dark hair and eyes, he is considered a peaceful, hardworking, and very religious man. He resides, with his family which often numbers five or more, in a simple one or two room house made of local materials. With little available furniture, they sleep on straw mats placed in the center of the floor. Homegrown rice, the main stay of their diet, is supplemented by fish and homegrown vegetables.

C-21. Religions of New Freeland

a. Christianity. Christianity, embraced by slightly less than half of the Synthese was introduced into New Freeland by Monarchia, the ruling power in the sixteenth century. Due to the complexity of its religious beliefs, its followers were drawn from the better educated urban upper and middle classes. During the succeeding two centuries, through the efforts of a small group of missionaries, Christianity was able to draw a small percentage of followers from New Freeland's large lower class.

b. Patharism. The Pathari religion, with its strong Synthese following, was founded in the tenth century by the prophet Path Ban Hai. This is basically a dualistic religion incorporating such concepts as reincarnation and setting forth a simple set of basic conduct guidelines through which one can achieve the goal of reincarnation in a higher and better life-form at the end of one's present earthly sojourn. It appeals, for its simplicity and promised rewards, to the intellectually unsophisticated masses seeking reassurance that their present misery will not last forever. Although in competition with proselytizing done through missionary work by the Christian religion, Patharism has had little trouble drawing adherents from the rural and mountain areas and the unskilled laborers in the cities. In general, its followers have a low level of education. Considered to be a primitive and outmoded sect by the Christian Synthese, Patharism has been

able to develop a strong, devoted following.

c. *Buddhism and Hinduism.* Buddhism, with its Chinese adherents, and Hinduism, the religion of most of the Indians, are practiced by twenty-six percent of the population.

d. *Animism.* Animism, practiced by the Primipeople, is the most primitive of religious beliefs found in New Freeland. With its basic belief that inanimate objects and natural phenomena possess a personal life or soul, the various tribes have developed their own guardian spirits and elaborate rites.

C-22. Education

a. The bulk of the population of New Freeland is illiterate. However, the people have a deep and pervading passion for education and will often go into debt so that a child may go to school. Prior to the insurgency, the government had initiated a program for the establishment of elementary schools through the sixth grade level in remote, rural areas where illiteracy

abounds. The emphasis was placed on vocational and technical training to match the country's industrial expansion. Under the same programs, secondary schools were being established in the large population centers. The curriculums offered in such schools were basically academic, intended for those who wished to go to college.

b. With respect to university level institutions (in addition to Xavier and St. Francis Universities, run by Catholic teaching orders, and Christian University, run by Protestant missionaries), the central government, since independence, has created a system of public universities. State universities have been established in each of the provincial capitals. Northland State is located in North City. Southland State is located in South City. Eastland State is located in East City. Westland State is located in West City. Middleland State is located in Middle City. Coastland State is located in Coast City. Each of these universities had an associated teachers college.

Section V. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DATA

C-23. Governmental Structure

a. The military coup d'etat of January 1964 intensified the dictatorship qualities of the New Freeland government. The New Freeland constitution had been suspended by President Yumjab in 1955. The government structure as described in this section refers to pre-insurgency, and hopefully post-insurgent conditions. Governmental functions are being directed and supervised by General Bardo through his military command channels down to provincial level. From province down to the local level, governmental structure has been preserved but a military "advisor" to the government official at each level exercises the real power.

b. New Freeland is divided into six political subdivisions known as provinces. The provinces and their capitals are—

<i>Provinces</i>	<i>Capital City</i>
Coastland -----	Coast City
Southland -----	South City
Westland -----	West City

Northland -----	North City
Eastland -----	East City
Middleland -----	Middle City

Each of these provinces is divided into a number of geographical districts. These districts have no capitals and no administrative powers, as the towns and villages are controlled by the provincial capitals.

c. A single-chamber parliament, called the National Assembly, exercised legislative powers in New Freeland. Members of the National Assembly, called deputies, were elected for a four-year term of office by direct popular vote on the basis of one deputy for every 50,000 citizens. The President also was elected by popular vote for an identical term. He was both chief-of-state and holder of executive powers. He appointed a cabinet consisting of a Premier and ten ministers, all subject to confirmation by the National Assembly.

d. Assemblies, established in each of the six provinces, exercised powers limited to local aspects of government such as agriculture, sani-

tation, and forestry. A commissioner was the nominal central authority in each provincial capital. At the municipal level, elected town councils exist only in major urban centers. In smaller communities, local authority is vested in village chiefs.

