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One-Time Pad OTP

The unbreakable code

The **One-Time Pad**, abbreviated **OTP**, is an **encryption technique** in which each character of the plaintext is combined with a character from a random *key stream*. Originally described in 1882 by banker Frank Miller (USA), it was re-invented in 1917 by **Gilbert Vernam** and Joseph Mauborgne. The **OTP** is named after the sheets of paper (pads) on which the key stream is usually printed. It can only be used once. When applied correctly, the **OTP** provides a truly unbreakable cipher. An automated form, used in combination with a **teleprinter (telex)**, is known as *One Time Tape (OTT)*.

The image on the right shows a page from a typical **OTP** booklet as it was used during the **Cold War** by **Eastern-Bloc** agents and spies, in particular by agents from the **Soviet Union (USSR)** and **East-Germany (DDR)**. The booklet consists of a stack of very thin sequentially numbered pages, each of which contains a series of random 5-digit numbers. Each page could only be used once and had to be destroyed immediately after use.



OTPs of this type were often used in combination with Eastern-Block spy radio sets, such as the **DDR Type 2** and the **Russian R-353 (PROTON)**.

This section shows a selection of **OTP** systems from various sources and countries. Although the exact operating procedure varies between **OTP** systems, we will try to provide examples whenever possible. Original **OTP** booklets are extremely rare as they were normally destroyed after use. The surviving ones are generally held by the intelligence services that either used or confiscated them.

OTP systems on this website



USSR

CZ

OTT

Theory

With a one-time pad (**OTP**), the encryption key has at least the same length as the actual message (i.e. the plaintext) and consists of truly random numbers or letters. Each letter of the plaintext is 'added' to one element from the OTP using modulo-addition. When the key is unknown, this results in a ciphertext that has no relation with the plaintext. At the receiving end, the same OTP is used to retrieve the original plaintext. For this to work, the following rules are mandatory:

1. The OTP should consist of truly random characters (noise).
2. The OTP (i.e. the key) must have at least the same length as the plaintext.
3. Only two copies of the OTP exist.
4. The OTP can be used only once.
5. Both copies of the OTP are destroyed immediately after use.

When the above rules are strictly obeyed, the **OTP** is absolutely safe. Combining numbers with the plaintext manually, is a time-consuming task. It is therefore sometimes thought that **OTPs** are no longer practical. With modern computer technology however, the entire task of enciphering and deciphering can easily be automated, just like it was done in the past on **teleprinter systems**.

Although it may sound strange, manual OTP ciphers are still being used today (2015) for sending secret

- Covert
- Radio
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- Telephones
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- Agencies
- Manufacturers
- DONATE
- Publications
- Standards
- For sale
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- Links

messages to agents (spies) via the [Numbers Stations](#), or [One-Way Voice Links \(OWVL\)](#), that you may have heard on the short-wave radio bands. For a detailed description of the One-Time Pad Cipher and its history, complete with numerous examples, we would like to recommend the excellent paper *Secure Communications with the One Time Pad Cipher*, by Dirk Rijmenants [3].

[► Read now \(off-site\)](#)

Distribution

The major disadvantage of the [OTP](#), is the logistical problem of its distribution. A unique pair of [OTP](#) booklets must be issued and distributed to each individual agent abroad. As the [OTP](#) will be destroyed immediately after use, sufficient and timely supply of new [OTPs](#) has to be guaranteed.

During the [Cold War](#), [OTPs](#) were often smuggled into a country by means of a [concealment](#), such as the one shown in the image on the right. This regular travel kit was cleverly converted into a concealment device by the [East-German Stasi](#).



[► More information](#)

Concealment

Another popular method for distributing and hiding [OTP](#) booklets, was by printing them at very small size and hiding them [inside common objects](#) like ballpoints, photoframes and, as shown in the image on the right, inside a walnut.

For many years, the walnut concealment was very popular with [KGB](#) agents in Western Europe, until it was discovered by the West-Germans.

[► Walnut concealment](#)
[► Other concealments](#)




Variations

[OTP](#) systems come in many forms and flavours, but most of them consist of either **numbers** or **letters**. An [OTP](#) based on numbers is also known as a One-Time Figure Pad ([OTFP](#)). When sending text, each letter of the plaintext has to be converted into a number before applying the [OTP](#).

An [OTP](#) based on letters is also known as a One-Time Letter Pad ([OTLP](#)). An example of an [OTLP](#) is shown in the image on the right. It consists of a stack of ~ 30 pages that are stapled together. The cover (just visible at the left) holds a folded alphabet that is used in the translation process.

Some [OTPs](#) are so small that they can easily be hidden inside a small object. More examples and detailed photographs below. Some [OTPs](#) are so small that they can be fitted inside a slide frame.



Compromise

When used properly, **OTP**s are inherently safe. But when they are used incorrectly, e.g. by reusing them, they can be a cryptologic nightmare. A good example of improper use is described by Matt Blaze in an article about the book *Compromised* by former **FBI** counterintelligence agent Peter Strzok [4]. He describes how secret **OTP**-encrypted messages were sent to Russian illegals¹ in the **US**, via a **Numbers Station** in Cuba which had a good coverage throughout the **US**.

The station would broadcast message in **morse code** and voice 24 hours a day, interleaving real messages with dummy traffic, so that it was not revealed to an interceptor how often and how many real messages were sent. However, the **FBI** discovered (as did others) that dummy traffic could easily be discriminated from real traffic, as it did not contain the number 9. This was probably caused by a failure of the random number generator used for the dummy traffic, or a bug in the software that handled it. With this knowledge, the **FBI** was able to correlate the real messages to the times that messages were decoded by a Russian illegal couple they had under surveillance. It eventually led to the arrest of an several Russian illegals in the **US** and Canada.

1. In the espionage trade, an **illegal** is a foreign person who lives in a country under a false or assumed identity, also known as a *legend*, for the purpose of spying.

Capture

OTP booklets, such as the one shown above, have been captured during the Cold War by Western intelligence agencies on a number of occasions. One documented example is the capture of a Dutch man, who acted as an East-German agent in The Netherlands, in 1969. When he was finally exposed, the Dutch intelligence service **BVD** (now: **AIVD**) found a partly used **OTP** booklet in his home, along with a fully operational **R-353** spy radio set, a **burst encoder** and **cassettes** [5].



► [More about the R-353 radio](#)

References

1. Detlev Vreisleben, *Personal collection of One-Time Pads*
Photographed by Crypto Museum. Köln (Germany), 20 March 2010.

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2. [Wikipedia, *One-time pad*](#)
Retrieved January 2013.
 3. [Dirk Rijmenants, *Secure Communications with the One Time Pad Cipher*](#)
Paper (English) 2009-2014. Version 6.2, 18 December 2014.
 4. [Matt Blaze, *A Cryptologic Mystery*](#)
18 September 2020.
 5. [AIVD, Short description and image of captured R-353](#)
Website. Retrieved November 2009.

Further information

- [Morse code](#)
- [The Vernam Cipher](#)
- [One-Time-Tape \(OTT\)](#)
- [One-Time Pad on Dirk Rijmenant's website](#)
- [One-Time Pad on Wikipedia](#)
- [Main Crypto Page](#)

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