C-24. Constitution

a. In the constitution of 1947, New Freeland is declared to be a sovereign, unitary republic in which "all powers emanate from the people." All citizens are guaranteed equal treatment. The constitution guarantees the voting privilege to all women over 18 who can read and write. For men, the voting age is also 18, but there is no literacy test required. Freedom of conscience, speech, press, and assembly is guaranteed to all citizens. Free enterprise and private property are protected, and the value and dignity of the individual are stressed.

b. The constitution also provides for the separation of church and state. All religious groups have the same legal status, and the government neither promotes nor hinders any specific religious activity.

C-25. Political Dynamics

a. Mytholonia obtained its independence from Atlantian colonial rule on 1 December 1947. The road to independence had not been one of violence and bloodshed. The moderation and lack of violence which marked the end of colonial rule in the country were to be ascribed to the political ability of Uttar Yumjab who led his very popular Mytholonia Independence Rally (MIR) through the non-violent struggle for freedom. Yumjab had founded the MIR in 1945 with the avowed purpose of obtaining independence for his country while avoiding the violence and chaos which characterized such an occurrence elsewhere in the world. With independence came the task of selecting a constitutional assembly and a government for the new nation. By agreement among the leaders of the country's political parties the voters were asked to elect a president and deputies who, after drafting the nation's first constitution, would stay on to form the first National Assembly. The voters were also asked to decide

whether the new nation should remain in the Atlantian Commonwealth.

b. The elections were held on 15 December 1947. The major contending parties were NFIR (New Freeland Independence Rally), formerly known as MIR, and Rab Isa's Popular Democratic Union (PDU). The NFIR had been long identified as the party for peaceful independence. It drew members from all social classes and ethnic groups, for the most part people who on religious or other grounds disliked violence, and, also in large numbers, people who were attracted by Yumjab's dynamic personality and saw in him the only national figure capable of bringing meaningful progress to the country. The PDU had been founded, also in 1945, by a radical nationalist group led by Rab Isa and had advocated the violent overthrow of Atlantian rule. Several of its leaders, including Isa, had been jailed by the Atlantians. When Atlantia granted the country independence without a struggle, it proved to the people that Yumjab had been right. The election results were a smashing victory for the NFIR which obtained 80.3 percent of the votes. PDU obtained 12.6 percent and the five splinter groups—ranging throughout the entire political spectrum—a total of 7.1 percent. Thus far the results had been predictable. The surprise came with the result of the referendum on continued membership in the Atlantian Commonwealth, 68 percent of the people voted against it. During his election campaign, Yumjab had not openly endorsed the Atlantian Commonwealth for fear of being named a tool of the former colonial power. The PDU had of course campaigned vigorously against the referendum.

c. One of the first acts of the new government was to officially sanction the will of the people by disassociating the country from the Commonwealth and then proclaimed the country to be a republic under the name of New Freeland.

d. During the period between the first and second elections, Yumjab's government had had to face the harsh realities of trying to run an independent country on its own. Having left the Commonwealth, New Freeland could expect little help from Atlantia. People at the

lower socio-economic levels were disappointed in realizing that freedom did not automatically bring with it all the good things which they had envied in their Atlantian rulers. Hard work and a meager existence still remained the lot of the majority. That the country by international standards was managing quite well and winning the respect of many in the free world meant nothing to the landless peasant and the unemployed urban worker. The Popular Democratic Union (PDU) leadership knew very well how to make political capital of the people's dissatisfaction.

e. The second elections were held in December of 1951. The New Freeland Independence Rally (NFIR) dropped to 55 percent of the total votes, the PDU went up to 40 percent and the splinter groups dropped to 5 percent.

f. President Yumjab became alarmed by the rise in PDU strength. While continuing to do his best to bring progress to the country, Yumjab sought ways to insure he would be given the time to carry out his design for a gradual but sure improvement. As the time for the third elections approached Yumjab's fear increased that further gains at the polls by the PDU would nullify all his efforts for the betterment of New Freeland. In September of 1955, making full use of his slim majority in the National Assembly, Yumjab forced passage of a new electoral law which combined gerrymandering with abolition of direct proportional representation. The PDU leaders reacted angrily to this maneuver but were essentially helpless in the National Assembly. As a countermeasure, the leaders of the PDU and those splinter groups of a similar political hue decided on a merger to reduce the effects of the abolition of proportional representation. Thus emerged a new political party, the People's Liberation Alliance (PLA), grouping all center left opposition elements under Rab Isa's leadership.

g. The third, and last, elections were held in December 1955. In spite of an almost 50-50 split in popular vote the New Freeland Independence Rally (NFIR) was awarded 70 percent of the seats in the National Assembly thanks to the new electoral law. The People's Liberation Alliance (PLA) leaders refused to

accept the election results and appealed to the people for direct action. Strikes and civil disturbances followed. On 21 December 1955, Yumjab delivered his "Declaration for National Unity" speech over the government's radio. He announced that the irresponsible acts of the leaders of the opposition had left him no choice so that for the good of the nation he was suspending the constitution, restricting civil liberties, and abolishing all opposition political parties. Yumjab claimed that the only solution for the country's economic and political problems was to have political stability. Political stability is possible only under a "one party rule"; therefore the NFIR was declared the sole legal party in New Freeland and only its deputies would be allowed to retain their seats in the National Assembly. Although Yumjab promised immunity from persecution to the members of the PLA, he made this conditional upon their tacit acceptance of his policies. In response, Rab Isa, Roda Khan, and other leading exponents of the PLA fled to Hostilonia where they quickly obtained political asylum.

C-26. Domestic Policy

a. New Freeland's dominant internal policy has been aimed at overcoming ignorance and poverty. President Yumjab had stated that the welfare of the people was the chief concern of his administration.

b. Some progress in the overall effort to improve education had been made in the late 1950's. The establishment of community schools throughout the country's rural areas and the creation of university-level institutions controlled by the state have been the principal achievements in the area of education.

c. In a drive to raise the country's standard of living, Yumjab's government made great efforts to increase both the quality and quantity of its principal crops. Farmers received demonstrations and free advice from state employed agricultural experts. Research institutions sought ways to combat plant disease and improve crop yields. Expansion of existing industries was encouraged and foreign investment was welcomed.

d. The political instability of the mid-50's

and the insurgent activities since 1962 dealt a severe blow to the hopes for a rapid modernization of the country and a significant improvement in the standard of living of the people. The present regime has been forced to subordinate its domestic socio-political and economic aims to the military task of dealing with the insurgents. During the latter part of 1965, the military and socio-political aims of the regime have been better coordinated and the latter have received greater emphasis than ever before.

C-27. Population Control

In 1956, the government of New Freeland enacted the National Registration Act, which General Bardo continues to enforce, providing a means of controlling the population through the use of the following measures:

a. *Identification Card.* Everyone over the age of 15 is issued an identification card. The purpose of the card is to distinguish New Freelanders from aliens. Included on the card are the bearer's thumb print, date of birth, place of birth, present residence, and occupation.

b. *Ration Card.* As a means of insuring the equal distribution of food, the head of each family is issued a ration card. The card contains the number of individuals in the family and spaces to indicate when certain items of food were purchased. As additional food items or amounts become available control of them can be maintained by the use of the cards.

c. *Employment Permit.* In order to obtain employment, an individual must register with the Department of Labor. Upon registration he is issued a card which must be presented to the organization where employment is sought. In addition to the individual's name and address, the permit includes a section to be filled in by the employer. Information in this section consists of the name of the organization and its location, the type of work and date of employment. A duplicate copy of the report is filed with the Department of Labor to facilitate control of the individual if he desires to obtain employment elsewhere.

d. *Birth Certificate.* At the time of birth a parent must register the child with the local

government. Verification of birth is obtained from another person present at birth, usually a midwife, and a birth certificate is issued.

e. *Death Record.* The death of an individual must be reported to the local government. The local government reports the fact to the next higher governmental level and also maintains its own record. Such records assist in the control of rationing.

C-28. Foreign Relations

a. As a result of the 1947 Referendum, New Freeland withdrew from the Atlantian Commonwealth. While retaining a cordial relationship with Atlantia and welcoming private Atlantian business enterprises and encouraging Atlantian professional and technical personnel to remain in the country, New Freeland adopted a generally neutral attitude in international politics.

b. By 1950 it became clear that some measure of outside economic aid would be needed in order to carry out an effective program of modernization in New Freeland. For this purpose President Yumjab, in 1950 while visiting the United States at that Government's invitation, appealed for and obtained American economic and technical aid. Yumjab insisted, however, that he be allowed to retain a position of nonalignment in his foreign policy. In spite of repeated urging from his military advisors in 1954, Yumjab refused to accept U.S. military aid and to join the U.S. supported regional defense alliance in that area of the world.

c. In 1956, faced with increasingly open interference by Hostilonia in New Freeland's internal affairs, Yumjab began negotiations with the United States to obtain protection from his hostile northern neighbor. As a result, a bilateral treaty of mutual defense was signed in Washington between the United States and New Freeland in December 1956. In addition to immediate military aid in the form of financial and material assistance, the United States pledged to send military specialists to assist in training the New Freeland armed forces and further pledged to provide any other assistance that country might request to defend itself against open or covert aggression

from a third power. In keeping with the provisions of this treaty, at the request of the government of New Freeland, the United States sent military advisors to that country in May 1957. Shortly thereafter the U.S. substantially increased its economic and military aid, and by the end of 1965 had begun to send combat units to assist in suppressing the Hostilonian supported insurgency.

d. New Freeland's relations with Hostilonia had been cordial until 1950 when the Aggressor supported Hostilonian Circle Trigon Party overthrew the freely elected democratic government of that country. Yumjab refused to recognize the new Hostilonian government. Since then there have been no official relations between the two countries but Hostilonia has embarked upon a policy of subversion and covert aggression which lead to the present situation.

e. New Freeland's neighbor to the northeast, the republic of Pacifica, is a member of a pro-west regional defense alliance. As such it has shown sympathy and given moral support to New Freeland's struggle against the Hostilonian aggression but since it is not bound to New Freeland by any formal treaty ties it has not furnished military support.

f. The other country bordering New Freeland is Neutralistan. This country has traditionally adhered to a strict policy of nonalignment. In recent years there has been a perceptible trend on the part of Neutralistan leaders to assume a more sympathetic attitude toward Aggressor, and consequently toward its satellites including Hostilonia, while proclaiming the continuance of a policy of nonalignment. On several occasions in 1965, the Neutralistan ambassador in Capital City has presented strongly worded protests for alleged New Freeland violations of the Neutralistan border.

C-29. Economy of New Freeland

a. Data on New Freeland's economy refer to the pre-insurgency period. Although by Western standards New Freeland was an underdeveloped country when it acquired independence, the resourcefulness of its people and the presence of some outstanding econo-

mists among its younger government officials had contributed to aiming the country toward a more prosperous future. The failure of the Yumjab government to achieve its economic objectives is attributed primarily to political factors. If Yumjab had been given time to carry out his program with the aid of American economic and technical assistance, New Freeland probably could have eventually been turned into a self-supporting country. The impatience of the New Freeland masses, exploited by foreign intervention, made it impossible to follow a sensible timetable for gradual development.

b. In pre-insurgency New Freeland, about 85 percent (18,105,000) of the population lived in rural communities; consequently, agriculture was the backbone of the country's economy. The vast majority of the agricultural population is Synthese, a much smaller number are Primipeople with the Chinese and Indians comprising the small remainder. The Primi-people, due to their isolation from the rest of the country, were not considered a part of the agricultural economy until the 1930's when they began raising cash crops of rattan and hemp.

c. Pineapples, sugar, and bananas are grown in the southern and eastern sections of the country and the western lowlands. These and tea, which is grown in the eastern and central upland regions, constituted the major export crops. Rice, of lesser importance as an export crop, is still raised extensively for local consumption. Persimmons, plums, and yellow watermelon are raised through New Freeland but they were never export crops.

d. Most of the essentials as well as the few luxuries of life are produced by small home industries. These industries for the most part are the responsibility of the women and children. Villagers in the north that have access to the rattan and hemp harvested by the Primi-people produce baskets, small articles of furniture and a coarse hemp cloth. In those areas where ores are available, some light metal work is done principally in bronze and copper.

e. Mineral resources exist in the provinces of Westland and Northland but they have not been exploited. Gas and oil reserves located northwest of Junction City offer the best pot-

ential for economic expansion. Bituminous coal exists in the region surrounding Mining City, but it is of such poor quality that it is not suited for coking. Because there is no iron ore, development of a steel industry is out of the question. Copper, gold and manganese are found in the Alto Mountain range but in too small a quantity to make mining of them feasible. Soft gold and silver are fashioned into jewelry as a minor industry.

C-30. Land Reform

a. In the mid-1950's land reform was one of the most pressing problems facing the government of New Freeland. Following independence, the vast estates of the plantation owners and the land belonging to the Christian Church were appropriated by the State and became national reserves. It was Yumjab's intention to make these reserves available to the peasants as rapidly as possible. However, many obstacles obstructed this reform.

b. First was the National Appraisal Act of 1949 which decreed that the government was to survey the land and determine a fair price for each parcel. The Act required that the land be appraised before it could be sold. The survey bogged down because of corruption and mismanagement. Often the peasants occupied the land without legal title and bitter disputes with the former owners as well as among the pe-

sants were common. In other areas, the land was overvalued and the peasants could not afford to pay for it.

c. Much of the land produced a profit only when cultivated on an extensive scale. This required large capital expenditures for fertilizer and farm machinery which the peasants obviously were unable to provide. Because of the expense involved, the government, in many cases, expropriated land and ran it as state-owned plantations causing the peasants to become bitter toward the government.

C-31. National Police Organization

The National Police, a constabulary force under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Interior, numbers 20,000 personnel. Half of the force is used to man border outposts along the Hostilonian boundary and checkpoints at the nation's two major harbors to supervise customs procedures and immigration. The other half is organized into 20 military-type battalions (TOE strength, 600; actual strength, 500). The National Police has the overall responsibility of maintaining civil control, performing civil counterintelligence functions and, when needed, to perform other police duties. After mobilization the member of General Bardo's directorate responsible for national defense matters assumed operational control of the National Police.

Section VI. ARMED FORCES

C-32. Control of the Armed Forces

Under the 1947 constitution, the President is commander-in-chief of the New Freeland Armed Forces. Most of his administrative and operational control of the military is delegated to the Minister of Defense. The Minister of Defense is assisted by six assistant ministers who advise him on matters pertinent to their particular fields. At present General Bardo has retained command of the Armed Forces but he has the equivalent of a Minister of Defense in his military directorate.

C-33. National Defense Council

The National Defense Council was the high-

est military and security policy advisory body. It convened periodically on order of the President to advise him on the status of the military and the internal security situation, and to establish security plans and policies. Permanent members of the Council were the President, who was the chairman of the Council, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Communications, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Interior, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The Military Directorate has absorbed the functions of the National Defense Council.

C-34. Command of the Armed Forces

The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces acted

as the Armed forces commander under the direction of the President. General Bardo retained his title of Chief of Staff after the coup d'etat. He is assisted by two Vice Chiefs of Staff. As a means of directing the activities of the military, there are a joint and a special staff.

a. Joint Staff. The joint staff headed by a major general has four departments: J1 (Personnel), J2 (Intelligence), J3 (Operations) and J4 (Logistics). Because the Army is the largest of the military forces, each department is headed by an Army officer with assistants being from the Navy and Air Force.

b. Special Staff. The special staff is composed of the Commandant of Schools, the Inspector General, and ranking officer of the various branches and services. Included in the latter are: Chief of Infantry, Senior Artillery Officer, Senior Armor Officer, Senior Signal Officer, Senior Ordnance Officer, Senior Engineer Officer, Judge Advocate General, Surgeon General, and the Comptroller. While the Commandant of Schools and Inspector General are members of the special staff, they are directly responsible to the Chief of Staff.

C-35. Composition of the Armed Forces

a. The Armed Forces are composed of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The mission of the Armed Forces is primarily to maintain internal security and additionally to provide defense against an outside attacking force.

b. As of December 1965, the strength of the New Freeland Armed Forces totaled 259,170: 253,170 in the Army; 2000 in the Navy; and 4000 in the Air Force.

C-36. Organization of the Armed Forces

a. General. The Armed Forces are organized into three separate commands: District Command, Training Command, and Strategic Command.

b. District Command. The District Command is composed of six military districts, one in each province. The senior military officer in each district acts also as military district chief. As such he has operational control over all Army, Navy and Air Force units, except those

of the Strategic Command, located within his districts.

c. Training Command. All training elements of the Armed Forces are a part of the Training Command. Included are the War Academy, the Military Academy, and all branch and service schools. The headquarters of this command is located in Capital City.

d. Strategic Command. The Strategic Command contains the striking force and reserve of New Freeland's Armed Forces. It is composed of independent tactical units of the Army, Navy and Air Force which are operationally controlled by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

C-37. Conscription

Compulsory military service is required for all males between 20 and 50 years of age but before the present emergency, only men between the ages of 20-22 were inducted. Conscription period was two years in the Army and Navy, and three years in the Air Force; it has been extended until the end of the present emergency. The physically disabled, the clergy, and individuals with a criminal record were exempt from serving. As the need for manpower increased, rules regarding the latter category were relaxed. There was a total of about 2,475,000 males considered fit for military service in New Freeland prior to the emergency.

C-38. Reserve

Approximately 100,000 officer and enlisted personnel, former members of the Armed Forces, were in the reserve. These personnel have, for the most part, been recalled to active duty. Reserve officers had been receiving about three weeks refresher training every two years. Enlisted reservists received little or no training, although it was authorized. Generally, reservists have been assigned directly to existing units without further individual training upon reporting for active duty.

C-39. Mobilization Capability

a. The manpower mobilization (M) capacity of New Freeland had been estimated to be as described below and as of December 1965 these figures have proven reliable—

$\frac{M+Day}{87,000}$	$\frac{M+15}{95,000}$	$\frac{M+30}{110,000}$	$\frac{M+90}{150,000}$	$\frac{M+180}{180,000}$	$\frac{M+1\ yr}{200,000}$	$\frac{M+2\ yr}{500,000}$	$\frac{M+3\ yr}{1,000,000}$
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b. Weapons and material mobilization stocks were adequate to equip only approximately 100,000 men, but the arrival of U.S. equipment has made it possible to reach the present active duty strength.

C-40. Status of Arms and Equipment

New Freeland produces only limited amounts of certain types of small arms and equipment. The bulk of its military equipment, especially major items (tanks, artillery, planes), is furnished by the United States. Maintenance of equipment is poor, but is slowly improving.

C-41. Munitions Industry

New Freeland has one arsenal (Capital City) and several smaller installations capable of producing limited quantities of small arms (rifles, machineguns, mortars), small-arms ammunition, medium caliber artillery shells, and landmines. Its munitions capability is hampered by a lack of skilled laborers and the need to import most of the required raw materials.

C-42. Strengths and Weaknesses

Strengths of the Armed Forces are well organized, trained and equipped units, sufficient arms inventory for forces presently on active duty, and troops inured to hardship. Weaknesses are low morale due to the present precarious military situation, dependence upon foreign sources for military equipment, and lack of technically trained manpower due to the low educational level within the nation. The morale situation has greatly improved by the arrival of U.S. combat support units and the expected arrival of U.S. combat units.

C-43. Capabilities

New Freeland's Armed Forces are capable of temporarily holding the country's major cities against insurgent attacks and if provided with air mobility are capable of undertaking offensive actions. Without significant increases in combat manpower to counteract the increase in insurgent manpower, the New Freeland Armed Forces are not capable of effectively

counteracting the present insurgent threat to the country's independence.

C-44. Organization and Strength of the New Freeland Armed Forces (December 1965)

a. The New Freeland Army has a total of 253,170 men organized as follows:

- (1) Tactical units: 157,850 in
 - (a) 12 infantry divisions (TOE strength, 11,242—actual strength 10,000 each).
 - (b) 5 separate infantry brigades (TOE Strength 4874—actual strength 4000 each).
 - (c) 1 guard brigade (TOE strength 4231—actual strength 4200).
 - (d) 3 armored regiments (TOE strength 1572—actual strength 1500 each).
 - (e) 8 separate infantry battalions (TOE strength 1024—actual strength 800 each).
 - (f) 6 artillery battalions (TOE strength 279—actual strength 270 each).
 - (g) 5 Air defense battalions (TOE strength 279—actual strength 250 each).

b. The New Freeland Navy has a strength of 2000 men manning naval operating facilities and 25 vessels.

- (1) Most of the vessels are of the patrol type but there are some landing craft which give the Navy a limited capacity of supporting the Army in amphibious operations.
- (2) New Freeland has three naval operating facilities: Capital City Naval Base, Coast City Naval Station, and Pearl City Naval Station. The two naval stations are subordinate to the Capital City Naval Base, which operates naval training and ship repair facilities. They are responsible for patrolling New Freeland's coastal waters, to the limits of tidal influence and navigable inland waterways. The

Force, the naval element of the Strategic Command, is also located in Capital City.

c. The Air Force has the primary mission of supporting the ground elements and the addi-

tional responsibility of providing air defense for the country. It has 4000 personnel and 97 aircraft of varying types organized into two wings: The Tactical Wing and the Support Wing.

The New Zealand Army has a total of 20,000 men organized as follows:

- (1) Tactical units: 17,800 in
 - (a) 12 Infantry Divisions: 17,000 strength, 11,500 actual strength, 10,000 each.
 - (b) 2 Separate Infantry Brigades: 17,000 strength, 4,750 actual strength, 4,000 each.
 - (c) 1 Guard Brigade: 17,000 strength, 4,200 actual strength, 4,200.
 - (d) 2 Armored Regiments: 17,000 strength, 1,750 actual strength, 1,000 each.
 - (e) 4 Separate Infantry Battalions: 17,000 strength, 1,054 actual strength, 800 each.
 - (f) 8 Artillery Battalions: 17,000 strength, 778 actual strength, 370 each.
 - (g) 2 Air Defense Battalions: 17,000 strength, 378 actual strength, 300 each.

The New Zealand Navy has a strength of 2,000 men manning seven operating facilities and 20 vessels.

Most of the vessels are of the patrol type but there are some landing craft which give the Navy a limited capability of supporting the Army in amphibious operations.

New Zealand has three naval bases: the main base is at Hamilton, Capital City; the second base is at Auckland, the third base is at Napier. The two main bases are subordinate to the Capital City Naval Base which operates naval training and ship repair facilities. They are responsible for maintaining New Zealand's coastal waters to the limits of tidal influence and navigable inland waterways. The

Army has made it possible to reach the present state of its strength.

C-40. Status of Arms and Equipment. New Zealand provides only limited amounts of certain types of small arms and equipment. The bulk of its military equipment, especially major items (tanks, vehicles, planes), is furnished by the United States. Maintenance of equipment is poor, but is slowly improving.

C-41. Munitions Industry. New Zealand has one arsenal (Capital City) and several smaller installations capable of producing limited quantities of small arms (rifles, machineguns, mortars), small-arms ammunition, medium caliber artillery shells, and landmines. The munitions capability is hampered by a lack of skilled laborers and the need to import most of the required raw materials.

C-42. Strength and Weaknesses. Strengths of the Armed Forces are well equipped, trained and equipped with sufficient armor inventory for forces generally in active duty and reserve forces to participate. Weaknesses are low morale due to the present economic military situation, dependence upon foreign sources for military equipment, and lack of tactically trained personnel due to the low educational level within the nation. The tactical situation has greatly improved in the years of U.S. combat support and the expected arrival of U.S. combat units.

C-43. Capabilities. New Zealand's Armed Forces are capable of temporarily holding the country's major cities against imminent attack and of providing with air mobility and capable of undertaking offensive actions. Without significant increases in combat power to counter the increases in Japanese strength, the New Zealand Armed Forces are not capable of effectively

APPENDIX D

EMPLOYMENT OF AGGRESSOR INSURGENT FORCES

D-1. General

The planning for the use of Aggressor forces in internal defense/internal development exercises (command post exercises, field training exercises, and maneuvers) is the same as for conventional Aggressor forces. Details pertaining to planning as well as training and employment of Aggressor forces are outlined in FM 30-102.

D-2. Uniforms

a. Guerrilla Units. For those exercises which use the country of New Freeland as a training vehicle, Aggressor guerrillas should wear the dress of a New Freeland peasant which is described in paragraph 9-1*a*. When an actual country is the setting for exercises, the dress of the natives of that particular country should be worn.

b. Regular Units. Regular units employed in internal defense/internal development exercises should wear the uniforms of Aggressor regulars described in FM 30-102, appendix III.

D-3. Equipment

Aggressor guerrillas employed in internal defense/internal development exercises should be equipped with old model weapons and equipment manufactured by any country and with civilian type weapons such as shotguns. Regular forces may be equipped as outlined in FM 30-102, appendix III.

D-4. Procurement of Uniforms and Equipment

a. Guerrilla Forces. No supply of civilian type clothing is available nor is there any practical means of converting U.S. Army issue uniform items to represent the dress of a peasant. Neither does a supply of old model weapons and equipment exist. Local commanders are encouraged to use initiative in improvising in order to make exercises as realistic as possible.

b. Regular Forces. Uniforms and equipment of regular units to be used in exercises may be obtained as outlined in FM 30-102, appendix IV.

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